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FROM THE EDITORS
one of the four key missions assigned the Naval War College has long been the 
education of future leaders. In 2007, the College of operational and strategic 
leadership (Cosl) was established as a component of the College to sharpen 
the focus of its educational activities in direct support of the fleet. In our feature, 
after these notes, rear admiral James Kelly, UsN (ret.), the current dean of 
Cosl, provides an account of what may prove to be the most important initia-
tive undertaken in recent years to review, align, and strengthen the policies and 
processes by which the Navy develops its leaders at all levels. (rear admiral ted 
Carter, President of the Naval War College, addresses this topic in his “President’s 
forum,” below.)  further reflections on military leadership today are offered later 
in this issue by retired Navy captain Chris Johnson, as well as by the distinguished 
military historian Williamson Murray in his extended essay on tom ricks’s 
widely discussed recent book The generals. 
the Naval War College’s War gaming department is located in McCarty little 
Hall, a state-of-the-art gaming and decision-support facility on the College’s New-
port campus. as Hank J. brightman and Melissa K. dewey remind us in “trends 
in Modern War gaming: the art of Conversation,” lieutenant William McCarty 
little, the founder of war gaming in the U.s. Navy, was a true innovator and vi-
sionary who devised an approach to war gaming that remains highly relevant to-
day. rather than seeking to use gaming tools to reduce complex interactions into 
artificially simplified terms, McCarty little understood clearly that warfare is a 
holistic experience that is at its heart a dialogue or conversation among comrades 
and adversaries alike. as the coauthors show, this understanding persists today in 
the way the department structures its games in such challenging contemporary 
areas as irregular warfare. a complementary discussion of contemporary gam-
ing is provided by stephen downes-Martin in “your boss, Players, and sponsor: 
the three Witches of War gaming.” Professor downes-Martin too focuses on 
the personal-interaction factor in gaming, but from a different point of view. for 
the unwary, it is too easy to overlook or underestimate the corrosive effects on 
the integrity of the gaming process of bureaucratic and personal imperatives 
on the part not only of the sponsoring organization but of the chain of command 
of the executing organization, and even the players themselves. Hank brightman 
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and Stephen Downes-Martin have had long experience as professor-practitioners 
in the war gaming Department of the naval war college.
along with war gaming, the study of naval and maritime history has been a 
central component of a naval war college education from its beginning more 
than a hundred and twenty-five years ago. The history of the royal navy re-
mains today one of the richest stores of naval experience on a global scale over 
a number of centuries. John B. Hattendorf, in “The idea of a ‘Fleet in Being’ in 
Historical Perspective,” traces the elusive and widely misunderstood concept of 
a “fleet in being” from its apparent origins in an anglo-French naval encounter 
of 1690 through the american revolution to the arguments surrounding it in 
the writings of British (and american) naval theorists in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. He makes the case that while a proper understanding 
of the concept can be a useful guide to action for an inferior fleet under certain 
circumstances, it would be unwise to elevate it to the status of a viable and attrac-
tive strategic option. John Hattendorf is the ernest J. King Professor of Maritime 
History and chairman of the Maritime History Department, naval war college.
The question of the options available to inferior fleets is taken up from quite a 
different angle by Maksim Y. Tokarev, in “Kamikaze: The Soviet legacy.” improb-
ably, yet persuasively, Tokarev finds in the Japanese kamikaze attacks of the last 
period of the Pacific war a model for understanding how the Soviet Union sought 
to solve the problem posed by american carrier strike groups over the course of 
the cold war. His analysis of the bureaucratically orphaned Soviet naval aviation 
community is of particular interest in understanding the ever-present challenges 
of joint and combined-arms warfare at sea. Maksim Tokarev served as an officer 
in the Soviet navy and later in the russian coast guard.
world war ii, needless to say, also remains a rich source of naval operational 
experience. in “‘winning’ the Pacific war: The Masterful operational Design of 
Minoru genda,” angelo n. caravaggio revisits the well-known story of Japanese 
planning for the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Using a neglected 
trove of oral interviews from the early 1950s, he makes the case that of all Japa-
nese naval planners, commander Minoru genda had the clearest grasp of the 
strategic and operational situations in the Pacific at this juncture and devised a 
plan to achieve what in retrospect appears to have been the only real chance for a 
decisive Japanese victory over the United States—a determined effort to eliminate 
Hawaii as a forward base for american military forces in the Pacific. Fortunately, 
genda’s ideas were too bold and unorthodox for a Japanese military leadership 
fatally handicapped by interservice rivalry and an inability to prioritize strategic 
options realistically. additional commentary on Japanese competence in the Pa-
cific war is provided by James P. levy in his brief review of the literature on the 
battle of Midway of June 1942. levy’s thesis in brief is that contrary to much of 
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this literature, the battle was not so much lost by the Imperial Japanese Navy as 
won by the U.s. Navy.
lieutenant Jimmy drennan, UsN, in “strength in Numbers: the Potential of 
(really) small Combatants,” sets out to use statistical analysis to test the argu-
ment put forward by Jeffrey Kline and Wayne Hughes, in the autumn 2012 issue 
of the review, concerning the merits of a “flotilla” concept for the U.s. Navy in the 
face of the challenge it confronts in the western Pacific by the rising naval power 
of the People’s republic of China. His conclusion is that a large number of even 
modestly effective small warships (smaller and cheaper than the littoral Com-
bat ship) operating independently of each other has better odds of defeating a 
major enemy combatant than does a single very capable combatant of one’s own. 
this certainly flies in the face of much conventional thinking not only about the 
cost-effectiveness of carriers and other large surface warships but also about the 
merits of net-centric warfare. (the essay itself represents a mode that we hope to 
revisit—see the item below.)
MaKing THe MoST oF THe online realM, in PrinT
In publishing the essay “strength in Numbers,” by Jimmy drennan, in this issue’s 
“research & debate” department (briefly introduced above), we think we may 
have found, with lieutenant drennan’s kind cooperation, a model for a useful 
synthesis of the strengths of online and print publication. His original “post” 
took advantage of the web’s ability to put a specialized piece of work efficiently 
before the eyes of a large, specialized audience of fellow “practitioners” and to 
collect their immediate responses. What appears in this issue capitalizes, in turn, 
on what a print quarterly can do—putting a fully thought-out synthesis before 
an even broader audience, including readers who don’t routinely enter the online 
world but are engaged with or interested in the issues. We’d like to keep up the 
momentum. Have you posted online a piece of this kind that has attracted such 
valuable responses, from which you might produce such a synthesis in essay 
form? We’d be delighted to consider it.
new FroM THe naval war college PreSS
the twenty-first in our Historical Monograph series—Blue versus orange: The 
U.S. naval war college, Japan, and the old enemy in the Pacific, 1945–1946, by 
Hal M. friedman—is now available for online sale by the government Printing 
office. the new book (a companion to the author’s 2010 Digesting History: The 
U.S. naval war college, the lessons of world war Two, and Future naval warfare, 
1945–1947) closely analyzes war gaming at the Naval War College in the academ-
ic year 1945–46, as both a reflection and source of the U.s. Navy’s doctrinal and 
strategic responses to the experience of World War II—responses that would help 
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the Navy shape its approach to the Cold War. Blue versus orange also describes in 
fascinating detail the practice of war gaming at the Naval War College in that era. 
iF YoU viSiT US
our editorial offices are now located in sims Hall, in the Naval War College 
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 335, 
309). for building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at the main 
entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (841-2236).
STaTeMenT oF ownerSHiP, ManageMenT, anD circUlaTion
statement of ownership, management, and circulation (required by 39 UsC. 3685, Ps form 3526-r, 
august 2012) of the naval war college review, Publication Number 401390, published four times a year 
at 686 Cushing road, Newport, r.I., 02841-1207. general business offices of the publisher are located at 
the Naval War College, 686 Cushing road, Newport, r.I., 02841-1207. Name and address of publisher is 
President, Naval War College, 686 Cushing road, Newport, r.I., 02841-1207. Name and address of editor 
is dr. Carnes lord, Code 32, Naval War College, 686 Cushing road, Newport, r.I., 02841-1207. Name 
and address of managing editor is Pelham g. boyer, Code 32a, Naval War College, 686 Cushing road, 
Newport, r.I., 02841-1207. owner is the secretary of the Navy, Navy department, Washington, d.C., 
20350-1000. the purpose, function, and nonprofit status of this organization and its exempt status for 
federal income-tax purposes have not changed during the preceding 12 months. average number of cop-
ies of each issue during the preceding 12 months is: (a) total number of copies: 8,781; (b)(1) requested 
subscriptions (outside Newport County): 7,404; (b)(2) requested subscriptions (inside Newport County): 
215; (c) total requested circulation: 7,619; (d)(1) Nonrequested distribution by mail (outside Newport 
County): 116; (d)(3) Nonrequested copies by other classes: 74; (d)(4) Nonrequested distribution outside 
the mail: 760; (e) total nonrequested distribution: 950; (f) total distribution: 8,569; (g) Copies not distrib-
uted: 212; (h) total: 8,781; (i) Percent requested circulation: 89%. Issue date for circulation data: summer 
2013; (a) total number of copies: 8,861; (b)(1) requested subscriptions (outside Newport County): 7,399; 
(b)(2) requested subscriptions (inside Newport County): 230; (c) total requested circulation: 7,629; (d)(1) 
Nonrequested distribution by mail (outside Newport County): 112; (d)(3) Nonrequested copies by other 
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 Who are the leaders in our Navy?If “four star admirals” is the response, that is the wrong answer.* the 
right answer is: every sailor, insofar as he or she is responsible for other sailors, is 
a leader in our great Navy.† from the most junior enlisted personnel to the most 
senior officers, all are a part of the leadership equation. Junior enlisted personnel 
need to be recognized as prospective leaders who have the potential for strategic 
impact through their performance—not as folks “who just follow orders”—just as 
senior officers are called on to be bold and decisive leaders with the responsibili-
ties of promoting and safeguarding the morale of those under their command. 
Indeed, all sailors must understand that we—individually and collectively as the 
Navy team—are accountable for the welfare of our shipmates, no matter our 
respective ranks.
leadership is not just about what we do, it is about who we are. being an ef-
fective leader requires more than mastering a checklist of skills. at its core, being 
effective leaders is about who we are as members of the naval profession. first and 
foremost, the naval profession exists to serve our country, to help accomplish our 
Furthering our advantage as the world’s finest navy requires developing 
leaders who personify their moral obligation to the naval profession by 
upholding navy core values and navy ethos; fulfill their obligations as 
leaders of character and integrity; and confidently exercise their author-
ity and responsibility with a strong and abiding sense of accountability 
for their actions throughout a career of selfless service.
navY leaDer DeveloPMenT STraTegY, JaNUary 2013
STRENGTHENING OuR NavaL PROFESSION 
THROuGH a CuLTuRE OF LEaDER  
DEvELOPMENT
* the epigraph is from U.s. Navy dept., The navy leader Development Strategy (Washington, d.C.: 
n.d. [January 2013]), available at www.usnwc.edu/navyleader. I would like to thank dr. olenda 
Johnson and dr. Carnes lord, in particular, and my leadership & ethics team in the College of 
operational and strategic leadership in general, for their invaluable contributions to this article.
† In this article, the term “sailors” represents both the enlisted members of the U.s. Navy and the 
officer corps, at all ranks and grades, e-1 to o-10.
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nation’s purposes and objectives, and to protect our way of life. every sailor, then, 
as a member of the naval profession is called to selfless service, to live by a set of 
core values, and to exhibit the ethos the Navy espouses. as members of the naval 
profession we possess specialized knowledge, skills, and expertise that enable us 
continually to achieve mission success. We are warfighters. at the same time, 
the naval profession has the responsibility of ensuring that our members uphold 
Navy standards and are developed as effective Navy leaders. Ship—Shipmate 
—Self applies here: the “ship” is the naval profession and the Navy’s global mis-
sion set; our shipmates are the members of our team whom we look after and 
who look after us, always; and “self ” is every sailor—the warfighting member of 
the naval profession dedicated to a life of selfless service to our nation and Navy.
so, where do we stand today in terms of how we set out to develop our leaders?
let us state the obvious: the Navy makes good leaders. Just look through the 
annals of history or the lens of today to witness the extraordinary leadership 
that sailors of all ranks have exhibited in times of both peace and war. for the 
most part, Navy culture dictates that leadership derives from command at sea—
which, many will agree, is a unique and challenging experience that demands 
self-reliance, independence, sound judgment, and confidence. Within the Navy 
culture, however, there is an expectation that leadership “just happens,” or that 
effective leadership is achieved through what admiral James stavridis, recently 
retired, has described as “transference”—“just do what I do and you will be a 
good leader.”* We may couple this with robust just-in-time training that ensures 
technical and tactical competence, and occasionally we augment our experiences 
with leadership training that focuses on a prescribed set of skills. In the end, 
though, we have a Navy culture in which leaders are forged primarily by experi-
ence and independent operation at sea. 
What this reflects is that as a Navy we have not deliberately attended to de-
veloping the person as a leader (with “leader” being about the individual, “lead-
ership” being about skills). What is lacking is an intentional process aimed at 
growing our sailors. Instead we tend to leave development of the sailor to chance 
or opportunistic events based on career timing or availability. Nor have we em-
phasized the significance of being members of the naval profession as we should. 
We seem to identify most closely with our individual communities first (“I am 
an aviator”) and our Navy second. Consequently, the way we tend to think about 
“leadership” development has excluded (perhaps unintentionally) a purposeful 
focus on cultivating leaders of character who embody Navy core values—honor, 
courage, commitment—and the Navy ethos. 
* adm. James stavridis, then supreme allied Commander, europe, comments during a briefing on the 
Navy leader development Continuum, Naval War College, Newport, r.I., 24 october 2012.
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furthermore, we must acknowledge that as a Navy we tend to undervalue the 
contribution of education in developing our sailors as leaders. We limit the time 
sailors are given to attend schoolhouses, or we seek to waive the requirement 
altogether. We mandate the shortest possible course lengths, while structuring 
career paths designed to maximize operational experiences. this has created a 
culture where going to the schoolhouse or attending war college is considered 
“time off ”—rather than an uncompromising investment in our people and in 
our profession. this must change. Consider the following, from admiral arleigh 
burke, in January 1959:
there is one element in the profession of arms that transcends all others in impor-
tance; this is the human element. No matter what the weapons of the future may be, 
no matter how they are to be employed in war or international diplomacy, man will 
still be the most important factor in Naval operations. this is why it is so important 
that under the greater pressure of our continuing need to develop the finest aircraft, 
the most modern submarines, the most far ranging carriers and the whole complex of 
nuclear weapons, we must keep uppermost in mind that leadership remains our most 
important task. 
admiral burke’s observation is as relevant today as it was more than fifty years 
ago. and this is why the Navy has embarked on extraordinary culture change in 
the way we develop our people as leaders—from the time a sailor voluntarily 
joins our great Navy to the time he or she departs.
How do we think more broadly about leader development for our sailors?
absent from our current leader development efforts is a continuum of learn-
ing that is systematic, integrated, and comprehensive. What we generally rec-
ognize as “leadership training” is for the most part disjointed and episodic, in 
some instances simply hit-or-miss. therefore, the first step in creating a culture 
for Navy leader development is to establish a career-long “leader development 
Continuum” from e-1 (seaman recruit) to o-10 (admiral, four stars), across all 
Navy communities, and from accession to retirement or conclusion of service. 
development of Navy leaders must, of necessity, be a deliberate and progressive 
process. Most importantly, this establishment of a career-long leader develop-
ment Continuum is driven by the conviction of Navy senior leadership that such 
an effort is essential for sustaining and strengthening the naval profession, now 
and into the future. Critically, this effort is not just another “compliance” program 
designed to remedy a set of problems. rather, it is the start of a long-term and 
proactive effort to influence the culture of the Navy and better prepare leaders 
for the future—a future characterized by increasing complexity and uncertainty, 
a future that brings its own set of new and unique challenges to the character of 
each sailor as a leader.
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so, it is within this context that over the last year and a half a dedicated team 
has been working to reshape the way the Navy approaches leader development, 
while laying the groundwork for a leader development Continuum. the foun-
dation for the continuum is the navy leader Development Strategy—quoted at 
the beginning of this article—signed by the Chief of Naval operations (CNo), 
admiral Jonathan greenert, in January 2013. fundamentally, the navy leader 
Development Strategy establishes expectations for building leaders who will con-
fidently and competently win our wars and meet the peacetime challenges of the 
increasingly complex maritime environment, as the scope of sailors’ responsibili-
ties grows. More specifically, the strategy serves as our Navy’s overarching guid-
ance and framework for how we align, in a deliberate manner, the multiple ways 
by which we develop our people through experience, education, training, and 
personal development. the latter element, personal development, entails cultivat-
ing self-reflection, critical thinking, moral growth, and lifelong learning—areas 
of leader development that have garnered little, if any, systematic attention in the 
Navy writ large.
the navy leader Development Strategy further describes the “leader devel-
opment outcomes” (ldos) that connect education, training, experience, and 
personal development, enabling their systematic alignment in order to optimize 
Navy leader development. the ldos are the character attributes, behaviors, 
and skills expected of Navy leaders—enlisted and officer—as defined for spe-
cific career-transition points. they set the leader expectations for each of us 
at all ranks, and they will be integrated throughout the leader development 
Continuum. foundational ldos are included in the navy leader Development 
Strategy; expanded ldos for enlisted personnel, warrant officers, and commis-
sioned officers were approved by the vice Chief of Naval operations, admiral 
Mark ferguson, in august 2013.
the CNo is leading this charge. the leader development Continuum Coun-
cil (ldCC)—a body of key stakeholders at the flag and master-chief level, chaired 
by the President of the Naval War College—is guiding the principal processes 
necessary for establishing a career-long leader development Continuum. the 
ldCC in turn reports to the advanced education review board (aerb), chaired 
by the vice Chief of Naval operations. Navy community leaders (type com-
manders) are charged with tailoring leader development continuums within their 
communities that integrate the unifying leader development outcomes while 
also recognizing the specific character and unique needs of each community—a 
process that is now well under way.
Where do we go from here?
our first priority in establishing a leader development Continuum is to le-
verage existing programs and structures. Within our Navy there are numerous 
development opportunities—whether through experience, education, training, 
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or personal development. these opportunities require aligning, synchronizing, 
and sequencing to enable systematic and progressive leader development. We 
are also looking to communities to share best practices; we can learn from each 
other. additionally, as gaps in leader development are identified we are pursuing 
ways to address them. Ultimately, we must be imbued with the mind-set—and 
operate with the conviction—that developing our people as leaders is central 
to our warfighting ethos. as the CNo notes in his opening letter in the navy 
leader Development Strategy, time associated with rigorous leader development 
is “complementary” to and “necessary” for the demands of technical and tactical 
competence. this is the extraordinary culture change we seek.
realizing this vision for leader development means the Navy must embrace in-
stitutional and cultural change. this is a vision that transcends our distinct Navy 
communities and extends beyond ensuring the mastery of specific technical and 
tactical skills. Indeed, rethinking the way we approach Navy leader development 
will filter into everything we do, including career management, evaluation sys-
tems, etc. We are preparing the next generation of leaders for three decades into 
our future. this culture change will take time and effort, but we cannot afford to 
say that it is too hard or too big, or that there is too much pushback, and not get it 
done. We have to do what we know is right for our Navy and our sailors. We have 
to do the best we can for our people as leaders, or our platforms simply won’t mat-
ter. although we know that competence reigns supreme, we also need to focus on 
developing leaders of character on the basis of our ethos and the unique qualities 
of naval service to strengthen the naval profession. Character is as much a core 
competency as technical and tactical prowess.
a final point. at the core of the profession of arms is a sense of service. by 
improving our leader development practices—and making the positive changes 
in our personnel and institutional systems that it will certainly engender—we will 
renew our commitment to the naval profession and the development of our sail-
ors as leaders who exemplify the highest standards of service. the navy leader 
Development Strategy states that “there is no higher priority than to develop effec-
tive Navy leaders.” We owe it to our sailors, our service, and our nation to ensure 
that our actions and our efforts fully reflect that priority.
rear adMIral JaMes Kelly, UsN (ret.)
rear admiral Kelly is dean of the college of operational and Strategic leadership 
at the naval war college in newport, rhode island. a former naval Flight officer 
(at his retirement in 2009 he was the longest-serving naval Flight officer on active 
duty), he commanded attack Squadron 115, USS sacramento (aoe 1), USS Con-
stellation (cv 62), carrier Strike group 5, and Task Force 70. 
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rear admiral walter e. “Ted” carter, Jr., became the 
fifty-fourth President of the U.S. naval war college 
on 2 July 2013. a native of Burrillville, rhode island, 
he graduated from the U.S. naval academy in 1981, 
was designated a naval Flight officer in 1982, and 
graduated from Top gun in 1985.
His career as an aviator includes sea assignments in 
Fighter Squadron (vF) 161, on board USS Midway 
(cv 41); in vF-21, the “Freelancers,” on board USS 
Independence (cv 62); in carrier air wing Five 
(cvw 5); in command of the vF-14 “Tophatters”; 
and as executive officer of USS Harry s. truman 
(cvn 75), culminating in command of USS Camden 
(aoe 2) and USS Carl vinson (cvn 70). Subsequent 
fleet command assignment includes service as com-
mander, enterprise carrier Strike group (cSg 12).
carter has served in numerous shore assignments, 
including vF-124, the “gunslingers”; in Fighter wing 
Pacific; as executive assistant to the Deputy com-
mander, U.S. central command; as chief of staff 
of the Joint warfighting center, U.S. Joint Forces 
command; as commander, Joint enabling capabili-
ties command; and as Director, 21st century Sailor 
office (n17).
He has led strategic projects, including the dis-
establishment of U.S. Joint Forces command, and 
most recently, was charged with leading Task Force 
reSilienT.
He is the recipient of various personal awards, in-
cluding the Defense Superior Service Medal (two 
awards), legion of Merit (three awards), Distin-
guished Flying cross with combat v, Bronze Star, 
air Medal (two with combat v and five strike/
flight), and navy and Marine corps commendation 
Medal (two with combat v). He was also awarded 
the vice admiral James Bond Stockdale leadership 
award and the U.S. navy league’s John Paul Jones 
award for inspirational leadership and was ap-
pointed an Honorary Master chief by the Master 
chief Petty officer of the navy.
He has accumulated 6,150 flight hours in F-4, F-14, 
and F-18 aircraft and has made 2,016 carrier-arrested 
landings, the record among all active and retired U.S. 
naval aviation designators. He has also flown 125 
combat missions in support of joint operations.
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tHe Naval War College is a multifaceted joint military aca-
demic institution, in support of the naval profession, composed 
of resident education for U.s. and international officers and focused on mari-
time research, regional studies, distance education, war gaming, and education/
programs at the operational level of war. each of these intricate areas has unique 
programs and initiatives, but their common underlying theme is their ability to 
educate our future leaders and to teach them to think strategically and operation-
ally. educating leaders is conducted not only at the War College but also at our 
off-site locations around the country, and the research products generated are 
world renowned. I would like to bring your attention to a new area of focus to 
which the War College has significantly contributed. although it is in its early 
stages, I would classify this work as potentially the greatest enhancement of our 
Navy’s professional development since John Paul Jones helped to establish it 
during the american revolution—the Navy’s leader development Continuum 
(ldC). 
In the fall of 2011, shortly after admiral Jonathan greenert became our thir-
tieth Chief of Naval operations, he tasked the Naval War College (NWC) to help 
him in executing his vision for a more detailed and involved leader development 
Continuum. being a visionary leader, he necessitated that the newly formulated 
ldC encompass all sailors from e-1 to o-10 and that it become an integral part 
of a comprehensive lifelong learning strategy, aligning experience, training, edu-
cation, and personal development during an individual sailor’s career. 
the rigorous process used to develop the strategy was led by the NWC’s Col-
lege of operational & strategic leadership. Initial analysis by the core group 
assigned to work this project, aided by faculty from the U.s. Naval academy and 
[navy’s leader Development continuum] marks a significant 
starting point for the navy and . . . full implementation will 
span generations.
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the Center for Personal and Professional development, found that the Navy was, 
in effect, on a course with no well-defined plan. there was no published strategy 
to guide Navy leader development. subsequent research revealed that while there 
had been much written on the subject of Navy leadership, the development of 
individual sailors as leaders was assumed to be a naturally occurring process and 
was not deliberately designed to achieve the outcomes desired. 
to ensure that Navy-wide input was received, the leader development Con-
tinuum Council was established to guide the effort. Chaired by the President, 
Naval War College, it was composed of flag officers at the one-and-two-star level; 
command master chiefs, who represented the fleet; experts from the training 
and education elements of the Navy; the bureau of Naval Personnel; and several 
type commanders who had responsibilities for community management (such 
as Naval air, submarine, surface, and Info-dominance forces). It was supported 
by military and Navy civilian experts at the o-6-and-below level. It also included 
support from a number of professional academics from NWC, the Naval acad-
emy, and elsewhere who were experienced in leader development. 
after many months of intense analysis and fleet-wide discussion, the navy 
leader Development Strategy was published in January 2013 as the first step in 
an effort to define a more deliberate methodology to develop each sailor into a 
leader for the future. In publishing the document, admiral greenert noted: “the 
purpose of this strategy is to synchronize the Navy’s leadership and strengthen 
our naval profession by providing a common framework for leader development 
—regardless of community—that is comprehensive in scope and enduring.”
this strategy is based on specific outcomes that are identified for various ranks 
as an individual progresses through his or her career. It stresses the primacy of the 
profession, being a sailor, as an individual’s first responsibility, followed closely 
by a focus on specialty qualifications (such as aviation, surface warfare, etc.). 
the overall strategy is agnostic as to designator or rating and relies on four core 
elements to develop each sailor as an individual leader: experience, education, 
training, and personal development. each of these core elements has a specific 
function: 
	 •	 experience is the principal means by which we develop leaders through practical 
application and learning. experience builds resilience and confidence through 
success as well as failure, and [it] fosters adaptation and innovation, while also 
reinforcing what was learned through education and training.
	 •	 education inculcates the fundamental tenets of Navy leadership, broadens the un-
derstanding of the naval profession, imparts advanced knowledge, enhances criti-
cal thinking, and fosters intellectual and character development. education also 
serves to contextualize past experience to enable the application of new learning 
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to future assignments, cultivate adaptive leader abilities, and provide methods for 
exploring and addressing unknowns.
	 •	 Training develops role-specific leadership skills and builds confidence and  
competence.
	 •	 Personal development focuses attention on individual strengths and weaknesses, 
enables personal evaluation, furthers reflection on Navy and personal values, and 
contributes to lifelong learning, diversity of thought, and moral growth. Personal  
development also includes performance evaluation, coaching, counseling, and  
mentoring.
Navy leadership recognizes that this strategy marks a significant starting point 
for the Navy and that full implementation will span generations. It is a long-term 
effort, and as we enter the fourth decade of an “all-volunteer” force, the strategy 
recognizes the need to develop deliberately each individual as a member of the 
naval profession. Unlike the commercial sector, the Navy must internally grow 
and nurture our future leaders. It is also important to recognize that this strategy 
is not a contractor-generated plan but rather a program developed entirely within 
our Navy family. 
the Navy now has the vision and clear direction to enable a comprehensive 
leader development plan with community leaders. this effort has become more 
than just a tasking: rather, it is a journey that will encompass generations to come, 
as the Navy’s leadership is committed to developing the leaders we need to ad-
dress the challenges we will face in the decades ahead. 
Walter e. “ted” Carter, Jr. 
rear admiral, U.S. navy
President, naval war college 
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Dr. Brightman is professor and director of applied re-
search and analysis in the war gaming Department 
of the naval war college, in newport, rhode island. 
He holds a doctorate in educational leadership and 
three master’s degrees (in holistic counseling, holistic 
leadership, and criminal justice administration) and 
is a certified clinical trauma professional. He is cur-
rently engaged in advanced study at the assisi insti-
tute of Brattleboro, vermont, in the area of archetyp-
al pattern analysis and its therapeutic application to 
individuals and systems. 
Ms. Dewey served as a student research assistant in 
the office of the Dean of academic affairs at the na-
val war college from 2011 to 2013 and received her 
Ma in holistic counseling from Salve regina Univer-
sity, in newport, in May 2013.
naval war college review, winter 2014, vol. 67, no. 1 
21
War College: Winter 2014 Review
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
TRENDS IN MODERN WaR GaMING
 lieutenant William McCarty little—a war-gaming visionary—was truly a man ahead of his time.1 although physically sight impaired and medically retired 
from active naval service, he opted to use his ideational vision and keen mind to 
support the Naval War College, in Newport, rhode Island, during its first few 
years of operation after its founding in 1884. Initially an unpaid volunteer, he 
was appointed in 1887 as a member of the faculty, where he developed two-sided 
war gaming at the College—a construct that is still in use at the state-of-the-art 
facility that today bears his name. 
often touted as the father of modern war gaming, McCarty little, who served 
on the faculty until 1915, understood that meaningful force-on-force gaming 
can occur only if two conditions are satisfied.2 first, decision makers must be 
provided with a suitable environment (referred to in the language of fields theory 
as a “safe container”) within which to develop strategies and contingencies.3 this 
container (i.e., a “setting in which the intensities of human activity can safely 
emerge”) must be more than simply a secure physical gaming space.4 Indeed, 
it must afford players intellectual security—a mechanism for sharing ideas and 
perspectives in a nonjudgmental, attribution-free environment, whatever in-
ner contradictions and inconsistencies may arise during the decision-making 
process.5 second, he set out to clarify and expand issues beyond the content of 
a particular game to garner deeper insights into complex problems. McCarty 
little appreciated the power to that end of dialogue, as well as the role of group 
processes in both micro-level systems (for example, tactical unit actions) and 
operational-level systems, such as battle fleets. 
The art of Conversation
Hank J. Brightman and Melissa K. Dewey
now the great secret of its power lies in the existence of the enemy, a live, 
vigorous enemy in the next room waiting feverishly to take advantage 
of any of our mistakes, ever ready to puncture any visionary scheme, to 
haul us down to earth.
Naval War College, War gaMINg dePartMeNt 
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like modern-day systems thinkers, working both intuitively and intellectu-
ally, he knew that it was important to understand the pieces that contribute to 
the whole system, not by dissecting them into individual parts and seeking to 
reaggregate them, but rather by considering the entire messy, often obfuscated 
processes that characterize systems such as naval warfare taken as a whole.6 for 
example, although much of his initial work was highly detailed and tactical, 
McCarty little introduced 
innovations in broader think-
ing, such as visual blocking 
screens “to restrict the fields 
of view of the players to those 
portions of the area of op-
erations that corresponded 
approximately to real-world 
conditions.”7 McCarty little’s development of two-sided gaming emerged from a 
desire to foster broader thinking and discussion while retaining detailed records 
of ship positions and statuses at the end of each move for further study and 
discussion. 
His ability to look beyond the notion of reductionism—the preeminent phi-
losophy in scientific thought during his lifetime—and consider broader complex 
problems without breaking them into pieces is remarkable, especially when one 
considers the sociopolitical environment in which his holistic concept emerged—
the latter portion of the Industrial revolution. In the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, naval culture was at a crossroads. although steeped in the 
traditions of the age of sail, navies had already begun trading their rich lore for 
the technological discipline of steam power and battleships. the last of the U.s. 
Sabine-class sailing frigates had been built. america’s navy had begun to embrace 
a new paradigm, firmly entrenched in the machine world, as well as a stalwart 
desire to seek more technologically focused solutions, such as enhanced com-
munications and command and control.8 
McCarty little understood the importance of examining the deliberative 
processes of an adversary. He considered the dialogue involved in two-sided 
gaming to be an essential component in achieving victory at sea.9 long after 
his time, however, beginning with the Navy electronic Warfare simulator in 
1959 and extending into the highly technical, simulation-dependent global 
War games of the 1980s and 1990s, Naval War College gaming tended to focus 
on the analytical outcomes of player actions rather than on pursuit of McCarty 
little’s view that an understanding of the deliberative processes employed by 
adversaries is at least as important as the objective data that games generate.10 
today McCarty little’s emphasis on exploring adversary thinking and decision 
Both Mccarty little and nimitz understood 
that the value of war gaming resides neither in 
its predictive abilities nor in its tangible move 
outcomes. rather, the true power of gaming 
may be found . . . in the dialogue that occurs 
within the . . . game cell.
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making remains a most appropriate but, as a result, perhaps inadequately con-
sidered mechanism for informing decision makers in today’s decidedly more 
complex warfare environment.
war gaMing in THe age oF reDUcTioniSM 
Much of war gaming’s pedigree is to be found in the enlightenment think-
ing of francis bacon, rené descartes, Isaac Newton, and Immanuel Kant— 
specifically, in the reductionist premise that the world functions as one great 
machine. this perspective contends that complex organisms or processes can 
be “taken apart, dissected literally or figuratively, and then put back together 
without any significant loss. the assumption is that the more we know about the 
workings of each piece, the more we will learn about the whole.”11 one early ex-
ample can be found in a rudimentary war game developed by dr. C. l. Helwig in 
1780. His chess-like board comprised multicolored squares representing various 
types of terrain. It was coupled with a single piece representing “a large body of 
soldiers or organized combat units.”12 Helwig’s game also included a referee, or 
umpire, in an effort to assess impartially the players’ moves. His process was the 
precursor of far more complex war-game adjudication processes that are used in 
two-sided gaming today.
Moving beyond this form of military chess, a scotsman, John Clerk, developed 
a demonstrative process for exploring the arrangement of ships, fleets, and lines 
of battle, a scheme that he ultimately published in both preliminary and revised 
forms, in 1779 and 1782, respectively. although Clerk was not a naval officer 
(indeed he had never been to sea), his efforts were well received by the military 
establishment. especially welcome was his analysis of game data pertaining to 
the relationships between wind and ship maneuvers and his assessments of battle 
damage resulting from naval guns.13 While some specialists today contend that 
Clerk’s work was not war gaming per se but essentially a modeling or simulation 
tool, his findings did make their way into actual combat operations; they were 
used by lord Nelson himself during the british victory at trafalgar in 1805.14
More importantly, Clerk’s efforts were grounded in linear, deductive thinking 
and in the application of mathematics and quantitative analysis to military prob-
lem solving. by the 1820s, such military thinkers as the Prussian war counselor 
baron von reisswitz and his son lieutenant georg H. r. J. von reisswitz had 
developed game boards, featuring realistic terrains and ranges, and employed 
complex adjudication tables and umpire-initiated dice rolls to assess the efficacy 
of player actions and the infliction of battlefield casualties.15 
the perceived value of these games often stemmed from military leaders’ 
desire to provide experiential opportunities for their officers without encumber-
ing themselves with the expense and liabilities normally associated with field 
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training. Moreover, to enhance the perceived accuracy of outcomes, new quanti-
tative tools (that is, simulations) were developed.16 these tools were pursued by 
the West in the ever-more-technology-driven world of the Industrial revolution; 
the result was the use of games more detailed and restrictive than strategy games 
of the past.17 for example, in the past, chess players had ultimately relied on 
their own cognitive thinking processes—experience, imagination, and creativity 
—to defeat an opponent. Quantitatively derived efforts at modeling, simulation, 
and adjudication rapidly overtook, and in some cases replaced, these thought 
processes. as Jung aptly noted, “in the West, consciousness has been developed 
mainly through science and technology—not through art, social interaction, cul-
tural development, or spirituality.”18 Imagination was rapidly replaced by tech - 
nological prowess.
the use of  lanchester 
equations at the height of the 
first World War made clear 
the inherent flaws of seeking 
to reduce human conflict to 
the sum of its parts. In 1916, 
frederick lanchester, a brit-
ish mathematician, sought to apply two equations—the law of squares to “‘aimed 
fire’ (e.g., tank versus tank) and the linear law to ‘unaimed fire’ (e.g., artillery 
barraging an area without precise knowledge of target locations).”19 as is the 
case with many simulations, lanchester’s equations failed to consider qualitative 
factors, such as “the effects of terrain or the differences in competence between 
equally sized and equipped forces of different nations.”20 this tendency to avoid 
qualitative inputs or, worse, mask them as seemingly numerically weighted (i.e., 
quantitative) data sets is an example of what has proved to be a recurring problem 
throughout the history of linear deductive thinking.21 
In fairness, some linear, deductive processes rooted in Western thought can be 
useful in thinking through complex problems, especially when such a thinker is 
confronted with another Western adversary or one who is simply willing to play 
by a Western-bounded rule set. However, as Ian Mcgilchrist notes in a treatise on 
the differences between the Western and non-Western brain, “People in the West 
characteristically overestimate their abilities, exaggerate their ability to control 
essentially uncontrollable events, and hold overoptimistic views of the future.”22 
Indeed, in such circumstances, there is actually very little difference between 
formal war gaming and engagement in such modeling and simulation processes 
as game theory. 
While it should be considered a valuable decision-making tool, game theory is 
in fact the ultimate expression of Cartesian-Newtonian thinking. It is an effort to 
indeed, failure to distinguish between the 
utility of game theory and that of war gam-
ing may result in the conflation of qualitative 
problems with quantitative solutions—a pos-
sible recipe for strategic disaster.
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resolve on a quantitative basis often highly complex problems involving multiple 
stakeholders and outside interests. Nowhere is the use of game theory more sub-
ject to bias than in situations where a Western-thinking player is confronted with 
a non-Western-thinking opponent.23 there are essentially two types of game-
theory models: the simple-form game (sfg) and the extensive-form game (efg). 
sfgs have two players, each of whom seeks the highest possible payoff at the end 
of a simultaneous move. these payoffs are numerically weighted and must be the 
same for both players. efgs, in contrast, consist of at least two players engaged in 
multiple move-for-move exchanges. In an efg, because each player’s preferred 
payoff can be achieved only at the conclusion of the game (as opposed to after just 
one move in the sfg), participants are generally less concerned with intermedi-
ate payoffs than with the ultimate one.24
of course, defining mutually agreed payoffs in the efg is far more compli-
cated than in the sfg, because the players must consider both short-term and 
long-term payoff values. Compounding this challenge are differences in how 
players perceive the values of these payoffs—especially, again, when a Western 
player is engaged in a game against a non-Western player.25 Moreover, as time 
progresses the efg becomes susceptible to influences from outside forces. these 
forces affect the willingness of both players to adhere to previously established 
rules. therefore, the overall stability of the game may be decreased. eventually 
players may engage in corrupt practices, such as offering side payments to other 
players in an effort to conclude the game.26
MiSTaKing gaMe THeorY For war gaMing
during the interwar years, from 1919 to 1939, the U.s. Naval War College, in 
Newport, rhode Island, engaged in a variety of war games and exercises against 
a variety of named adversaries and near-peer competitors. these games under-
pinned the development of a series of planning documents referred to as the 
“rainbow plans.”27 the most famous was Plan oraNge, which explored pos-
sible strategies and contingencies in a protracted conflict with Japan. by 1930 
the Naval War College had “made its exercise a grand production that included 
navy and marine faculty and student officers from Newport and Quantico.”28 
the data garnered from the games and exercises (along with those from other 
activities) associated with the rainbow plans made them collectively one of the 
most successful applications of naval war gaming in american history.29 Indeed, 
fleet admiral Chester Nimitz remarked in 1960 that the myriad explorations of 
Japanese tactics, maneuvers, operations, and strategies identified through gam-
ing Plan oraNge were to prove incredibly valuable to senior decision makers. 
Unfortunately, Nimitz’s comments were misconstrued at the time and contin-
ue to be misunderstood to this day.30 While Plan oraNge undoubtedly assisted 
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the United states and its allies in planning and execution during the second 
World War, its value did not lie in its quantitative nature.31 War games are not 
experiments. even if such events are repeated, they lack sufficient controls to 
be generalized. Neither are they models or simulations yielding predictive be-
havioral outcomes. If they were, game-theoretic models (such as sfgs or efgs) 
could be used instead. toward this end, one scholar of game theory notes, “there 
are fundamental reasons to be concerned about the possibility of accurately de-
scribing realistic situations exactly by [game theory] models [because] practical 
modeling difficulties arise when players’ beliefs are characterized by subjective 
probabilities.”32 
although descriptive quantitative techniques—for example, such basic statis-
tical tools as t-tests and analyses of variance (aNovas) on likert-style, survey-
based responses to determine participant cohesion or disparity between player 
cells—may be used in analyzing players’ decision-making processes, the bulk of 
data generated from war games is qualitative. Qualitative data can be grouped, 
binned, and discussed, but they are not amenable to the kind of quantitative 
modeling used for predictive purposes in the natural sciences. as dr. Kenneth 
Watman, a former director of the War gaming department at the Naval War 
College, writes, “War games can be a powerful way of developing questions, is-
sues, and provisional insights that must then be analyzed more vigorously with 
different methods. In this sense, war games can be an essential precursor to the 
process of [quantitative experimentation].”33 thus, it is important to understand 
the differences in appropriateness between basic quantitative modeling tools (like 
game theory) for considering stable, readily quantifiable problems and qualita-
tive decision making for the far more complex issues found in many war games. 
Indeed, failure to distinguish between the utility of game theory and that of 
war gaming may result in the conflation of qualitative problems with quantitative 
solutions—a possible recipe for strategic disaster.34 one such instance involved 
secretary of defense (1961–68) robert s. McNamara and his quantitatively ori-
ented “whiz kids,” whose failed efforts to prosecute a war in southeast asia were 
founded in a vast overextension of the inferentiality and generalizability of the 
findings of their parametric models of prediction.35 the whiz kids’ models could 
not account for qualitative differences between the United states and North viet-
nam and their respective desired payoffs and end states, because such differences 
“cannot be comprehended by linear models.”36
the american physicist and author fritjof Capra notes that “the process of 
model making consists of forming a logically consistent network of concepts 
to interconnect the observed data [and] . . . to gain precision, and to guarantee 
scientific objectivity by eliminating any reference to the observer.”37 Unfortu-
nately, with respect to military conflicts like the vietnam War, models fail on 
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two accounts. first, there are myriad inputs, both qualitative and quantitative, 
that must be considered in their construction, many of which negate the use of 
linear equations or parametric statistical techniques. second, since at least the 
appearance of Werner Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in 1927, successive 
generations of quantum theorists have moved well beyond anecdotal claims into 
the realm of empirical evidence to support the connection between observer and 
subject, even in the most tightly controlled experiments.38 If, that is, pure experi-
mentation and predictive modeling are influenced at the micro-level simply by 
observation, Watman’s quoted assertion about war-gaming technique’s being a 
precursor to analysis within the social sciences arena, not an analytical technique 
in its own right, is wholly appropriate. 
War gaming is not about the development of products purely for analysis. 
rather, it must also focus on process—the meaningful interactions among and 
between participants as they wade through waist-high “fields of conversation” 
and strive for shared meaning.39 rather than seeking to deconstruct highly com-
plex problems and processes, gaming should seek to explore a “holistic world-
view, seeing the world as an integrated whole rather than a dissociated collection 
of parts.”40 
caSe in PoinT: THe cUrioUS caSe oF canS
In March 2011, the Naval War College’s War gaming department was tasked by 
an external sponsor with developing an implementation strategy for the U.s. stra-
tegic Command’s (UsstratCoM’s) Concepts & analysis of Nuclear strategy 
(CaNs) project. UsstratCoM aspired, through CaNs, to develop a quantita-
tive probability tool for exploring issues of nuclear deterrence and escalation.41 
specifically, the tool had been designed to provide decision makers with predic-
tive values for how strategies and contingencies might fare within the nuclear 
domain; the meat of the simulations involved was to be garnered through the 
assignment by modelers of “values to the pair of parameters that show the causal 
strength . . . for each directed link that connects pairs of nodes.”42
as discussed above, the transposition of qualitative inputs into seemingly 
quantitative values is in itself a flawed approach, being subject to the biases of the 
modeler. However, many senior military decision makers, trained in the natural 
sciences (e.g., mathematics or chemistry) or engineering, are quick to embrace 
these outputs as offering more measurement reliability and validity than do 
“squishier” terms, phrases, and concepts yielded by qualitative techniques, such 
as grounded theory, ethnography, case studies, or content analysis.43 CaNs, in 
fact, sought to model complex strategic nuclear deterrence and escalation dy-
namics with qualitative data that were masked as quantitative and to produce 
information sets that were portrayed as complete. Ultimately, the result could be 
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a false sense of security in the value of the tool’s predictions of adversary actions 
in the nuclear arena.44 
both McCarty little and Nimitz understood that the value of war gaming re-
sides neither in its predictive abilities nor in its tangible move outcomes. rather, 
the true power of gaming may be found, both experientially and analytically, 
in the dialogue that occurs within the “safe container” of the game cell. Plan 
oraNge generated a vast series of events during which seemingly disparate 
elements of the U.s. Navy and Marine Corps (and to a lesser extent army air 
and ground forces, through cooperative efforts with fort leavenworth, Kansas) 
worked together to develop common goals and objectives.45 one scholar of 
strategic management refers to this process as the “necessity of complicating an 
organization” so that it can “develop a sufficiently varied account of the outside 
world that will make signals meaningful and that can be shared among its mem-
bers.”46 In short, Plan oraNge fostered group cohesion, which a distinguished 
psychiatrist contends inevitably yields the most meaningful outcomes.47 
exPloring THe groUP coHeSion ProceSS in war gaMing
In the late 1950s and through the early 1960s, at about the same time that francis 
McHugh at the Naval War College was writing about the technical aspects of 
war gaming in his seminal Fundamentals of war gaming, the social psychologist 
edwin Cohen, under contract for the department of the army, was examining 
the role and value of group cohesion. Much of the analytic value obtained from 
war-gaming data is a function of the safe container provided for the players and 
the phenomenological event of working together to resolve complex issues. Play-
ers cannot be separated from the story of the game as it unfolds, and this shared 
experience provides them with a common bond.48 
Cohen defines this bond as group cohesion, “a dynamic process that is reflect-
ed in the tendency for a group to stick together and remain united in the pursuit 
of its goals and objectives.”49 over time, a group reframes the individual distinct 
characters of its members into a collective identity that embodies the beliefs of 
the group as a whole.50 factors such as repeated exposure to an event or process 
influence the degree to which members of a group feel connected as they work 
toward the common purpose. group cohesion plays an important role in achiev-
ing military objectives: “those armies that have enjoyed the highest degrees of 
cohesion and combat effectiveness in the past have achieved such success” in part 
because members become “personally involved in the group task, and perceive 
that the team shares a common goal of accomplishing the task, facilitating the 
cohesion-performance relationship.”51 as the degree to which individuals feel 
involved in carrying out a task increases, the likelihood of success also increases. 
as individuals work with one another in a group, members often flourish as they 
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are positively influenced by surrounding individuals. the more individuals feel 
involved and needed in the group, the more they will likely invest in helping 
achieve the group’s goal.52 Indeed, individual specialties must “come together in 
convocation,” and this convocation yields “conversation.”53 It is this conversation 
that, as McCarty little discovered more than 125 years ago, is at the heart of the 
war-gaming experience. 
Myriad games conducted at the Naval War College during the past five years 
have demonstrated that rigidity—marked by highly structured and formally 
organized relationships—does little to engender conversation or foster cohe-
sion. Whether this rigidity is 
rooted in an autocratic leader 
or restrictive policies or in-
structions, it often proves det-
rimental to effective working 
relationships.54 
one such case study in the valuable role that cohesion may play in execut-
ing a successful strategy can be found in the 2008 final destination 2 (fd2) 
game-design test. against a background of six, highly complex homeland- 
security/homeland-defense vignettes, each event building on the one before, 
fd2 sought to explore two specific issues related to group process and cohesion. 
the first of these issues was to determine whether a relationship could be iden-
tified between the quantity of information provided to a player cell, perceived 
group cohesion, and the cell’s internal decision-making process while countering 
an asymmetrically thinking adversary. the second issue was to examine possible 
relationships among the quantity of information provided to a player cell, per-
ceived group cohesion, and the cell’s ability to develop courses of action at the 
operational level of war. 
two player cells were provided the same vignettes, each cell consisting of per-
sonnel comparable in terms of age, race, gender, education, occupation, person-
ality style (based on the Keirsey temperament sorter), and years of experience.55 
However, cell number one was provided with all the data it desired, as expressed 
by its requests for information (rfIs) throughout the game. Cell two was afforded 
only limited responses to its rfIs. Neither cell was aware that there were differ-
ences in the quantity of data being provided. 
fd2 informed the Naval War College’s war-gaming faculty that player access 
to as much information as desired might not be optimal. for example, cell two 
(which did not receive responses to all its rfIs) conducted moves at a broader 
operational level than cell one and was more effective in using inductive think-
ing to counter the seemingly disparate threats presented in the game. Moreover, 
cell two’s individual responses for both the open-ended and likert-scale (i.e., 
while it should be considered a valuable  
decision-making tool, game theory is in fact 
the ultimate expression of cartesian- 
newtonian thinking.
30
Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 1, Art. 20
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss1/20
 2 6  Nava l  Wa r  C o l l e g e  r e v I e W
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”) qualitative surveys suggested a greater lev-
el of group cohesion than in cell one. this trend appeared immediately after the 
first move and continued throughout game play. for its part, cell one focused its 
moves tactically and emphasized deductive thinking (even when its hypotheses 
were not bearing fruit); its members, as indicated by survey responses, perceived 
that they had achieved little group cohesion throughout game play. 
this game did not prove that there is a relationship between quantity of 
information desired, group cohesion, and success in combating asymmetrical 
threats. rather, it provided decision makers with useful insights into processes 
and practices in a way that would not have been possible using game theory or 
linear modeling. 
gaMing coMPlex iSSUeS
the modern U.s. Navy carries out the most diverse missions of any maritime 
service in the world.56 given the complexity of these assignments, an ability to 
function within a large, systemic network comprising micro-level groups is es-
sential. on a daily basis, the Navy not only works in the Joint staff environment 
but cooperates with the department of state, nongovernmental organizations, 
and numerous international stakeholders. therefore, it is imperative that deci-
sion makers move beyond traditional, quantitative product–driven, symmetrical 
force-on-force games toward qualitative, process-oriented games—toward games 
that will allow “interested parties to work on the system, and [allow] everyone 
to recognize how they fit in the system.”57 games must explore big, multifaceted, 
messy problems without external pressure to distill them down to their simplest 
parts. such games are indeed possible, as evidenced by the success of the July 
2010 Irregular Challenges game conducted at the Naval War College. 
the overarching purpose of the 2010 Irregular Challenges game was to help 
the Navy better understand the complexity of problems it could one day face in 
unstable maritime regions and address better how it might respond. Unlike in the 
games of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which reduced issues to their 
essence (taking, that is, a reductionist approach), both the game designer and 
lead analyst for Irregular Challenges were tasked with exploring conditions such 
as economic strain, public health issues, population increases, natural resource 
scarcity, and climate change. the game team was further directed to examine how 
these variables could potentially stress littoral regions and coastal environments 
around the globe. In addition, “prospective catalysts of instability” (crime, piracy, 
drug and human trafficking, extremism, and so on) were examined relative to 
these conditions.58 
a wide range of academicians, researchers, nongovernmental organization of-
ficials, military personnel, and interagency individuals (from the department of 
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state, the U.s. agency for International development, and the like) were provid-
ed “with an environment to explore and appreciate the complexities of decision-
making when faced with maritime instability–oriented irregular challenges.”59 
the Irregular Challenges 2010 game afforded participants a systems-thinking 
perspective focused on decision-making processes rather than specific outcomes 
in areas such as movement of forces, acquisition, and logistics. It offered them 
an opportunity to view the world differently, “to move from a reactive stance—in 
which [navies] merely respond 
to events—to an intentional or 
creative one, in which [they] 
can design systems that pro-
duce sustainable results.”60 
It also fostered cohesiveness 
among the participants (based 
on likert-scale and open-ended survey responses), along with, at the completion 
of the game, a sound analytical product. In short, it was both an experiential and 
an analytic success. 
the 2010 Irregular Challenges game was a one-sided activity in which players 
addressed security issues in a fixed scenario, but it set the stage for the two-sided 
Maritime stability operations game (Mstog) the following year. Held at the 
Naval War College in december 2011, the Mstog “explore[d] how to conduct 
maritime stability operations (Msto) in order to prevent and respond to insta-
bility.”61 building on the 2010 Irregular Challenges event, the Mstog focused 
on three research areas: emerging Msto doctrine, future force structure, and the 
overall maritime strategy relative to Msto. 
Within the safe container of the gaming environment, players were afforded 
the opportunity to engage in dialogue about a notional, complex, and dynamic 
security environment requiring “a range of maritime capabilities for contribut-
ing to stability and responding to instability.”62 through their participation in 
shared phenomenological experience, players reported that they were better able 
to understand processes including transitioning from steady-state engagement 
to crisis response while building host-nation capabilities, deterring near-peer 
challenges, and addressing a range of irregular threats. as group cohesion built 
up, players identified innovative ways to improve Navy interoperability with U.s. 
Marine Corps, Coast guard, special forces, and multinational partners and to 
foster better practices for collaborative planning and coordination with country 
teams, multinational partners, and nongovernmental organizations. 
Postgame analysis of allied and adversary comments and actions was per-
formed using a variety of established, qualitative techniques (i.e., grounded 
theory, content analysis, and survey research) to “triangulate” the game’s findings. 
like modern-day systems thinkers, [Mccarty 
little] . . . knew that it was important to . . .   
[consider] the entire messy, often obfuscated 
processes that characterize systems such as 
naval warfare taken as a whole.
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It determined that forward presence represented a critical requirement in three 
mission areas: maritime governance and participation, foreign humanitarian 
assistance, and deterrence. It is unlikely these insights would have emerged had 
reductionist, quantitative gaming processes been employed rather than the two-
sided approach, marked by exploration of complex “systems of systems,” devel-
oped for this event. 
fields theorist Kurt lewin urges that we not be “blinded by philosophical consid-
erations, an atmosphere which recognizes only physical ‘facts’ as existent in the 
scientific meaning of that term which has now outlived its usefulness.”63 games 
such as final destination 2, Irregular Challenges, and the Maritime stability 
operations game point out for war-gaming professionals a path that will return 
them to the explorative power of gaming envisioned by McCarty little in the 
late nineteenth century—a perspective that values both experiential processes 
and analytical outcomes and understands that these domains are not mutually 
exclusive.
gaming complex issues involves the realization that despite well-intentioned 
efforts to create empirical boundaries between outside forces, players, and the 
analytic products generated during events, war gaming is not experimentation; 
there is a continual cycle of influencing others and being influenced. Indeed, as 
McCarty little understood, it is talking and listening at the edge of the players’ 
boundaries and resistances, the “gestalts”—emergences of new patterns from new 
inputs—at which shifts in beliefs, judgments, or actions occur, that prove the 
most valuable in garnering insights useful to senior decision makers.64 
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YOuR BOSS, PLaYERS, aND SPONSOR
n national-security war gaming there are three classes of senior stakeholders 
whom I call “the three witches”—critical to the success of a game but with the 
power to affect negatively its quality. these comprise, first, the war-game direc-
tor’s superior and chain of command; second, the senior players within each 
game cell; and third, the sponsor of the game and that officer’s chain of com-
mand. each of these three stakeholders frequently attempts to influence the 
design of the war game, even during play itself. for two reasons, such attempts 
amount to inappropriate interference. first, these stakeholders are not (usually) 
expert in war-game research, design, development, or production. second, it is 
a conflict of interest for them to influence the game’s design; such interference 
puts the credibility of the results into justifiable doubt. the director, responsible 
for delivering a quality game, must manage these three stakeholders throughout 
design, play, analysis, and postevent reporting to ensure that the game meets 
the sponsor’s national-security-related objectives. 
failure to do so puts the war-game director at risk 
of following the three witches to a fate analogous 
to Macbeth’s.
wHen leaDerSHiP geTS in THe waY
research into intellectual leadership indicates that 
it is extremely difficult for individual contributors 
in a discipline to return to primarily intellectual 
roles after having been in positions of administra-
tive leadership for any length of time.1 this does 
not mean it is “hard to get their old job back” or 
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that “it takes time to get back into practice.” It means that after they have gotten 
their old jobs back as individual contributors they rarely perform as well as they 
did before they took leadership positions—in other words, acting in a signifi-
cant leadership position often permanently reduces one’s ability to perform at a 
previous job, now being performed by subordinates. this is one reason why the 
military calls some very senior leaders “general officers”—that is, “generalists”—
which is to say, “not expert specialists anymore.” they have become resource 
providers, managers, and leaders, but they are no longer expert at producing or 
doing what they once did, no matter how expert they once were.2
research also indicates that senior people tend to be overconfident in their 
ability to control events that are in fact outside their own control, failing to real-
ize the need for adapting their thinking to that reality. their successful control of 
past situations leads them into the mistake of believing their competence applies 
to current situations, especially situations involving a high degree of chance.3
even if these critical stakeholders were once war-gamers or war-gaming ex-
perts, time spent in the interim leading and managing organizations (which is 
what senior people generally do) instead of actually delivering war games results 
in decayed specialist knowledge and lapsed expertise. they have been consumers 
rather than producers of war games for too long.
there is also the problem of conflict of interest. three risk factors have been 
identified as present in nearly all cases of scientific fraud. the perpetrators 
“knew, or thought they knew, what the answer to the problem they were consid-
ering would turn out to be if they went to all the trouble of doing the work prop-
erly; were under career pressure; and were working in a field where individual 
experiments are not expected to be precisely reproducible.”4 one must accept the 
possibility that all three factors characterize the stakeholders of any war game 
that addresses important national-security issues and thus that the stakeholders 
will have to be prevented from interfering inappropriately with the game’s design 
and thereby be protected from charges of manipulating its results.
the war-game director must learn how to preempt problems with these 
stakeholders before they arise and what to do if preemption is unsuccessful. to 
succeed, the director must have three personal characteristics. two are required 
for any profession, these being a high degree of professional expertise (in this 
case, in game design) and the moral courage, integrity, and poise, even charisma, 
to face down inappropriate interference from seniors—including his or her own 
superiors. the former trait will provide guidance as to whether the interference 
is justified or not. the third characteristic is a specific skill—ability to perform 
“objectives analysis,” applied to the specifics of war gaming. good objectives 
analysis with the sponsor is a necessary precursor to forestalling problems with 
all three of the stakeholders.
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If the game director fails to display the courage and professional integrity re-
quired to manage these three stakeholders and instead follows their advice for the 
wrong reasons, then despite an initial appearance of all going well, the director 
will, like Macbeth, eventually end up in a very bad place. acquiescing to inappro-
priate demands or advice can be the path of least resistance for the director (and 
sometimes the senior stakeholders) but comes at the cost of damage to national 
security and to the reputations of the director and the stakeholders, if the game 
was worth playing in the first place. the likelihood of this failure is highest when 
the director does not know enough about gaming or when distorted stakeholder 
motives are in play. sponsors who discover later that game results are suspect will 
blame the directors, and rightfully so, even if it was sponsor interference that cre-
ated the problem. Morally weak or incompetent directors are in effect gambling 
that sponsors will not realize that game results are corrupted before one or both 
of them have moved on to other duties.
THe FirST wiTcH: YoUr cHain oF coMManD
War-game directors tend to be second-guessed by their bosses and other seniors 
in their chains of command—people ready, perhaps with the best of intentions, to 
help directors do a job at which the directors, but not they themselves, are expert. 
furthermore, they often collaborate with sponsors to second-guess the director, 
to the point of demanding significant changes to design and execution even dur-
ing the game itself. I have watched a senior leader in the game director’s chain 
of command and the action officer of the sponsoring organization override the 
vigorous, analytically based objections of the game director and insist on game 
design changes in the middle of a major war game. the result was loss of informa-
tion critical to the sponsor’s objectives and inability to correlate information from 
before the change with that obtained after the change, leading to a serious reduc-
tion in the final value of the game products for the sponsor. the senior officers in 
the two chains of command did not understand the nuances and impacts of the 
changes, and they did not understand that they were no longer expert in game 
design and analysis. during game play there is not enough time for the director 
to educate senior stakeholders about the deleterious effects of midgame changes.
the director’s only recourse if this happens during a game is to explain suc-
cinctly the likely adverse effects on game validity, the prospect of unknown un-
intended consequences from breaking the design in the middle of the game, and 
the necessity of documenting in the game report the source of the changes and 
their effects. the director then—if directly ordered to do so by the director’s own 
chain of command—proceeds with the changes. the game director can reduce 
the likelihood of this happening in the first place by performing good objectives 
analysis with the sponsor and by keeping his or her chain of command informed 
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of the results of that analysis. all this requires that the director do a good job 
from the outset, be expert in all nuances of the game and its design, and have the 
courage to do the right thing for the sponsor.
the conflict-of-interest problems that facilitate intellectual fraud are present 
for war-game directors and their chains of command. these risks are removed 
for directors if they have no career stakes in the outcomes of games; if their or-
ganizations are “mission funded” (specifically, funding for the game is not under 
the control of the sponsoring organization); if their chains of command have 
confidence in their expertise; and if they are authorized by their chains of com-
mand to face down inappropriate interference from senior players, sponsors, or 
their own superiors—and are supported when they do so. War-game directors 
must be willing to execute their authority and be expert enough to distinguish 
inappropriate interference from justifiable oversight.
THe SeconD wiTcH: YoUr Senior PlaYerS
the senior leaders of player cells, the cell “leads,” have two roles. In addition to 
the obvious one of playing the game, they lead their cells in playing the game as 
designed. the game director recruits senior players with the knowledge, experi-
ence, and leadership skills needed to lead the cells; ideally, they are expert at their 
jobs, which are presumably relevant to the game’s objectives. senior players are 
chosen for their operations experience, not their game-design expertise. being 
good at an operational task is not the same thing as being a trained and experi-
enced analyst or an expert war-game designer.
senior players will be tempted to redesign the game from the moment they 
turn up until the end of the exercise, but they are extremely unlikely to have the 
analytic skills to identify the downsides of a last-minute or in-play reworking of 
a game. their ideas might have been good back when the games were being de-
signed (or they might not). I have watched a retired three-star cell lead redesign 
a game during play and thereby seriously damage the quality of results provided 
to the active-duty four-star who was the sponsor because the director did not 
have the combination of skill and moral courage to challenge the cell lead on the 
issue. to claim that such things are matters of seniority is disingenuous. National 
security deserves better.
one way to avoid this problem is to recruit (not “invite”) senior cell leads early, 
during the design phase, but after objectives analysis. the game director would 
meet with candidate senior players, explain the sponsor’s objectives and game de-
sign, and explicitly call on them to lead their cells in playing the game as designed. 
It is at this stage that the game director can usefully incorporate into the design 
any good ideas the candidate senior players have. the director, however, must be 
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prepared to reject unsuitable proposals and even recruit different senior players 
if, in the director’s judgment, candidates are unwilling to endorse the objectives 
and design or commit themselves to playing the game as designed. If for some 
reason a candidate senior player is simultaneously uniquely necessary to the 
game, very senior, and inclined to challenge the design to the point of endanger-
ing the sponsor’s objectives, the director must put the candidate senior player in 
touch with the sponsor for resolution.
If notwithstanding all these precautions an accepted senior player attempts a 
redesign during the game, the director must point out that although the changes 
have obvious merit they interfere with the sponsor’s objectives and then request 
that play be resumed according to the agreed design. If the senior player refuses, 
the director should bring the game to a halt and engage the command and the 
sponsor, informing them of the likely deleterious effects of the changes being 
insisted on and the requirement to document both the changes and their likely 
effects for the sponsor’s objectives. finally, the game director implements the 
changes, if directly ordered by his or her own chain of command.
THe THirD wiTcH: YoUr SPonSor
Ideally, game sponsors bring to the table clearly articulated problems—issues of 
importance to national security whose elucidation legitimately involves war gam-
ing. all too often sponsors bring instead either the task of implementing a poorly 
thought-out solution to a problem that has not been articulated (of which, at the 
fundamental level, a sponsor may even be unaware) or a desire to advocate some 
preconceived answer. attempts by sponsors to influence game design in the latter 
case are clearly a conflict of interest.
there also exist absentee sponsors, of two kinds. some are about to leave their 
billets, while others delegate games and their decisions almost entirely to subor-
dinates while retaining the right to countermand those officers’ decisions late in 
the timeline.
•	 first, military officers have limited “shelf lives”—they rotate fairly quickly 
out of the sponsoring organizations. a war game must be designed, ex-
ecuted, analyzed, and written up, and its results socialized by the sponsor 
in person, before the sponsor moves on, if the whole exercise is to have any 
effect. although most senior officers serve in their billets for a year or two, 
a game might be initiated only a few months before its sponsor is to leave. 
If the sponsor plans to be fully engaged in the project, the time available for 
design, execution, analysis, and reporting is the period remaining until the 
sponsor’s detachment, minus the time needed to use the results to influence 
the sponsor’s audiences.
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•	 second, senior sponsors, who necessarily delegate most day-to-day game 
preparations to action officers from their staffs, are often so busy that they 
leave fundamental decisions to these officers, while retaining the right to 
change, at the last minute, decisions made or objectives agreed to by them. 
these principals being disengaged from the projects, their action officers 
effectively become the sponsors. Unless of sufficient seniority, however, these 
designees might not have the authority to make serious or speedy decisions, 
and in addition they might not fully understand the intent of their bosses.5 In 
this situation the game director faces the likely risk of seeing the representa-
tive’s decisions reversed late in the day, thus generating inefficiencies and 
damaging game quality.
I have had the experience of first being briefed by members of a sponsor’s staff 
who—not believing it necessary for the game director to meet with the principal 
—explained to me the sponsor’s highest-priority objective. I then refused to pro-
ceed further until I met the sponsor to confirm it. at the resulting meeting the 
staff and I heard the sponsor flatly contradict his staff as to what his number-one 
objective was and explain to me what his priorities really were. a game aimed at 
what the staff had claimed was the objective would have been completely unsat-
isfactory to the sponsor.
If sponsors persistently delegate discussions about games and objectives to 
action officers, it is the rotation dates of the representatives, rather than those of 
the principals, that mark the end of sponsoring organizations’ interest in game 
results. such sponsors thereby signal the relative unimportance of the games in 
their lists of priorities. the director’s boss must then decide how important a 
project is to the gaming organization and whether its priorities for the game are 
the same as the sponsor’s.
wHaT iS To Be Done?
Key to managing the three witches to avoid inappropriate interference and the 
ensuing damage to a game’s results is objectives analysis by the game director. 
the game director must push for a first game-planning meeting with the sponsor 
in person, not just the action officer (however many staff members participate 
in that first meeting, and however many slides they use to brief the objectives). 
the game director’s boss need not be present. sponsors’ degree of willingness to 
schedule detailed interviews with directors about proposed game objectives, or 
the ranks of action officers if the sponsors do not make themselves available, will 
say much about how serious they and their organizations are about the game. 
that in turn will influence the level of seriousness and allocation of resources the 
project deserves on the part of the gaming facility.
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the game director’s first task, then, is to identify the real objectives and their 
importance to the sponsor. remember, the sponsor may be unaware of what 
these actually are. the approach is to ask four questions:6
•	 “What do you want?” this question is usually answered by sponsors’ first 
communications with game directors’ organizations. the sponsors state what 
they want, and the directors do not argue.
•	 “Why do you want it?” the game director explains to the sponsor that any 
objective is broad enough to cover a myriad of subtopics, only some of 
which would be important in this context. It is necessary to “drill down” 
to those that are of greatest interest to the sponsor, to ensure the game is 
focused on his or her priority needs. the process is equivalent to asking for 
the commander’s intent. this is an art, interviewing and boring in until the 
game director has identified the priority needs of the sponsor. It is critically 
important to find out at this point who the sponsor’s intended audiences are, 
who has stakes in the game’s results, and when the sponsor needs the results 
in order to influence those audiences and stakeholders.
•	 “Why don’t you have it?” the game director here searches out the reasons 
why this problem has not already been solved. finding the root causes will 
draw out invaluable information about hidden agenda items, political and 
institutional pressures and imperatives, and previous attempts and why they 
failed, etc.
•	 “When are you rotating out of here?” the director also asks, “When is your 
action officer for this game rotating out?” the answer makes clear to the 
director and sponsor (or action officer) how much time is available for the 
game and for its analysis, report, and socialization, which in turn bounds the 
scale of the project and the level of effort devoted to it. 
the game director must ask these four questions in the order given and in the 
presence of the sponsor’s action officer. the very act of answering the first three 
makes the sponsor think through the objectives, the reasons for them, and the 
barriers to achieving them. articulating all this, in turn, has three major effects. 
first, the sponsor and the game director now understand the problem better; 
second, both have better understandings of how important, or not, the game is 
to the sponsor and the sponsor’s organization; and third, the sponsor’s action of-
ficer (and through that officer, the rest of the staff) now understand the objective 
and mission.
Question 2, “Why do you want it?,” is critical in that the sponsor’s answers 
bound the problem and reduce the risk of “mission creep.” during the initial 
interview the game director follows up each of the sponsor’s answers to “Why 
42
Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 1, Art. 20
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss1/20
 3 8  Nava l  Wa r  C o l l e g e  r e v I e W
do you want it?”—the sponsor is likely to give more than one answer—with such 
follow-up questions as “Why is that important to you, or to your stakeholders, or 
to [whoever else has surfaced]?” “What is it that is important about that?” this 
initial interview with the sponsor should last about sixty minutes. Knowing when 
one is done is an art. after about an hour the sponsor will have provided enough 
information to write up (for the sponsor) and diagram (for the game director’s 
own use) the commander’s intent for the game. the director then drafts a one- to 
three-page information paper for the sponsor to review and sign or to correct. If 
there are many corrections, there may need to be a follow-up interview.
When the sponsor and the game director have an agreed objectives document, 
it is useful to diagram it for design purposes (see figure 1, taken from an actual 
sea-basing war game). the diagram imitates the structure of the interview, al-
though the interview usually jumps around more than the diagram would imply. 
the top node in the diagram is the answer to the question “What do you want?” 
each successively lower node is an answer to the “so what?” question about the 
Research, Analyze, and Game Requirements and Trade-os of a Joint Sea Base to
Support an Opposed Projection of a Brigade-Sized Force from Strategic Distances
Sea base will reduce
dependence on land bases
Using land bases generates
high international political
costs
Sea base will
speed ow of
forces ashore
Force protection and 
InfoSec of a sea base are
easier than for a land base
Sea base increases
area held at threat
Land-base nations may deny
or delay deployment
Easier to disperse a sea 
base than a land base Fast projection of
large ground forces
Longer deployment times 
give the enemy more 
opportunity to put in place 
antiaccess strategies
Enemy may have credible
antiaccess forces
Want to keep options for
force projection as exible
as possible
Heavy airlift from a sea base
is dicult
Sea base must move
in close to land to
debark ground forces
Sea base will enhance
ability to project force
Increase the res and
logistics rate
FIGuRE 1
PaRT OF a “WHY DO YOu WaNT IT?” DRILL-DOWN DIaGRaM FROM a SEa-BaSING 
WaR GaME
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linked claim pointing to it. for example, in answer to the question “Why is it 
important that force protection and information security for a sea base are easier 
than for a land base?,” the sponsor of this game said, “because it is easier to dis-
perse a sea base than a land base.” asked why that in turn was important, he said, 
“because I want to keep options for force projection as flexible as possible”—and 
so on. Note that the graphic result is likely to be a lattice rather than a tree. the 
paper should use not “PowerPoint Pentagonese” or cartoons but complete eng-
lish sentences—nouns, adjectives, and verbs. In the diagram each phrase must 
make sense if prefaced with “this is important for our objectives because . . . .” 
for the game’s designer, the nouns provide guidance as to what actors the game 
must represent (either by live players or simulation), the verbs as to what actions 
the actors are to carry out in the game, and the adjectives as to the characteristics 
of the actors and of their actions. traditional “PowerPoint Pentagonese” and car-
toons hide meaning and do not provide enough specificity or breadth to support 
effective game design.
the game director is now in a position either to design a game, to advise that 
something other than a game is needed, or to suggest that other approaches must 
be used as well to illuminate the problem. If a game is in fact to be played, the 
director is now equipped to think about the resources required—time, people, 
technology. the game director also has the information needed to keep the chain 
of command informed as the design proceeds, to keep the sponsor’s action officer 
and staff from driving the design, to recruit senior players to lead the game cells, 
and to set up safeguards against inappropriate interference from well-meaning 
Game Director’s Chain of 
Command
Senior Players in the Game Sponsors and Their Chains
of Command
Successful senior people tend to be overcondent in their ability to handle novel situations that include chance.
They often believe they already know the answers.
No longer expert in research, 
development, or delivery of war 
games, owing to time spent leading 
and not doing.
An attempt to inuence game
design risks being an attempt to 
provide the sponsor with an 
answer the sponsor likes.
Objectives analysis with the sponsor aligns all three stakeholders onto the sponsor’s objectives and preempts 
inappropriate attempts to inuence the game design, thus protecting the stakeholders from charges of conict of 
interest.
Expert in topics being gamed 
but usually never was an expert 
in war-game design or analysis.
An attempt to inuence game 
design risks being an attempt to
advocate for a preconceived
answer.
Responsible for obtaining
answers to questions about 
topics being gamed, but usually 
never was an expert in war-game
design or production. Might not 
even be expert in the topic.
An attempt to inuence game
design risks being an attempt to 
advocate for a preconceived 
answer.
FIGuRE 2
SuMMaRY OF RISKS BROuGHT TO THE WaR GaME BY INExPERT SENIORS
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dr. downes-Martin presented an earlier ver-
sion of this article to the annual Connections 
Wargaming Conference, in July 2012, at the 
National defense University, Washington, 
d.C. 
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senior people. Nevertheless, and however well prepared and informed they may 
be, it is critical that directors be expert and professional in all aspects of game 
delivery and, above all, have the moral courage to do what is right for the sponsor 
and the support of their own command when they do so.
n o T e S
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THE IDEa OF a “FLEET IN BEING”  
IN HISTORICaL PERSPECTIvE
 the phrase “fleet in being” is one of those troublesome terms that naval his-torians and strategists have tended to use in a range of different meanings. 
the term first appeared in reference to the naval battle off beachy Head in 1690, 
during the Nine years’ War, as part of an excuse that admiral arthur Herbert, 
first earl of torrington, used to explain his reluctance to engage the french fleet 
in that battle. a later commentator pointed out that the thinking of several brit-
ish naval officers ninety years later during the War for american Independence, 
when the royal Navy was in a similar situation of inferior strength, contributed 
an expansion to the fleet-in-being concept. to examine this subject carefully, it is 
necessary to look at two separate areas: first, the development of the idea of the 
fleet in being in naval strategic thought, and, second, the ideas that arose in the 
royal Navy during the War of the american revolution. 
THe concePT in HiSTorY
as a strategic concept, “fleet in being” became a point of discussion among naval 
strategists in 1891, with the publication of vice admiral Philip Colomb’s book 
naval warfare.1 In this work Colomb pointed to the origins of the phrase with 
admiral lord torrington in his speech before Parliament explaining the ratio-
nale for his actions in the battle of beachy Head (Cap béveziers). In that action, 
the comte de tourville, with seventy-five french ships of the line, had defeated 
the fifty-six ships of the anglo-dutch fleet under torrington’s overall command 
on 30 June/10 July 1690.2 When torrington was called before Parliament to 
explain his defeat, he reputedly declared, “as it was, most Men were in fear that 
the french wou’d invade; but I was always of another opinion, which several 
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members of this Honorable House can witness: for I always said, that whilst we 
had a fleet in being, they would not dare to make an attempt.”3 
there is some question about the authenticity of the phrase “fleet in being” in 
that quotation, as it does not appear in the contemporary manuscript records of 
torrington’s speech;4 it is known only from an anonymously prepared pamphlet 
that purports to be the speech, published twenty years after the event, in 1710.5 
In a preface to the reader, the publisher of the 1710 pamphlet explained, “the 
following speech falling into my hands by accident, and being pleas’d with the 
History it relates; I thought it might give the World a great deal of satisfaction if it 
were made publick.”6 those words might well impress a skeptical historian as the 
tone of invention, but be that as it may. Whether or not torrington actually used 
the phrase in 1690, it is one that has certainly taken on a life of its own during the 
three hundred years that have followed. 
among naval strategists, Philip Colomb was the first in the anglophone world 
to draw attention to the idea as a broad strategic principle, and his thinking de-
veloped into an exchange of differing opinions between such well-known writers 
as alfred thayer Mahan and sir Julian Corbett. later writers, such as Herbert 
richmond, raoul Castex, Herbert rosinski, and geoffrey till, have commented 
on their exchange and added their own thoughts in the process.
Colomb himself, in light of the controversy that he had raised in 1891, tried to 
clarify his thinking in a revised third edition of his work, eight years later: “lord 
torrington, in his definition of the principle, went no farther than to assert that 
while he observed the enemy’s fleet with one certainly inferior, but yet not so in-
ferior as to be debarred from offering battle on any advantageous circumstances 
appearing, it would be paralysed.”7 While this convoluted wording took into ac-
count some of the criticism that had been made of Colomb’s initial understanding 
of the battle, he believed that the general principle should go farther: “‘a fleet in 
being,’ even though it was discredited, inferior, and shut up behind sand banks, 
was such a power in observation as to paralyze the action of an apparently victori-
ous fleet either against ‘sea or shore.’”8 stating the concept again elsewhere in the 
same work, Colomb wrote, “a ‘fleet in being’ has come into general use to denote 
what, in naval affairs, corresponds to ‘a relieving army’ in military affairs. that 
is to say, a fleet which is able and willing to attack an enemy proposing a descent 
upon territory which that force has it in charge to protect.”9
Captain Mahan’s biography of admiral lord Nelson included a telling criti-
cism of Colomb’s concept of the idea of a fleet in being. Writing about Nelson’s 
1794 landing at Calvi in Corsica, Mahan declared that Nelson’s actions in that 
operation showed the weakness of the fleet-in-being concept. If Nelson had been 
in tourville’s place, Mahan wrote, tourville would not have thought the opposing 
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english force, as a fleet in being, would be any kind of a deterrent to making a 
landing.10 
Colomb responded by saying that Mahan misunderstood the fleet-in-being 
concept. He argued that Mahan himself, through his service as a member of the 
U.s. War board during the spanish-american War of 1898, had become associat-
ed with one of the most extreme examples in history of the potential effectiveness 
of a fleet in being when U.s. forces had been deterred for a time from capturing 
santiago de Cuba by the spanish navy’s fleet in being, a squadron under admiral 
Pascual Cervera.11 Mahan, however, would have none of it. Using an example 
from the Peloponnesian War, Mahan pointed out that during the athenian 
expedition to syracuse, the syracusans moved their inferior fleet to tarentum. 
“the momentary safety of syracuse would illustrate the influence of a ‘fleet in 
being’; its subjugation after the fall of tarentum would show the limitations of 
such a fleet, which, by definition, is inferior.”12 Mahan felt that “the exaggerated 
argument about the ‘fleet in being’ and its deterrent effect is, in effect, assuming 
that war can and will be made only without risk.”13 that is, “it was not the beaten 
and crippled english and dutch ‘fleet in being’ that prevented an invasion of 
england. It was the weakness or inertness of tourville, or the unreadiness of the 
french transports.”14 Underscoring a related general point, Mahan noted that 
when a fleet is tied to defending a position ashore that is otherwise inadequately 
protected by fortification or by an army, it is unable to concentrate or move freely 
and forcefully against an enemy.15
sir Julian Corbett took a different stance when he pointed out that a fleet in 
being is a legitimate method of disputing command of the sea by assuming a 
defensive attitude. He argued that historical misunderstanding about the circum-
stances that had given rise to the phrase and the subsequent limitation of the con-
cept to deterrence against an amphibious landing obscured the full significance 
of the strategic concept. “for a maritime Power, then,” Corbett wrote, “a naval 
defensive means nothing but keeping the fleet actively in being—not merely in 
existence, but in active vigorous life.”16 In Corbett’s interpretation, torrington’s 
intention was to act on the defensive and to prevent the enemy from achieving 
any result until such time as torrington could consolidate his scattered forces 
so as to have a fair chance of winning a fleet engagement with tourville’s fleet. 
“the doctrine of the ‘fleet in being,’ as formulated and practiced by torrington,” 
Corbett explained, “goes no further than this, that where the enemy regards the 
general command of a sea necessary to his offensive purposes, you may be able 
to prevent his gaining such command by using your fleet defensively, refusing 
what Nelson called a general battle, and seizing every opportunity for a counter-
strike.”17 Corbett concluded that those who criticized torrington at the time—as 
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well as those who had since used the historical example for developing a strategic 
principle—did not understand that the meaning of a fleet in being was at sea and 
in contact with an enemy.
later commentators have continued this discussion but have achieved little 
resolution of the conceptual problems involved. admiral raoul Castex favored 
Mahan’s argument over Corbett’s.18 Castex thought Colomb’s argument exagger-
ated and Corbett an inexperienced civilian, harshly judging him as “an armchair 
strategist ignorant of the reality of war.”19 In contrast, admiral sir Herbert rich-
mond followed Corbett’s view and added his own thoughts. “What torrington 
meant is plain,” richmond wrote. “so long as he had an active fleet, prepared to 
seize any opportunity of slipping past the french and joining the score of [eng-
lish] ships to the west, tourville, despite his superior numbers, could not commit 
himself to a major operation.”20 an inferior fleet, richmond pointed out, could 
not prevent a raid and could not be an absolute or complete safeguard, only a 
temporary one. However, in a situation where a superior enemy fleet needed 
to obtain a rapid and decisive victory, to disable completely an inferior fleet to 
carry out an invasion or some other larger objective, the inferior fleet can have 
a temporary deterrent effect. It does this by avoiding action until such time as 
conditions might be more favorable, as the english eventually did in that war two 
years after beachy Head, in 1692, as well as afterward.21 
In the next generation of naval strategic thinkers, the german american 
Herbert rosinski started in the 1930s a comparative study of maritime strategic 
thinkers, of which he completed only the section devoted to Mahan.22 In this 
work, rosinski noted that Mahan agreed completely with Corbett that “‘dispute 
of command,’ if attempted at all, can only be achieved by the greatest display 
of activity and offensive spirit conceivable.”23 rosinski went on to exclaim, “It 
is therefore more than astonishing to find [Mahan] throughout all his writ-
ings violently opposed to the concept of a ‘fleet in being,’ which when rightly 
understood, stands precisely for such a watchful and aggressive ‘hanging on the 
enemy’s flanks.’”24 looking carefully at Mahan’s reasoning, rosinski concluded 
that Mahan had taken torrington to mean a passive retreat to safety—the very 
opposite of what torrington had actually intended, an aggressive defense. one 
might add that Mahan’s understanding was similar to that which the king, queen, 
and council expressed in 1690 and that led to torrington’s dismissal, imprison-
ment in the tower, and trial.25 
While naval historians and strategists have tended to study the concept as an 
abstract strategic idea, historians of the reign of King William III and the after-
math of the revolution of 1688 are aware that there may have been other reasons 
why admiral Herbert (that is, torrington) did not fight the french, as he had 
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been ordered to do. as the historian stephen b. baxter summarized the range 
of possibilities, “He [torrington] may have resented the orders of the cabinet 
council. He may have been involved in the political squabbles that were almost 
destroying the fighting capacity of the english navy. He may have been jealous of 
the dutch. He may have played the coward or the traitor.”26 after all, there was a 
parallel in very recent memory, the failure of the english fleet under lord dart-
mouth to oppose William III’s invasion of england in 1688.
to complicate the issue further, the concept of fleet in being has come to be 
used very loosely, for a range of related naval options. Understanding the term as 
employed in twentieth- and twenty-first-century naval discussion, geoffrey till 
has identified within the concept four different types of operations, ranging from 
moderated offense to passive defense:27 
 1. obtaining a degree of command of the sea by temporarily avoiding a decision in 
battle.
 2. achieving positive strategic benefit by carrying out missions, such as attack on 
trade, while avoiding a decisive engagement with a superior enemy.
 3. Using continuous harassment and evasion of the enemy as a means of denying a 
superior enemy the unfettered use of the sea.
 4. Using actions designed merely to ensure the survival of a weaker opposing fleet.
the historian Jerker Widén has recently commented that these four variants con-
stitute collectively a potential problem for the proper interpretation of the fleet-
in-being concept. He argues that the fourth—actions merely to ensure a fleet’s 
survival—is not a legitimate form of fleet in being, which requires maintaining 
an active and credible threat against a superior enemy. the second and third 
are similar to one another, but they incorporate Corbett’s alternative method 
of disputing command of the sea—minor counterattacks. for theoretical pur-
poses, Widén recommends keeping conceptually separate the ideas of disputed 
command and minor counterattack. the fleet in being, he writes, is a defensive 
deterrent strategy by a weaker naval power, while minor counterattacks consti-
tute a limited form of offensive action within a defensive strategy. However, in 
practice, Widén notes, these two tend to coincide as separate elements of a single 
strategy.28 
THe naval war oF THe aMerican revolUTion
It was the famous british naval historian and strategist sir Julian Corbett who 
pointed out, in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, that the War of the ameri-
can revolution provided further evidence about the meaning and application of 
the concept of the fleet in being.29 
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In the first three years of the war, between 1775 and 1777, britain used its mili-
tary and naval resources to try to end the rebellion in North america quickly, but 
those attempts failed. In this period, relatively few british warships were built, but 
with france’s entry into the war in 1778 the royal Navy began a building program 
to try to recover the superiority of warship numbers and tonnage it had let slip to 
france. It would take the royal Navy years to recover that position. 
the year 1778 witnessed not only the entry of france into the war but the de-
parture of a french squadron under the comte d’estaing to North america and 
then to the West Indies. the government in london now changed its strategic 
priorities and put home defense and the protection of the colonies in the West 
Indies at a higher level than the issues at stake with the North american colonies. 
yet there were critics of this policy within the cabinet, notably the colonial sec-
retary, lord george germain, who led efforts that, from time to time, diverted 
the ministry from its initial intentions. as a result of this and other factors, 1778 
became a year of missed naval opportunities for both britain and france, as each 
in its turn looked across the atlantic. 
the french navy had the opportunity in 1778 to achieve something close to 
parity in naval strength with the royal Navy, even local superiority in european 
waters, by uniting the brest and toulon squadrons for a decisive battle. Instead, 
d’estaing took the toulon squadron to North america. at the same time, lon-
don, instead of using its strength to seek a decisive action with the french navy, 
dispatched vice admiral John byron and twenty ships to chase d’estaing across 
the atlantic. In the following year and a half neither of those fleets had any stra-
tegic effect in North american waters or even in the West Indies, where the naval 
battles they fought were indecisive. Meanwhile, in european waters, in the first 
major naval battle of the war, a french fleet under the comte d’orvilliers clashed, 
also indecisively, with a comparably sized british fleet in the first battle of Ushant 
on 27 July 1778.30
during the following autumn and winter the royal Navy and britain generally 
became further distracted by an argument that arose between two of the com-
manders at Ushant over their actions in that engagement: vice admiral sir Hugh 
Palliser and his superior, admiral the Honorable augustus Keppel. this personal 
and professional dispute resulted in courts-martial for them both; in Parliament, 
vicious disputes between the supporters of the respective admirals created a po-
litical opposition to the government. 
In the wake of all this, in the spring of 1779 the royal Navy needed to pre-
pare for a new campaign by finding a senior and experienced commander for 
the Channel fleet, a fighting admiral who was a supporter of the government. 
among the possible choices, there seemed to be no one who could meet all the 
necessary criteria. In the end, the selection fell on admiral sir Charles Hardy, a 
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very senior admiral who was above the political fray but had not been to sea in 
years. although Hardy had a reputation as a good-natured man, the divisive at-
mosphere of the day led some officers to refuse to serve under him. to back him 
up the admiralty turned to some untried officers who seemed to have potential. 
two captains in this group were promoted to rear admiral and given subordinate 
commands in the Channel fleet. another, Captain richard Kempenfelt, recog-
nized within the navy as a thoughtful reformer and tactical innovator, was given 
the post of Hardy’s captain of the fleet, a position that might be considered a 
precursor to a modern admiral’s chief of staff.31
as the Channel fleet prepared to put to sea in the spring of 1779, it was ham-
pered by a shortage of seamen, a shortage largely caused by the impressment of 
men carrying infectious diseases.32 at the same time, the strategic situation at sea 
was only gradually becoming clear to british leaders. In february, intelligence 
arrived in london that spain was beginning military preparations in the vicinity 
of gibraltar. In March, london learned that spain was fitting out warships at el 
ferrol, and france reportedly was preparing thirty-three at brest. at first british 
observers did not understand the full significance of these reports. It took them 
some time to conclude that spain was changing from a neutral mediator between 
britain and france to an active supporter of france against britain. It took even 
longer to understand that this franco-spanish alliance was tied strategically 
to the spanish siege of gibraltar and to a design to occupy part of england by 
amphibious assault to force britain to release gibraltar to spain in future peace 
negotiations.33 thus, the entry of spain into the war altered the strategic situation 
for britain.34
by July 1779 british officials were aware that a superior franco-spanish naval 
force was heading toward the Channel, but things were left in strategic suspense 
until it actually appeared off the british Isles. Meanwhile, senior british officers 
expressed a variety of opinions on the impending situation. some thought the 
enemy force would prove too unwieldy and ineffective to be a real threat in battle. 
In fact, the sixty-three-ship franco-spanish fleet would not actually be sighted 
entering the Channel until mid-august, by which time thirty thousand troops 
would be waiting in france to invade england. In the interim, Captain Kempen-
felt was at sea with admiral Hardy on board Hardy’s flagship, HMs victory, with 
some of the thirty-nine ships of the line of the Channel fleet. on 27 July 1779 
Kempenfelt wrote to his friend Captain Charles Middleton, the comptroller of the 
navy, reflecting on the strategic situation that he, as Hardy’s fleet captain, faced:
Much, I must say almost all, depends on this [i.e., the Channel] fleet; ’tis an inferior 
against a superior fleet; therefore the greatest skill and address is requisite to coun-
teract the designs of the enemy, to watch and seize the favourable opportunity for 
action, and to catch the advantage of making the effort at some or other feeble part 
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of the enemy’s line; or if such opportunities don’t offer, to hover near the enemy, keep 
him at bay, and prevent his attempting to execute anything but at risk and hazard; 
to command their attention, and oblige them to think of nothing but being on their 
guard against your attack.35
In the event, actions such as these, combined with the collapse of supplies and of 
the health of seamen in the franco-spanish fleet, as well as the random effects of 
chance, eventually prevented the franco-spanish fleet from achieving success.36 
the war for america continued without major strategic gains on either side, 
with roughly equally matched fleets opposing one another, until 1781. In that 
year britain was successful in slowing the flow of naval stores—including timber, 
pitch, iron, and copper—to the spanish and french navies, thus raising their 
costs; otherwise the british blockade had little effect on the enemy. However, it 
did create a new naval enemy in european waters, the dutch republic, by in-
terfering with dutch trade to france. as a result, a british squadron fought the 
dutch fleet off dogger bank. Celebrated (although in fact tactically indecisive) as 
a victory by both sides, dogger bank became a british strategic victory when the 
dutch fleet failed to venture out again during the remainder of the war.37 In 1781, 
the combined franco-spanish fleet returned to the Channel, again in strength 
too great for the royal Navy’s Channel fleet to dare challenge. 
Meanwhile, in september 1781, the strategic crisis of the war occurred when 
the comte de grasse was able to seize and maintain local command of the sea off 
virginia to control the waters around the Chesapeake Capes and in Chesapeake 
bay for several weeks, preventing relief from reaching british forces ashore at 
yorktown. general lord Cornwallis’s surrender eventually brought down the 
ministry in london and replaced it with a government that was pledged to end-
ing the war. yet it would be some time before all that happened.
In this situation, lord sandwich at the admiralty and his professional advis-
ers, who included Captain Charles Middleton, Captain lord Mulgrave, and rich-
ard Kempenfelt (promoted to rear admiral in 1780 and now in command of the 
Western squadron of the Channel fleet), proposed a dramatic new strategy. at 
this point, britain’s warship-building program, begun after the war started, was 
beginning to alter the strategic balance of forces between the combined french 
and spanish fleets and britain’s. the numerical superiority of the bourbon naval 
powers in capital ships in comparison to britain’s grew from 25 percent in 1775 
to a high point in 1780 of 44 percent. from 1780 to 1785 it declined to a low of a 
17 percent superiority.38 the percentages in numerical superiority, however, do 
not reflect differences in fleet readiness. as the french navy increased in size, it 
experienced increasing difficulties in manning and funding.39 Nevertheless, in 
the context of this overall situation, the royal Navy’s Channel fleet remained 
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considerably weaker than that in the West Indies. the cabinet in london had 
made a deliberate strategic choice to attempt a victory in the West Indies rather 
than in european waters. Its rationale might be justified by admiral sir george 
rodney’s victory on 12 april 1782 over de grasse at the saintes, preventing the 
loss of Jamaica. yet rodney’s victory was not the kind of stunning strategic vic-
tory that could end a war, despite its considerable moral effect. the high-risk 
strategy that brought it about left more serious vulnerabilities exposed at home.40 
While the ministry placed priority on the West Indies and reduced naval 
strength in the eastern atlantic and North sea to do so, the royal Navy at home 
still had essential duties to carry out as an inferior fleet in being, unable to con-
duct a major fleet battle. Most importantly, the government’s decision meant 
that the royal Navy could not maintain control of the Western approaches to 
the Channel with a sufficient number of its largest warships. such a force at that 
important naval strategic position at sea had traditionally served the multiple 
purposes of protecting british trade, attacking enemy trade, preventing inva-
sion, and deterring french forces from leaving brest for overseas missions.41 at 
the same time, the war with the dutch required a blockade of the dutch coast 
to prevent the dutch navy from returning to sea. Meanwhile, british warships in 
the North sea served to blockade the eastern approaches of the Channel and to 
intercept merchant ships carrying contraband naval stores to france. In addition, 
the war with spain called for a blockade of spanish ports, as well as the convoying 
of supplies for the relief of gibraltar during the spanish siege. all of this needed 
to be done while avoiding a major, decisive fleet battle. the royal Navy met this 
conundrum on an operational level by shuttling ships back and forth between the 
North sea and the Channel as the situation required and by maintaining superior 
ship-to-ship fighting capabilities.42
as for the broad, strategic level, however, rear admiral Kempenfelt explained 
his views of the theoretical aspects of the situation in early January 1782, after 
receiving admiralty orders for his Western squadron. In comparison with tor-
rington’s single-sentence statement, Kempenfelt’s thoughts, as sir Julian Corbett 
considered, represented the “developed idea of the ‘fleet in being’” that showed 
how the concept had matured in british naval thinking some ninety years after 
torrington:43
When the enemy’s force by sea [are]a superior to yours and you have many remote 
possessions to guard, it renders it difficult to determine [what may be]b the best man-
ner of disposing of your ships.
 a. the 13 January version replaces “is” with “are.”
 b. the 13 January version adds “what may be.”
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[When the enemy’s designs are known],c in order to do something effectual, you must 
endeavour to be superior to them in [such parts]d where, [if they should succeed in 
their design],e they would most injure you. 
If your fleet is so divided as to be in all places inferior to the enemy, they will then in 
all places have [the probability]f of succeeding in their attempts. 
[If a squadron of sufficient force cannot be formed to face the enemy at home, it 
would be more eligible to let the number of that squadron be yet less, that thereby 
you may be enabled to gain a superiority elsewhere].g
When inferior to the enemy, and you have only a squadron of observation to watch 
and attend upon their motions, such squadron should be composed of two-decked 
ships only,44 as [to answer its purpose]h it must have the advantage [in sailing of the 
enemy, otherwise in certain circumstances they may be forced to action or to give up 
some of their heavy sailers.]i
It is highly [expedient]j to have such a flying squadron to hang [about]k the enemy’s 
large fleet, as it will prevent their dividing into [squadrons]l for intercepting your 
trade [or other purposes],m or spreading [and extending]n their ships for a more 
 c. the 13 January version replaces “When you know the enemy’s designs” with the words between 
brackets.
 d. the 13 January version replaces “some part” with the words between brackets.
 e. the 13 January version replaces “if they succeeded” with the words between brackets.
 f. the 13 January version replaces “a fair chance” with the words between brackets.
 g. the 13 January version creates a new paragraph here and replaces “If a squadron cannot be formed 
of sufficient force to face the enemy’s at home, it would be more advantageous to let your inferiority 
be still greater, in order by it to gain the superiority elsewhere” with the words between brackets.
 h. the 13 January version replaces “as to ensure its purpose” with the words between brackets and 
eliminates the period after “purpose.”
 i. the 13 January version replaces “of the enemy in sailing; else, under certain circumstances it will 
be liable to be forced to battle” with the words between brackets. “Heavy sailers” refers to slow, 
cumbersome, unweatherly ships, rather than simply large ones. 
 j. the 13 January version starts a new paragraph with this sentence and replaces “necessary” with 
“expedient.”
 k. the 13 January version replaces “on” with “about.”
 l. the 13 January version omits the word “separate” before “squadrons.”
 m. the 13 January version adds the words between brackets.
 n. the 13 January version adds the words between brackets.
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extensive view. [such a squadron will be always at hand ready]o to profit from any 
accidental separation or dispersion of their [ships]p from hard gales, fogs or other 
causes. [they]q may intercept supplies, intelligence, etc. to them. In fine, such a 
squadron will be a check and restraint upon their [activity],r and thereby prevent 
[much]s of that mischief they otherwise might do.
When the enemy are near the Channel, I should suppose the best situation for such 
a squadron would be to keep without them to the westward[, as more favourable to 
protect your ships coming into the Channel. the squadron will also be more at lib-
erty for its operations to approach or keep distance from the enemy as they may find 
convenient, and not liable to be forced into port and blocked up].t
When the enemy [perceive]u your design of keeping the North sea free by a stout 
squadron for your trade to return home that way, it may be supposed they will detach 
from [their]v grand fleet as many ships as the inferiority of your Western squadron 
will allow to endeavour, in conjunction with the dutch, to turn in that sea, the bal-
ance of power on their side.45 [but probably they will penetrate into this scheme of 
ours time enough to prevent its good effects this ensuing summer, and other projects 
they may have in view to attempt with their grand fleet may divert their attention 
from it.]w
the enemy I conceive [have]x at this time two grand designs against us: the one, the 
conquest of our West India Islands; the other, at home, not confined merely to the 
interception of our trade, but to favour by [the superiority of their fleet]y a formidable 
 o. the 13 January version replaces “you will be at hand” with the words between brackets.
 p. the 13 January version replaces “fleet” with “ships.”
 q. the 13 January version replaces “you” with “they.”
 r. the 13 January version replaces “motions” with “activity.”
 s. the 13 January version replaces “a good deal” with “much.”
 t. the 13 January version adds the section between brackets, ending the paragraph with the additional 
words.
 u. the 13 January version replaces “perceives” with “perceive.”
 v. the 13 January version replaces “the” with “their.”
 w. the 13 January version adds the sentence between brackets.
 x. the 13 January version adds the word “have.”
 y. the 13 January version replaces “their superiority” with the words between brackets.
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descent upon great britain; z and I [would]aa suppose the blow would be directed 
where it would be most felt by us, either against the Metropolis or Portsmouth. I 
should rather think the latter, as [more practicable]bb from the nature of the navigation.
they will with some reason conclude that [one]cc of those designs will succeed; 
[knowing]dd that we cannot, by our naval power, guard against both, and that if we 
employ a force sufficient to defeat their design in one place, we must necessarily leave 
the other exposed to them.
[It may be (or might have been) in our power to send such a force of ships to the 
West Indies as would frustrate their designs there, but at home I imagine, with our 
outmost exertions, we must remain inferior by sea and trust our defence from a 
descent to our land forces.
as our ships are now all coppered, they are always ready for service; therefore, when 
the enemy’s fleet at the end of the campaign returns into port, which hitherto has 
been always early in the fall, you are then at liberty to send what number of ships you 
might think proper to act offensively or defensively in the West Indies during the 
winter months, and have them again at home in sufficient time for summer service.
there is great advantage upon such occasions in letting ships slip out singly, as their 
voyage is thereby rendered much shorter, and your design a secret.]ee
on the first of the two drafts of Kempenfelt’s document, sir Charles Middleton 
had written a short note that clarified the reasoning and was later incorporated in 
the final version sent to lord sandwich: “as something must [be] left exposed, it 
appears to me that great britain and Ireland are now more capable of defending 
themselves than our colonies; and that the present year will probably pass over 
before they discover our design in the North sea. It behooves us thus to make the 
best of the time allowed us.”46
to sir Julian Corbett’s way of thinking, Kempenfelt had already demonstrated, 
practically and “in the most positive and convincing manner,” the positive side 
of the fleet-in-being theory a few weeks before drafting his memorandum.47 
fifty-three leagues (approximately 159 nautical miles, or 294 kilometers) south-
west of the Ushant on 12 december 1781, Kempenfelt’s Western squadron had 
 z. the 13 January version omits “and Ireland.”
 aa. the 13 January version replaces “should” with “would.”
 bb. the 13 January version replaces “less difficult” with “more practicable.”
 cc. the 13 January version replaces “one or the other” with “one.”
 dd. the 13 January version replaces “well knowing” with “knowing.”
 ee. the 13 January version adds the three final paragraphs, shown here within brackets.
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encountered a french hundred-ship convoy sailing, under the escort of the comte 
de guichen, from brest with military supplies and reinforcements for the east 
and West Indies. observing that de guichen and his escorting warships were over 
the horizon, hull-down to leeward, Kempenfelt attempted to cut them off from 
the transports. Partially succeeding in this, Kempenfelt avoided a major action 
and took nine transports from among the hundred ships, as well as, on the fol-
lowing day, an additional five stragglers.
a number of critics of the action—including King george III, rear admiral 
sir samuel Hood, and admiral lord rodney—thought that Kempenfelt should 
have followed the french squadron and taken more ships, even to the extent of 
going all the way to the West Indies to tip the naval balance there, rather than 
returning home. at the tactical level, Kempenfelt’s skillful action in using an infe-
rior force to embarrass the enemy and to take prizes in the presence of its escort 
was remarkable, but strategically it had little effect.48 the strategic effect related to 
the convoy was caused by the weather on Christmas day, five days after Kempen-
felt returned to spithead, when a violent storm forced most of the french convoy 
back into port and prevented the rest from reaching its intended destination. 
Word of Kempenfelt’s action, along with the news of the surrender of the 
british army at yorktown (and the failure of the royal Navy to relieve it), had 
arrived at london in late November and led to political attacks in the House of 
Commons on lord North’s ministry for naval mismanagement. eleven days after 
Kempenfelt submitted his memorandum to lord sandwich, the House voted “to 
inquire into the causes of the lack of success of his Majesty’s naval forces during 
this war, and more particularly in the year 1781,” the first of a series of resolutions 
and charges that on 20 March 1782 forced lord North’s ministry from office, 
along with lord sandwich as first lord of the admiralty.49 during the course of 
the debates, the young opposition politician Charles James fox pointed out that 
the government’s strategy had been the reverse of what it should have been. that 
is, he argued, having limited naval resources it sent major squadrons to distant 
stations and left home waters exposed when it should have concentrated in eu-
ropean waters, where it could have controlled enemy forces at their source while 
at the same time providing for home defense.50 
Kempenfelt’s and Middleton’s thinking showed that their defensive, fleet-in-
being strategy was based on a number of factors related to the specific context 
of the strategic situation in late 1781 and early 1782. at the tactical and opera-
tional levels, their thinking depended on a growing sense that the enemy’s naval 
strength was becoming weaker in size and less unified in action.51 In proposing 
more daring moves they were depending on this trend, as well as on easy strategic 
maneuverability of their own naval forces from one theater of operations to an-
other; on subterfuge; on the enemy’s limited ability to guess what they were doing 
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and counter it; and on the (at least marginal) technological superiority provided 
by copper sheathing of the underwater hulls of ships, as well as on the adoption 
of carronades, which would prove their value as a new form of ordnance during 
the battle of the saintes.52
at the strategic level, the application of the concept that Kempenfelt and 
Middleton were advocating abdicated the royal Navy’s traditional role as britain’s 
first line of defense, leaving home defense to the british army and to the militia 
at the beaches. It also assumed that the constraining effects of wind, weather, 
and inefficiency on the enemy’s naval force would be less for the british. at the 
same time, it abandoned a strategic idea that had been proved valid in the past 
and would later be proved again in subsequent wars—that by maintaining naval 
superiority in european waters the royal Navy could eliminate or reduce (as fox 
argued on the floor of the Commons) the threat to overseas possessions at the 
source, by preventing french and spanish forces from sailing to distant stations.
this discussion should not lead a reader to think that the idea of the fleet in 
being was one that was widely understood or discussed in the royal Navy of 
the eighteen and nineteenth centuries. admiral Kempenfelt was certainly a very 
unusual naval officer, a man whose thinking was not widely reflected in the brit-
ish naval officer corps.53 the instances and documents mentioned here are the 
only known examples to have existed before Colomb opened the idea for wider 
discussion as a general strategic concept in 1891. In both the 1690 example and 
that of the War of the american revolution, the royal Navy’s use of the fleet-in-
being concept resulted in severe political repercussions for those who were held 
responsible. In 1690, the commanding admiral was blamed, in 1782 the govern-
ment. to the extent that the royal Navy employed a fleet in being, it was not a 
war-winning strategy but a delaying gambit, or a device to protract the war at sea 
so as to achieve other objectives. at beachy Head, its apparent success for the 
english navy was due largely to the inefficiency of the enemy and other factors 
within the larger context of that war. during the War of the american revolu-
tion, however, a strategy of fleet in being in home waters had a role in allowing 
the royal Navy to strengthen rodney’s fleet in the West Indies to the point that 
he could win the battle of the saintes on 9–12 april 1782.
the ideas on a fleet in being that richard Kempenfelt and Charles Middleton 
discussed during the final phase of the War of the american revolution certainly 
represented an elaboration of an idea that had been only hinted at in admiral 
lord torrington’s single sentence. their elaborated concept is more than an ex-
pansion on the original idea, and it expresses a much more precise meaning than 
Philip Colomb and a number of other commentators have allowed. an enemy 
cannot, as a strategic matter, entirely ignore such a fleet, presenting as it does 
an active threat that requires a significant response. In the context of a strategic 
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situation involving naval forces dispersed in several geographic areas, an active 
and aggressive fleet in being can potentially serve as a temporary deterrent in 
one area, if for a very limited time, simultaneously maintaining morale and op-
erational skills within that fleet and gaining time to concentrate forces in another 
area where a larger threat exists. the historical experiences that have been dis-
cussed here suggest, however, that it is a high-risk strategy to deal with particular 
circumstances, to be considered only when resources are strained and threats 
dispersed in different geographical areas, not to be expanded into the rationale 
for a general strategic naval posture.
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KaMIKazES
 throughout history, despite the influence of alfred thayer Mahan’s concepts, continental european and asian navies have had a simple choice to make: 
either to create a balanced fleet to engage another balanced fleet at sea and defeat 
it in one or more “decisive battles” or to take an “asymmetrical approach,” creat-
ing an “unbalanced” navy, able to prevent the enemy from achieving sea control 
and to keep one’s own vital sea lines of communication (sloCs), if one has any, 
untouched by the enemy’s naval forces.
In the case of russia, the era of a blue-water, balanced navy ended with defeat 
in the russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. russia did not lose the capability to 
build capital ships, nor did the context for their employment evaporate. How-
ever, the war occurred in a region where russia had little in the way of naval 
infrastructure—fleet bases or, more importantly, shipbuilding and repair fa-
cilities. russia’s main sources for these capabilities 
were (and still are) located in the european part 
of the country.1 the russian empire, for various 
reasons, had insufficient strategic motivation to 
restore its naval strength in the far east, nor did 
it until 1945, in the soviet era. the key sloCs 
for russia after 1905 were the ones that had been 
established by Peter the great on the eve of the 
eighteenth century: the baltic sea, with the dan-
ish straits, and the black sea, with the bosporus 
and dardanelles. both routes had been long used 
to send the main russian exports, wheat and fur, 
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to europe. It was vital to russia to keep these straits open, as payments for these 
exports filled the empire’s treasury with gold and, later, solid currency.2
In other words, the historical background of the russian Navy is almost the 
same as that of the german navy; only the names of the straits and the relevant 
seas differ.3 the two countries have similar naval imperatives that involve con-
fined and relatively shallow seas and their littorals. for this reason the asym-
metrical approach to naval power struck roots deeper and stronger than those 
of the Mahanian balanced, blue-water-fleet approach, although the latter was 
occasionally important for both. 
In any case, when a naval threat emerges involving an amphibious assault on 
home territory or the cutting of vital sloCs close to one’s shores, a navy will shift 
to the asymmetrical approach. the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), for example, 
from the fall of 1944, turned—although it still had a fleet of capital ships—to the 
clearly asymmetrical approach of suicide attacks from the sky. there was by that 
time no other way for the Japanese to engage the massive U.s. Navy carrier forces. 
It was, of course, a poor choice from the point of view of the individual human 
being, but it was effective from a naval tactics standpoint.
the american task forces, built around essex-class carriers, had become an 
“air force at sea.” this was not a traditional fleet, centered on capital ships and 
bound for decisive battle; rather, sea battle was just one of a number of tasks 
for this “wet air force.” from one perspective, these task forces were themselves 
asymmetrical, pursuing a doctrine similar to the land-warfare concept of blitz-
krieg. this point distinguished the U.s. Navy from the other two carrier navies, 
the royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy; its aircraft were more than 
extensions of ship weapons. even today, british naval aviators see themselves 
as equivalents to a surface ship’s torpedo or missile officers, as part of a pool of 
surface-fleet weapons systems. this outlook, while it defended the royal Navy’s 
fleet air arm from the political pressure of the royal air force, effectively pre-
vented the navy from creating a floating air force of its own.4
by 1944 it was beyond the IJN’s capability to oppose U.s. carrier task forces 
symmetrically, most of its ships and aircraft being on the bottom of the Pacific. 
the only way available to resist was to use land-based airpower to interfere with 
U.s. carrier operations. this interference involved not only crashing into the 
carriers but also, and equally important, knocking out radar-picket destroyers, 
deceiving carrier fighters, and fooling fighter-direction officers with primitive 
but effective electronic countermeasures, etc. the tactic used to accomplish 
these objectives was to make divided approaches with small groups of attackers, 
fighters, and trackers (surveillance aircraft shadowing the force), echeloned by 
height and bearing. It was hoped that this tactic would diffuse and neutralize 
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the strength of the american maritime air force, allowing the kamikazes to get 
through to their targets.
the key objective in the IJN kamikaze campaign was not suicide, which was 
just the price. rather, the most important points were the composition and se-
quencing of the attack and the suppression of air defenses.
all the tasks that were valid for the IJN tokkotai (special attack) units in 
1944–45 were also valid for the soviet Navy of 1955–95. they are still valid to-
day, by extension of dr. samuel Huntington’s argument, for the Chinese People’s 
liberation army Navy, the Cuban revolutionary air and air defense forces, 
the venezuelan air force, the Pakistani air force, and the North Korean People’s 
army air force.5
KaMiKaze TacTicS anD FigHTer DirecTion: Kill ’eM all
as far as we know now, the air-defense methods developed by the U.s. Navy 
against the kamikazes were centered on Commander John thach’s “big blue blan-
ket” tactics, which included early-warning destroyer pickets and fighter-direction 
officers (fdos), interconnected by very-high-frequency (vHf) voice radio 
circuits to combat air patrol (CaP) aircraft aloft.6 little attention was paid to the 
carriers’ self-defense, which was provided by their own antiair (aa) batteries. In 
tight quarters, aa gunfire from one ship could damage another; it was almost 
inevitable in battles like okinawa. such issues were later studied by the soviet 
Navy, from such data as were available—for example, damage to Uss enterprise 
(Cv 6) from a screening destroyer’s friendly fire in the spring of 1945.7
apparently, according to available Japanese sources, kamikaze tactics origi-
nally involved low-level bombing attacks rather than the dive-bombing runs that 
became famous later in the war.8 amazingly, low-level attacks were to that date in 
widespread use in allied experience, mostly in the U.s. army air forces.9 skip-
bombing and bracket bombing were in wide use in U.s. army bombing squad-
rons in the Pacific and Mediterranean starting in the spring of 1942. specially 
shaped bombs were developed to skip on the water’s surface and hit the target 
from the side. In the U.s. Navy, a few seaplane patrol squadrons and (even fewer) 
carrier-based night torpedo squadrons used so-called masthead-level bombing.10 
the navy preferred relatively high-level approaches and the steep dives of dive- 
bombing. In the Japanese case, the effectiveness of low-level bombing was limited 
by the relatively small size of the bombs (551 pounds) carried by the main kami-
kaze aircraft, the a6M2 Zero. but the initial benefits of this kind of antishipping 
attack—that it complicated antiaircraft targeting and allowed the bomb to hit 
vital parts of the ship near or even below the waterline—were not forgotten. at 
least two U.s. ships, the escort carrier Bismarck Sea (Cve 95) in february 1945 
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and the destroyer Twiggs (dd 591) in June 1945, were sunk using this method, 
regardless of whether the bombs were dropped before the planes crashed.11
Nonetheless, there was a shift in kamikaze tactics from low-level to dive-
bombing, because of the necessity to damage the flight decks of the target carri-
ers. as this kind of attack can disrupt the flight operations of the ship and its air 
group, it was the proper approach, and the primary targeting points on the deck 
were highly vulnerable: elevator platforms, island superstructure, arresting gear, 
parked planes, and so on. the wood sheathing of the flight decks themselves, 
while adding to the overall combustibility caused by burning fuel and aircraft 
debris, were nonetheless easy to repair.12 It is worth noting that the regular IJN 
dive-bombing units (kanbakutai), flying such planes as the d3a val and d4y 
Judy, typically used moderate dive angles, sixty degrees or less, carefully account-
ing for wind direction and speed. Kamikaze Zero pilots, in contrast, sometimes 
made near-vertical dives, though for accurate targeting they should have used 
less radical angles.
In addition to the bomb load—which, contrary to popular belief, was often 
not left attached to the plane’s hard points at impact but was meant to be armed 
and dropped on the final stage of the suicide dive, at least for the target first 
attacked—there were two other damage mechanisms: the plane’s engine and 
burning fuel from its ruptured internal and external tanks.13 the plane’s engine—
torn from the plane in the crash, still hot, burning, and charged with enormous 
kinetic energy—could cause significant casualties to the ship’s crew, as well as 
start fires on the hangar deck and even deeper in the hull. also, fuel fires on 
the decks were hard to bring under control. so even a single hit by a well-aimed 
plane could be quite enough to send a carrier to the bottom or at least put it in 
the shipyard for months.
the greatest problems in defending against kamikaze raids, as became clear 
to the U.s. Navy at okinawa, were, first, the uncertainties—the number of planes 
participating, their heights and directions, the presence of fighter escort—and 
second, above all else, coordinated sequential strikes. the only way to cope with 
all the possible threat combinations was to put as many fighters as possible aloft 
on CaP stations and distribute self-synchronized early-warning and fdo sta-
tions on ships. However, such a blanket of protection could not be established 
over all the forces at sea; the early-warning destroyers were often on their own. 
given this fact, the Japanese could hit the radar pickets first and then go after the 
main targets—the carriers—through the holes created in radar coverage.
further, even small kamikaze raids in 1945 conducted rudimentary electronic 
countermeasures (eCM), in the form of strips of metal foil (“window”) that when 
dropped could produce big blips on the carriers’ radars, hiding the exact location, 
movement, and composition of the raid. In one of the last such occasions, a little 
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group of four b7a2 grace torpedo bombers, trying to hit a british task force, 
including the aircraft carrier HMs victorious, was divided into two eCM aircraft 
and two attackers, carrying one 1,760-pound bomb each.
of course, all or most of these tactical considerations were included in the 
okha program, in which a shore-based medium bomber (g4M3 betty) carried 
an MXy-7 glide bomb manned by a suicide pilot, powered by rocket engine, and 
armed with a huge, integrated warhead instead of regular bombs. approaching 
the target, the kamikaze pilot climbed into his short-winged flying bomb and, 
when dropped from the betty, directed it to a hit on the target ship. although a 
viable concept, it was relatively unsuccessful in employment, owing to weakness 
of intelligence support, lack of fighter cover, low-quality assembly, and poor skills 
of the young, expendable pilots.14
given the overall effectiveness of kamikaze units, however, it is not an exag-
geration to claim that the most effective way to suppress them was to strike their 
airfields. since the beginning of carrier aviation, the earliest possible attack on 
enemy carriers or airfields, aimed to deny the enemy the use of its aviation, had 
been the main priority of the carrier air group, at least in the U.s. Navy and IJN.15 
this doctrine reflected the 1920s and 1930s thinking that carrier-based fighter 
planes, even properly manned and directed, could not effectively fight bombers, 
primarily large, land-based ones but carrier-based ones too, and in that way de-
fend their own carriers. later in the war, when carrier fighters had proved their 
air-to-air capability and radar had been installed on virtually every type of ship, 
there was still the problem of effective fighter direction, and the more planes, 
friend and foe, that were in the air the worse the problem became. 
but, as previously noted, all possible fighters had to be kept aloft on CaP 
stations ready to engage any Japanese plane, coming from any direction, that 
preliminary strikes on airfields had left able to take off and reach the task force. 
It was on the basis of this contradiction between the number of planes airborne 
and the complexity of their direction and control—a situation that more or less 
remains to this day—that the soviet Navy built the aviation part of its “national 
anticarrier doctrine.”
THe naval air Force oF THe SovieT navY: THe aDMiralS’ 
STePcHilD
despite the fact that russian military aviation was born within the navy, since 
1922—when the Union of soviet socialist republics, the Ussr, was created— 
until today the Naval air force has been essentially the representative office of 
the soviet/russian air force (voyenno-vozdushnie sily, or vvs) in the navy 
realm. russian naval aviation has not possessed two features that distinguish 
naval air forces from those of the army or “big” national air force counterpart:
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•	 a system of development, design, and purchase of aircraft and weapons
•	 a system of education and training of flying personnel (from 1956 onward).16
all such systems were and are still mostly in the hands of the air force (during 
World War II, an army air force, known as the vvs-rKKa).
technically, the soviet Naval air force (sNaf) was the part of the navy. but in 
fact, sNaf fixed-wing planes, with a handful of exceptions—such as the vertical/ 
short-takeoff-and-landing (vstol) light-attack yak-38 and a small family of 
seaplanes of the beriev aircraft Company (the be-6, be-12, be-200)—were, as 
they still are, ordered by and developed for the air force. all the huge long-range, 
heavy bombers, such as the tu-16 (Nato badger family), the tu-95 (bear), and 
the tu-22 (backfire), were developed under the orders and specifications of the 
soviet air force’s bomber command, the da (dal’naya aviatsiya, or long-range 
aviation). Moreover, the da’s heavy bomber units constituted an integral part of 
the anticarrier doctrine, representing nearly a third of the forces that would be 
involved in strikes. those units could temporarily fall under operational control 
of the sNaf. two-thirds of the rest were organized as the Mra (Morskaya rake-
tonosnaya aviatsiya, or Naval guided-Missile aviation), permanently under the 
operational and administrative control of the navy.
but this administrative interconnection did not remove the curtain between 
the navy’s philosophy and ethos and those of the vvs. soviet naval aviators, all 
commissioned officers, held field rank instead of deck (naval) rank and were 
completely out of the chain of command of naval surface ships, units, and staffs, 
let alone submarines. their areas of responsibility and service were almost ex-
clusively aviation matters. each of the four fleet staffs, typically headed by a full 
admiral (three stars) or a vice admiral (two stars), had a subordinate staff of 
Naval aviation of the X fleet (where X would be baltic, Northern, black sea, or 
Pacific), which commanded all the fleet’s air units. for each fleet’s commanding 
general of aviation, typically a major general or lieutenant general, to whom this 
staff reported, there was only one possible next career step within the navy: to 
become commanding general of Naval aviation of the soviet Navy in the Naval 
Main staff in Moscow, as a colonel general. 
Needless to say, then, almost all naval aviators and naval air navigators 
(roughly similar to american naval flight officers) from the beginning of their 
careers kept their eyes the other way—toward an interservice transfer to the vvs, 
where they could reach much higher command assignments, as air marshals.17 
Moreover, all of them had friends in the vvs, because the navy did not have its 
own system of pilot and navigator training courses, schools, or academies. all 
naval aviators, navigators, and aviation engineers were (and still are) graduates 
of vvs air military colleges or air military engineering colleges.18 so not only 
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were they aware that they represented a marginal part of the annual alumni pool, 
having chosen the restricted sNaf path instead of the wide-open vvs, but their 
early military and flying experience, the four or five years spent in an air college, 
had filled them with vvs ethos and traditions instead of the navy’s. It is worth 
noting that, contrary to U.s. military aviation training practice, soviet/russian 
vvs air colleges inserted cadets into the flying pipeline roughly in the middle of 
the course, two years before graduation and commissioning. all soviet military 
pilots could fly the modern military aircraft in almost all circumstances months 
before the little stars of a second lieutenant were on their shoulders.19 there are 
close parallels to british royal air force (raf) practice and ethos, and to those 
of the World War II luftwaffe as well.20
from World War II to the beginning of the 1960s the sNaf had its own 
fighter, attack, reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare (asW), bomber, and 
mine-torpedo forces, organized in squadrons, air regiments (two to four squad-
rons), and air divisions (two to three regiments).21 at that point fighter aviation 
was moved from the sNaf to the vvs. since then the core of the sNaf of each 
of the four fleets has been represented by attack and mine-torpedo units. the 
former, with Il-28, su-17, or su-24 attack planes and light/medium bombers, 
maintained the sea frontiers in shallow waters and supported amphibious assaults 
within their combat range. the torpedo-bomber units, in turn—the last soviet 
land-based torpedo bomber, the tu-16t, was armed with rt-1 and rt-2 rocket-
propelled torpedoes, in service until 1983—formed the basis for the new Naval 
guided-Missile aviation; in 1961 mine-torpedo aviation was absorbed into the 
Mra, in regiments and divisions, and given the heavy burden of carrying out the 
first stage of anticarrier doctrine. as mentioned above, the vvs da contributed, 
but the primary agencies for the planning and coordinating of anticarrier strikes 
were sNaf staffs. 
this semi-separation of the sNaf from the navy created, without doubt, ne-
glect on the part of the “true” naval officer communities, surface and submarine. 
given the rule that no naval aviator or navigator could attain flag rank in any of 
the fleet staffs and that the admirals and deck-grade officers of the soviet Navy 
only occasionally flew on board naval aircraft, and then as passengers only, there 
was no serious trust in the sNaf in general or its anticarrier role in particular.22 
the sNaf, though its actions were coordinated with surface and submarine units 
in war plans and staff training, would attack on its own, whereas missile-firing 
surface units and submarines had to complement each other, depending on over-
all results. the actual training of sNaf units had no significant connection with 
surface or submarine units below the level of “type” staffs of the fleet. Commu-
nications between sNaf aircraft aloft and guided-missile cruisers at sea or even 
with shore radio stations maintaining submarine circuits often failed because of 
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mistakes in frequencies or call signs. so the “real” admirals’ common attitude 
toward the Mra was essentially the same as that toward shore-based missiles: 
order them to take off, heading for the current target position, and forget them. 
No wonder that the kamikaze spirit was often remembered in the ready rooms 
of Mra units ashore.
the soviet Navy had itself experienced the real thing once, in 1945, in the 
last month of the war. While supporting an amphibious landing on the Kurile 
Islands, a small group of soviet ships was attacked by several b5N2 Kate torpedo 
bombers from the Kurile-based Hokuto Kokutai, an outfit normally devoted to 
patrol and asW over the surrounding sea. according to Japanese records, at the 
time of the attacks only five Kates from that unit were flyable, and four of them 
participated in kamikaze attacks against the soviet amphibious assaults, armed 
with two-hundred-kilogram depth charges or sixty-kilogram general-purpose 
bombs.23 on 12 august two of these planes were shot down by aa fire from the 
minesweeper T-525 (a U.s.-built aM type), and one crashed directly into the 
small motor minesweeper KT-152 (a mobilized fishing boat), which immediately 
sank with all hands. this was the only successful kamikaze encounter in soviet 
naval history.
wHY SHoUlD we aTTacK THe U.S. carrierS— 
anD For goD’S SaKe, How? 
Unable to create a symmetrical aircraft carrier fleet, for both economic and 
political reasons, the soviet Navy had to create some system that could at least 
deter the U.s. Navy carrier task forces from conducting strikes against the naval, 
military, and civilian infrastructure and installations on the Kola and Kamchatka 
Peninsulas, sakhalin Island, and the shoreline around the city of vladivostok. 
the only reasonable way to do so was as old as carrier aviation doctrine itself: 
conduct the earliest possible strike to inflict such damage that the carrier will be 
unable to launch its air group, or at least the nuclear-armed bombers. also, there 
was an important inclination to keep the sloCs in Mediterranean waters under 
the threat of massive missile strikes. these plans, given the absence of a soviet 
carrier fleet, definitely rode on the wings of land-based aviation. riding also on 
the shoulders of air-minded military leaders, they reached out farther than the 
typical five-hundred-mile combat radius of regular medium bombers, by means 
of something much more clever than the iron, unguided bombs that had been the 
main weapon of soviet bombers for a long time.
the origins of guided antiship missiles in military aviation are german. Hs293 
missiles and fX1400 guided bombs were successfully employed in 1943–44 by 
luftwaffe bomber units; one of only five battleships sunk at sea solely by aviation, 
the Italian battleship roma, was sunk by fX1400s dropped and guided by do-217 
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crews of Kampfgeschwader (bomber squadron) 100.24 but those weapons, being 
radio controlled, could have been easily disabled by relatively simple eCM mea-
sures, such as jamming, had the eCM operator known the guidance frequency. 
a more promising method of guidance was active radar seekers, which made 
such weapons independent of the carrying platform after launch. the first air-
to-surface missile with such guidance and targeting was created in sweden in the 
early 1950s and entered service with the swedish air force as the rb04 family.25 
regardless of whether it had the help of intelligence information, the soviet 
weapons industry managed to develop its own device at roughly the same time, 
but using semiactive targeting. the first such missile, the Ks-1 Kometa (Comet), 
started development in 1951 and entered service two years later. from the begin-
ning, and in contrast to all other such systems, soviet antiship missiles were de-
signed to kill carriers and other big ships by hitting pairs. the warhead of the Ks-1 
contained more than eight hundred kilograms of explosive, and the missile gener-
ally resembled a little unmanned Mig-15 fighter plane. the old Japanese okha 
concept had clearly been adopted entirely, with the exception of a sacrificial pilot.
It is worth noting that the nuclear strike/deterrent role was exclusive to U.s. 
aircraft carriers for less than a single year, from the first assembly of a nuclear 
bomb on board a carrier in december 1951 to the successful trial launch of a 
regulus nuclear cruise missile from a submarine in 1952.26 the carriers’ shared 
(i.e., with submarines) nuclear role lasted up to 1964, when george washington–
class ballistic-missile submarines went on patrol on a regular basis. from that 
time onward, as adm. James stockdale recalls, the primary role of the carrier air 
groups, even fighter squadrons, became the close support of land combat, as well 
as land interdiction.27 the beginning of the vietnam War featured this mode of 
employment. sNaf staffs found that the main skills of the carriers’ attack squad-
rons (medium and light) changed twice. from 1964 to 1974, during the vietnam 
War, it was mostly land targets that attack squadrons were intended to strike; 
from 1975 to the desert storM operation in 1990 the carrier attack community 
shifted its focus to readiness to engage soviet surface fleets at sea, developing 
the Harpoon guided-missile family.28 during the first Iraq war the main effort 
switched again, to close air support and battlefield interdiction ashore. While it 
was not going to deal with the carrier attack planes directly, the sNaf was watch-
ing with interest the fluctuation in the U.s. Navy’s fleet air-defense inventory 
and tactics, driven by changes in the targets between open sea and continental 
landscape. It was important to find the difference between the typical CaP tactics 
at sea and barrier CaP duty offshore, calculating the average times that f-4 and 
f-14 interceptors remained on station between aerial refueling and rotation of 
patrols.
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during this time the soviet Navy, sharing with the U.s. Navy the ballistic-
missile path as the main one for deterrence, actively developed cruise missiles 
for launch from submarines, as well as from surface ships. the development of 
air-launched antiship missiles was given secondary priority and was constantly 
caught up under vvs control, with consequent delays. the submarine-launched 
missiles, in contrast, made great strides and could strike targets at ranges up to 
seven hundred kilometers. It was not until 1982, when the NortHerN WeddINg 
naval exercise placed carrier battle groups near enough to the Kola Peninsula 
for fully loaded a-6e Intruders to reach the severomorsk main naval base and 
return, that U.s. carriers showed how they really intended to hit soviet land 
targets, with nuclear weapons or without them. but, as is usual for the militaries 
of autocratic political regimes or garrison states, the development of doctrines 
and weapon systems, once started, was hard to change, even in a clearly changed 
environment.
the U.s. carrier task force had first been considered a real threat to soviet 
shore targets in 1954, when intelligence confirmed the presence of nuclear weap-
ons (both bombs and regulus missiles) on board the carriers, as well as planes 
that could deliver them (aJ-1s and a3ds). the first anticarrier asset tested in 
the air at sea was of american origin—the tu-4 heavy bomber, a detailed replica 
of the boeing b-29 superfortress. the missile-carrying model, the tu-4Ks, was 
introduced with the black sea fleet air force in 1953. the plane was able to carry 
two Ks missiles and was equipped with a K-1M targeting radar. because of the 
need to guide the missile almost manually from the bomber, the aircraft had to 
penetrate the antiair-warfare killing zone of the task force to as close as forty kilo-
meters from the carrier or even less. the kamikaze-like fate was abruptly switched 
from the single pilot of an okha to the entire crew of a tu-4Ks. subsequent ef-
forts to develop autonomous active-radar missiles (the K-10, K-16, Ksr-2, 
and finally Ksr-5) were more or less unsuccessful. though the semiactive Ks 
placed the carrying plane under serious threat, it was considerably more reliable 
than the active-radar missiles. 
the next generation of planes was represented by the series known to Nato 
as the badger (the tu-16Ks, tu-16K-10/16, tu-16Ksr, with reconnaissance 
performed by the tu-16r, or badger e). this plane was not the best choice for 
the job, but it was the only model available at the beginning of the 1960s. the 
service story of the badger family is beyond the scope of this article, but it is 
noteworthy that the overall development of anticarrier strike doctrine grew on 
its wings.29 the first and foremost issue that had to be considered by sNaf staffs 
was the approach to the target, which involved not only the best possible tactics 
but the weapon’s abilities too. for a long time, prior to the adoption of antiradia-
tion missiles, and given the torpedo-attack background of Mra units, there was 
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a strong inclination toward low-level attack. such a tactic comported with the 
characteristics of the missiles’ jet engines and the poor high-altitude (and low-
temperature) capabilities of their electronic equipment. the typical altitude for 
launch was as low as two thousand meters; that altitude needed to accommodate 
the missile’s four-to-six-hundred-meter drop after launch, which in turn was 
needed to achieve a proper start for its engine and systems. although the sNaf 
experimented with high-altitude (up to ten thousand meters) and moderate-
altitude approaches—and until it had been confirmed that the carrier’s airborne 
early-warning (aeW) aircraft, the grumman e-2 Hawkeye, could detect the 
sea-skimming bombers at twice the missile’s range—the low-level approach was 
considered the main tactic, at least for half the strike strength.
FlYing THe BacKFire in DiSTanT-ocean coMBaT:  
a one-waY TicKeT
the Mra’s aircraft, such as the tu-16 missile-launching and the tu-95 recon-
naissance and targeting aircraft, were relatively slow, and they were evidently not 
difficult targets for U.s. fighters. they were large targets for the aIM-7 sparrows 
shot from f-4 Phantoms. the problem for the aircraft was detection by aeW 
assets. If e-2 (or U.s. air force e-3) crews did their job well, even surface ships, 
such as the numerous oliver Hazard Perry–class guided-missile frigates, could 
contribute to shattering a soviet air raid. despite the supersonic speed of the 
Ksr-5 missiles, it was not a big problem to catch the bombers before they reached 
the launch point.
those planes, by the way, had a very intricate system for the aircrew (of seven 
to eleven, depending on the model and mix of officers and enlisted personnel) 
to save themselves by bailing out. by comparison, the U.s. a3d’s arrangements 
could be considered very effective. While the tail gunner and radio operator (en-
listed or warrant officers), sitting in the small aft cockpit, could bail out by eject-
ing downward (which caused some casualties in accidents on takeoff and land-
ing), the remainder had to leave the plane (by means of a belt transporter on the 
tu-95, free-falling on the tu-16) through a single emergency hatch in the main 
cockpit floor. If the plane lost stability, it was almost impossible. losing stability 
was, in fact, quite possible, owing to the huge asymmetric wing drag caused by 
damaged propellers on the tu-95 or the long, heavy wing itself of the tu-16 (drag 
that could not be countered with thrust, because of the placement of the engine 
nacelles close to the fuselage). ditching a tu-16 was definitely much worse than 
bailing out from one: the main cockpit has only a narrow emergency hatch over-
head, and the aft cockpit has none at all—the tail crew members had to escape 
through the two little “leaf ”-type windows of the tail gunner’s compartment, just 
above the gunhouse.30 Inflight refueling, because of the complicated behavior of 
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these big birds at low speed and the primitive wing-to-wing technology used in 
the Ussr, was almost as dangerous as a combat sortie with live ordnance. all this 
amounted to sufficient grounds for sNaf crews to consider themselves “suicide 
bombers” even without the enemy’s presence.
the picture changed with the tu-22M, tu-22M-2, and tu-22M-3—the back-
fire family—which could reach almost Mach 2. (the pure tu-22, with the engines 
mounted on the tail, was used as a photoreconnaissance plane only; now only the 
M-3 model is in service.) the bird has a crew of just four: pilot, copilot, and two 
navigators—the first shturman (the destination navigator) and second shturman 
(the weapons-system operator, or Wso). all of them are commissioned officers, 
males only, the crew commander (a pilot in the left seat, age twenty-six to thirty) 
being not less in rank than captain. all the seats eject upward, and the overall sur-
vivability of the plane in combat is increased, thanks not only to greater speed but 
also to chaff launchers, warning receivers, active eCM equipment, and a paired 
tail gun that is remotely controlled by the second navigator with the help of opti-
cal and radar targeting systems. this plane significantly improved the combat 
effectiveness of the Mra.
In theory and in occasional training, the plane could carry up to three Kh-
22Ma (or the Ma-1 and Ma-2 versions) antiship missiles, one under the belly 
and two more under the wings. but in anticipated real battle conditions, seasoned 
crews always insisted on just one missile per plane (at belly position), as the wing 
mounts caused an enormous increase in drag and significantly reduced speed 
and range. 
the Kh-22 missile is not a sea skimmer. Moreover, it was designed from the 
outset as a dual-targeted missile, able to strike radar-significant shore targets, 
and the latest version can also be employed as an antiradar missile. the first and 
most numerous model of this missile, the Kh-22Ma, had to see the target with 
its own active radar seeker while still positioned under the bomber’s belly. but 
the speed, reliability, and power of its warhead are quite similar to those of the 
soviet submarine-launched sea skimmers. the price for those capabilities is the 
usual one for a soviet weapon—huge weight and dimensions. the Kh-22 is more 
than eleven meters long and weighs almost six tons, combat ready. the missile 
can travel at Mach 3 for four hundred kilometers. Usually it contains more than a 
ton of an explosive, but it could carry a twenty-to-two-hundred-kiloton nuclear 
warhead instead. 
there is a pool of jokes within the backfire community about the matter of 
who is more important in the tu-22M’s cockpit, pilots or navigators. the back-
seaters (both the navigators’ compartments are behind the pilots’) often claim 
that in a real flight the “front men” are usually doing nothing between takeoff and 
landing, while the shturmans are working hard, maintaining communications, 
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navigating, and targeting the weapon. In reality, the most important jobs are in 
the hands of the Wso, who runs the communication equipment and eCM sets 
as well. 
the doctrine for direct attacks on the carrier task force (carrier battle group 
or carrier strike group) originally included one or two air regiments for each air-
craft carrier—up to seventy tu-16s. However, in the early 1980s a new, improved 
doctrine was developed to concentrate an entire Mra air division (two or three 
regiments) to attack the task force centered around one carrier. this time there 
would be a hundred backfires and badgers per carrier, between seventy and 
eighty of them carrying missiles. as the NortHerN WeddINg and teaM sPIrIt 
exercises usually involved up to three carrier battle groups, it was definitely nec-
essary to have three combat-ready divisions both in northern russia and on the 
Pacific coast of siberia. but at the time, the Mra could provide only two-thirds 
of that strength—the 5th and 57th Mr air divisions of the Northern fleet and 
the 25th and 143rd Mr air divisions of the Pacific fleet. the rest of the divi-
sions needed—that is, one for each region—were to be provided by the vvs da. 
the two air force divisions had the same planes and roughly the same training, 
though according to memoirs of an experienced Mra flyer, lieutenant general 
victor sokerin, during joint training da crews were quite reluctant to fly as far 
out over the open ocean as the Mra crews did, not trusting enough in their own 
navigators’ skills, and tried to stay in the relative vicinity of the shore.31 given the 
complexity of a coordinated strike at up to two thousand miles from the home 
airfield, navigation and communication had become the most important prob-
lems to solve. 
being latent admirers of the vvs ethos, Mra officers and generals always 
tried to use reconnaissance and targeting data provided by air assets, which was 
also most desired by their own command structure. targeting data on the cur-
rent position of the carrier sent by surface ships performing “direct tracking” (a 
ship, typically a destroyer or frigate, sailing within sight of the carrier formation 
to send targeting data to attack assets—what the americans called a “tattletale”), 
were a secondary and less preferable source. No great trust was placed in reports 
from other sources (naval radio reconnaissance, satellites, etc.). lieutenant 
general sokerin, once an operational officer on the Northern fleet Naf staff, 
always asked the fleet staff ’s admirals just to assign him a target, not to define 
the time of the attack force’s departure; that could depend on many factors, such 
as the reliability of targeting data or the weather, that generate little attention in 
nonaviation naval staff work. the Naf staff had its own sources for improving 
the reconnaissance and targeting to help plan the sorties properly. sokerin claims 
that “no admirals grown as surface or submarine warriors can understand how 
military aviation works, either as whole or, needless to say, in details.”32
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as it was, the crews of the field-parked backfires, in the best aviation tradition, 
had to accept the primary flight data during briefings in the regiments’ ready 
rooms. of course, they had the preliminary plans and knew roughly the location 
of the incoming air-sea battle and the abilities of the enemy—the task force’s air 
defenses. In fact, the sorties were carefully planned, going in. but planning was 
very general for the way out. the following conversation in the ready room of the 
Mra’s 183rd air regiment, Pacific fleet Naf, which occurred in the mid-1980s, 
shows this very honestly. a young second lieutenant, a backfire Wso fresh from 
the air college, asked the senior navigator of the regiment, an old major: “sir, tell 
me why we have a detailed flight plan to the target over the vast ocean, but only a 
rough dot-and-dash line across Hokkaido Island on way back?” “son,” answered 
the major calmly, “if your crew manages to get the plane back out of the sky over 
the carrier by any means, on half a wing broken by a Phoenix and a screaming 
prayer, no matter whether it’s somewhere over Hokkaido or directly through 
the moon, it’ll be the greatest possible thing in your entire life!” there may have 
been silent laughter from the shade of a kamikaze in the corner of the room at 
that moment. 
the home fields of Mra units were usually no more than three hundred ki-
lometers from the nearest shoreline (usually much less). each air regiment had 
at least two airstrips, each no less than two thousand meters long, preferably 
concrete ones, and the engineering airfield service could support three fully 
loaded sorties of the entire regiment in thirty-six hours. the efforts of shore 
maintenance were important, as all the missiles, routinely stored in ordnance 
installations, had to be quickly fueled and prepared for attachment to the planes 
before takeoff. 
the takeoff of the regiment usually took about half an hour. While in the air, 
the planes established the cruise formation, maintaining strict radio silence. each 
crew had the targeting data that had been available at the moment of takeoff and 
kept the receivers of the targeting apparatus ready to get detailed targeting, either 
from the air reconnaissance by voice radio or from surface ships or submarines. 
the latter targeting came by high-frequency (Hf) radio, a channel known as Kts 
Chayka (the seagull short-message targeting communication system) that was 
usually filled with targeting data from the MrsC Uspekh (the success maritime 
reconnaissance targeting system), built around the efforts of tu-95rC recon-
naissance planes. the legenda (legend) satellite targeting system receiver was 
turned on also, though not all planes had this device. the backfire’s own eCM 
equipment and radar-warning receivers had to be in service too. With two to four 
targeting channels on each plane, none of them radiating on electromagnetic 
wave bands, the crowd of the backfires ran through the dark skies to the carrier 
task force.
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wHere are THoSe MaD rUSSianS?
generally, detailed data concerning the U.s. air-defense organization were not 
available to soviet naval planners. What they knew was that f-4, and later f-14, 
planes could be directed from three kinds of control points: the Carrier air traf-
fic Control Center on the carrier itself, an e-2 aloft, or the air defense Combat 
Center of one of the aegis cruisers in formation. eavesdropping on the fighter-
direction vHf and ultrahigh-frequency radio circuits by reconnaissance vessels 
and planes gave soviet analysts in 1973–74 roughly the same results as were sub-
sequently noted by late vice admiral arthur Cebrowski: “exercise data indicated 
that sometimes a squadron of f-14s operating without a central air controller was 
more effective in intercepting and destroying attackers than what the algorithms 
said centralized control could provide.”33
sNaf planners found that interceptor crews were quite dependent on the 
opinions of air controllers or fdos, even in essence psychologically subordinate 
to them. so the task of the attackers could be boiled down to finding a way to fool 
those officers—either to overload their sensors or, to some degree, relax their sense 
of danger by posing what were to their minds easily recognizable decoys, which 
were in reality full, combat-ready strikes. by doing so the planners expected to 
slow the reactions of the whole air-defense system, directly producing the “golden 
time” needed to launch the missiles. Contrary to widespread opinion, no consider-
able belief was placed in the ability of launched missiles to resist eCM efforts, but 
the solid and partially armored airframe of the Kh-22 could sustain a significant 
number of the 20 mm shells of Close-In Weapon system (CIWs) guns. (given the 
even more rigid airframe of the submarine-launched missiles of the granit family 
—what Nato called the ss-N-19 shipwreck—it would have been much better 
for the U.s. Navy to use a CIWs of at least 30 mm caliber.) 
things could become even worse for the carriers. In some plans, a whole vvs 
fighter air regiment of su-15tM long-range interceptors would have escorted 
the Mra division, so that the f-14s over the task force might have been over-
whelmed and crowded out by similar soviet birds. though the main targets for 
the sukhois, which as pure interceptors were barely capable of dogfighting, were 
the e-2 Hawkeyes, it is possible that some f-14s could have become targets for 
their long-range air-to-air missiles with active radar seeker (such as r-33, simi-
lar to the aIM-54). sure enough, no sukhoi crews had been expected to return, 
mainly because of their relatively limited range and the fact that they, mostly 
unfamiliar with long flights over the high seas, depended on the bomber crews’ 
navigation skills.
long before reaching the target, at a “split” position approximately five hun-
dred kilometers from the carrier task force, and if the target’s current position had 
been somehow roughly confirmed, the air division’s two regimental formations 
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would divide into two or three parts each. the Wso of each plane adopted his 
own battle course and altitude and a flight plan for each of his missiles. as we’ve 
seen, the early versions of Kh-22 had to acquire the target while on the plane’s 
hard points, making this a terrible job very close to that of a World War II kami-
kaze, because between initial targeting of the carrier by the plane’s radar and mis-
sile launch the backfire itself was no more than a supersonic target for aIM-54s. 
the more Phoenixes that could be carried by a single interceptor, the more 
backfires that could be smashed from the sky prior to the launch of their Kh-
22s. so if the backfires were the only real danger to U.s. carriers up to the fall of 
the Ussr, it would have been much better for the U.s. Navy to use the f-111b, 
a realization of the tfX concept, than the f-14. a tomcat could evidently carry 
the same six Phoenixes as an f-111b, but there were the data that the “turkey” 
could not bring all six back to the carrier, owing to landing-weight limitations. 
Imagine a fully loaded tomcat with six aIM-54s reaching its “bingo point” (limit 
of fuel endurance) while on barrier CaP station, with air refueling unavailable. 
the plane has to land on the carrier, and two of its six missiles have to be jetti-
soned. given the alternating sorts of approaches by backfire waves, reducing the 
overall number of long-range missiles by dropping them into the sea to land f-
14s safely seems silly. admiral thomas Connolly’s claims in the 1960s that killed 
the f-111b in favor of the f-14 (“there isn’t enough power in all Christendom to 
make that airplane what we want!”) could quite possibly have cost the U.s. Navy 
a pair of carriers sunk.34 
the transition of the U.s. Navy from the f-14 to the f/a-18 made the anti-
backfire matter worse. yes, the Hornet, at least the “legacy” (early) Hornet, is 
very pleasant to fly and easy to maintain, but from the point of view of range 
and payload it is a far cry from the f-111b. How could it be otherwise for a jet 
fighter that grew directly from the lightweight f-5? flying and maintaining naval 
airplanes are not always just for fun; sometimes it takes long hours of hard work 
to achieve good results, and it had always been at least to some degree harder for 
naval flyers than for their shore-based air force brethren doing the same thing. 
enjoying the Hornet’s flying qualities at the expense of the Phoenix’s long-range-
kill abilities is not a good trade-off. also, the Hornet (strike fighter) community 
evidently has generally replaced its old fighter ethos with something similar to 
the “light attack,” “earthmover” philosophy of the vietnam-era a-4 (and later 
a-7) “day attack” squadrons; all the wars and battle operations since 1990 seem 
to prove it. It is really good for the present situation that the ethos of f/a-18 
strike fighter pilots is not the self-confident bravado of the f-14 crews but comes 
out of more realistic views. yet for the defense of carrier task forces, it was not 
clever to abandon the fast, heavy interceptor, able to launch long-range air-to-air 
missiles—at least to abandon it completely. 
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to fool the fdos, the incoming backfires had to be able to saturate the air 
with chaff. Moreover, knowing the position of the carrier task force is not the 
same as knowing the position of the carrier itself. there were at least two cases 
when in the center of the formation there was, instead of the carrier, a large 
fleet oiler or replenishment vessel with an enhanced radar signature (making it 
look as large on the backfires’ radar screens as a carrier) and a radiating tacti-
cal air navigation system. the carrier itself, contrary to routine procedures, was 
steaming completely alone, not even trailing the formation. to know for sure 
the carrier’s position, it was desirable to observe it visually. to do that, a special 
recce-attack group (razvedyvatel’no-udarnaya gruppa, rUg) could be detached 
from the Mra division formation. the rUg consisted of a pair of the tu-16r 
reconnaissance badgers and a squadron of tu-22M backfires. the former flew 
ahead of the latter and extremely low (not higher than two hundred meters, for 
as long as 300–350 kilometers) to penetrate the radar screen field of the carrier 
task force, while the latter were as high as possible, launching several missiles 
from maximum range, even without proper targeting, just to catch the attention 
of aeW crews and barrier CaP fighters. Meanwhile, those two reconnaissance 
badgers, presumably undetected, made the dash into the center of the task force 
formation and found the carrier visually, their only task to send its exact position 
to the entire division by radio. of course, nobody in those badgers’ crews (six 
or seven officers and men per plane) counted on returning; it was 100 percent a 
suicide job. 
after the rUg sent the position of the carrier and was shattered to debris, the 
main attack group (Ug, udarnaya gruppa) launched the main missile salvo. the 
Ug consisted of a demonstration group, an eCM group armed with antiradar 
missiles of the K-11 model, two to three strike groups, and a post-strike recon-
naissance group. different groups approached from different directions and at 
different altitudes, but the main salvo had to be made simultaneously by all of 
the strike groups’ planes. the prescribed time slot for the entire salvo was just 
one minute for best results, no more than two minutes for satisfactory ones. If 
the timing became wider in an exercise, the entire main attack was considered 
unsuccessful. 
Moreover, in plans, three to five planes in each regimental strike had to carry 
missiles with nuclear warheads. It was calculated that up to twelve hits by missiles 
with regular warheads would be needed to sink a carrier; by contrast, a single 
nuclear-armed missile hit could produce the same result. In any case, almost all 
soviet anticarrier submarine assets had nuclear-armed anticarrier missiles and 
torpedoes on board for routine patrols.35 
Having launched their missiles, it was up to the crews, as has been noted 
above, to find their way back. because of the possibility of heavy battle damage, 
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it was reasonable to consider the use of intermediate airfields and strips for emer-
gency or crash landings, mainly on the distant islands, even inhabited ones, in the 
soviet or Warsaw Pact exclusive economic zones. the concept of using the arctic 
ice fields for this purpose was adopted, by not only the Mra but the vvs (inter-
ceptors of the su-15, tu-128, and Mig-25/31 varieties) too. though the concept 
of maintaining such temporary icing strips had been accepted, with the thought 
that planes could be refueled, rearmed, and even moderately repaired in such a 
setting, it was not a big feature of war plans. the vvs as a whole was eager to use 
captured airfields, particularly ones in northern Norway, but the Mra paid little 
attention to this possibility, because the complexity of aerodrome maintenance 
of its large planes, with their intricate weapons and systems, was considered un-
realistic at hostile bases, which would quite possibly be severely damaged before 
or during their capture. 
all in all, the expected loss rate was 50 percent of a full strike—meaning that 
the equivalent of an entire Mra air regiment could be lost in action to a carrier 
task force’s air defenses, independent of the strike’s outcome.
an Umi YUkaba For THe SUrFace anD SUBMarine  
coMMUniTieS 
although the first massive missile strikes on carrier task forces had to be per-
formed by sNaf/da forces, there were at least two other kinds of missile carriers 
in the soviet Navy.36 the first were guided-missile ships, mostly in the form of 
cruisers (Cgs), those of Project 58 (the Nato Kynda class), Project 1144 (Kirov 
class), and Project 1164 (Slava class).37 Moreover, all the “aircraft-carrying cruis-
ers” of Project 1143 (the Kiev class, generally thought of as aircraft carriers in the 
West) had the same antiship cruise missiles as the Cgs of Project 1164. also, the 
destroyers of Project 956 (Sovremenny class) could be used in this role, as well 
as all the ships (the Nato Kresta and Kara classes) armed with asW missiles 
of the type 85r/rU/rUs (rastrub/Metel, or socket/snowstorm) family, which 
could be used in an antiship mode. the main form of employment of guided-
missile ships was the task force (operativnoye soedinenie, in russian), as well as 
the above-noted direct-tracking ship or small tactical groups of ships with the 
same job (KNs or gKNs, respectively, in russian).
the other anticarrier missile carriers were nuclear-powered guided-missile 
submarines (ssgNs), in a vast number of projects and types, using either surface 
or submerged launch. the most deadly of these were the Project 949a boats 
(Nato oscar IIs), with P-700 granit missiles. (the ssgN Kursk, recently lost to 
uncertain causes, was one of them.) the operational organization for the subma-
rine forces performing the anticarrier mission was the Pad (protivo-avianosnaya 
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divisiya, anticarrier division), which included the ssgNs, two for each target car-
rier, and nuclear-powered attack submarines for support. In sum, up to fifteen 
nuclear submarines would deploy into the deep oceans to attack carrier task 
forces. one Pad was ready to be formed from the submarine units of the North-
ern fleet, and one, similarly, was ready to assemble in the Pacific fleet. 
a detailed description of the tactics and technologies of all those various as-
sets is beyond the aim of this article, but one needs an idea of how it worked as 
a whole. the core of national anticarrier doctrine was cooperative usage of all 
those reconnaissance and launch platforms. While they understood this fact, the 
staffs of the soviet Navy had no definite order, manual, or handbook for planning 
anticarrier actions except the “tactical guidance for task forces” (known as tr 
os-79), issued in 1979 and devoted mainly to operational questions of surface 
actions, until 1993, when “tactical guidance for Joint Multitype forces” entered 
staff service. the latter document was the first and ultimate guidance for the 
combined efforts of the Mra, surface task forces, and submerged Pads, stating 
as the overall goal the sinking of the designated target carriers at sea with a prob-
ability of 85 percent. 
It is no secret that the officers of the surface community who served on the 
guided-missile ships counted on surviving a battle against a U.s. Navy carrier 
air wing for twenty or thirty minutes and no more. In reality, the abilities of the 
surface-to-air missiles (saMs) installed on the ships were far less impressive than 
the fear they drew from U.s. experts. for example, the bow launcher of the storm 
saM on the Kresta- and Kara-class asW destroyers shared a fire-control system 
with the Metel asW missile. It would be quite possible for U.s. aircraft to drop 
a false sound target (imitating a submarine) ahead of the soviet formation to be 
sure that the bow fire-control radars would be busy with the guidance of asW 
missiles for a while. the bow saM launchers of the destroyers of these classes 
would be useless all this time, allowing air attacks from ahead. even “iron” bombs 
could mark the targets.
ssgNs were evidently considered in the West to be the safest asset of the 
soviet Navy during an attack, but it was not the case. the problem was hiding 
in the radio communications required: two hours prior to the launch, all the 
submarines of the Pad were forced to hold periscope depth and lift their high-
frequency-radio and satellite communication antennas up into the air, just to get 
the detailed targeting data from reconnaissance assets directly (not via the staffs 
ashore or afloat); targeting via low- or very-low-frequency cable antennas took 
too much time and necessarily involved shore transmitting installations, which 
could be destroyed at any moment. there was little attention paid to buoy com-
munication systems (because of the considerable time under arctic ice usual for 
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soviet submarines). thus the telescoping antennas in a row with the periscopes 
at the top of the conning tower were the submarine’s only communication means 
with the proper radio bandwidth. Having all ten or fifteen boats in a Pad at shal-
low depth long before the salvo was not the best way to keep them secure. also, 
the salvo itself had to be carried out in close coordination with the surface fleet 
and Mra divisions. 
However, the main problem was not the intricacy of coordination but targeting 
—that is, how to find the carrier task forces at sea and to maintain a solid, con-
stant track of their current positions. despite the existence of air reconnaissance 
systems such as Uspekh, satellite systems like legenda, and other forms of intel-
ligence and observation, the most reliable source of targeting of carriers at sea 
was the direct-tracking ship. Indeed, if you see a carrier in plain sight, the only 
problem to solve is how to radio reliably the reports and targeting data against 
the U.s. electronic countermeasures. Ironically, since the time lag of soviet mili-
tary communication systems compared to the Nato ones is quite clear, the old 
Morse wireless telegraph used by the soviet ships was the long-established way 
to solve that problem. With properly trained operators, Morse keying is the only 
method able to resist active jamming in the Hf band. for example, the soviet 
diesel-electric, Whiskey-class submarine S-363, aground in the vicinity of the 
swedish naval base at Karlskrona in 1981, managed to communicate with its staff 
solely by Morse, despite a swedish eCM station in the line of sight. all the other 
radio channels were effectively jammed and suppressed. While obsolete, strictly 
speaking, and very limited in information flow, Morse wireless communication 
was long the most serviceable for the soviet Navy, owing to its simplicity and 
reliability.38 
but the direct tracker was definitely no more than another kind of kamikaze. It 
was extremely clear that if a war started, these ships would be sent to the bottom 
immediately. given that, the commanding officer of each had orders to behave 
like a rat caught in a corner: at the moment of war declaration or when spe-
cifically ordered, after sending the carrier’s position by radio, he would shell the 
carrier’s flight deck with gunfire, just to break up the takeoff of prepared strikes, 
fresh CaP patrols, or anything else. being usually within the arming zone of his 
own antiship missiles and having no time to prepare a proper torpedo salvo, the 
“d-tracker’s” captain had to consider his ship’s guns and rocket-propelled depth 
charges to be the best possible ways to interfere with flight-deck activity. He could 
even ram the carrier, and some trained their ship’s companies to do so; the image 
of a “near miss,” of the bow of a soviet destroyer passing just clear of their own 
ship’s quarter, is deeply impressed in the memory of some people who served on 
board U.s. aircraft carriers in those years. 
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careFUl eSTiMaTion oF coST iS liKe an icY SHower (oF 
coMMon SenSe) 
In any case, there was a time when the U.s. Navy’s aircraft carriers were the worst 
enemies of the whole soviet Navy. that time is in the past now, but in spite of 
changed emotions, the “national anticarrier approach” as a model for other navies 
is still alive and could be applied to the current U.s. carrier fleet. the Chinese, for 
example, have added ballistic missiles to this general approach, in a way that has 
been effectively scaring U.s. naval staffs and analysts. While this is not the time 
to remember the blood and horror of okinawa, let me state that such a campaign, 
being asymmetrical by nature, requires such huge human sacrifice that there is no 
great difference from the kamikaze conception, if scholars are objective about it. 
one can imagine how strong would be the attempts of U.s. armed forces and 
their allies in the region to find and bomb df-21d launchers, with enormous 
loss of lives, both young Westerners and asians in uniform and collateral victims 
in the heavily populated mainland of China. Moreover, such a ballistic weapon 
cannot be deadly without active radar guidance, and since no properly reliable 
phased-array antenna can be stuffed into multiple, independently targetable re-
entry vehicles, it is doubtful that the use of those missiles against carriers makes 
sense without nuclear warheads. also, unfortunately, while posing a great threat 
to U.s. carriers at sea, this kind of asymmetrical naval warfare is not a cent less 
expensive, proportionally, for the country with the balanced carrier fleet than for 
the challenger. 
last, but not least—this kind of naval warfare claims human blood. Wars 
inevitably end, but the people killed in action cannot return to life. the deaths 
of brave and skilled warriors make the nation bloodless and weak. We russians 
have always won our wars by obligatory military drafts: our victories, being of 
the land-warfare kind every time, have been the victories of conscripts, without 
exception. thus it is the greatest job for each of our career military officers, de-
spite rank or service—as it should be for those of any country—to return these 
youngsters to their mothers and girls alive. People would probably feel much 
better if they could find ways to achieve unbreakable deterrence rather than to 
mount an irresistible strike. the strikes themselves are always defendable in this 
real world, but there is no invincible defense. 
n o T e S 
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“WINNING” THE PaCIFIC WaR
 Criticisms leveled at the Japanese for their “ill conceived” or “poorly planned” attack at Pearl Harbor on 7 december 1941 have failed to consider the true 
depth of vision and professional intellect of its principal architect, Commander 
Minoru genda.1 Charges of failure to execute follow-on attacks against the har-
bor facilities, if any such attacks were planned at all, or to exploit the immediate 
advantages created in the Central Pacific after the attack are commonly made by 
both academic and professional military scholars. genda has suffered the brunt 
of this criticism. but in fact genda’s plans were neither ill conceived nor poorly 
assembled—they were just not executed as originally envisioned. 
the generally understood intent behind the Pearl Harbor attack was to delay 
the westward advance of the U.s. Pacific fleet for 
up to six months, allowing Japan to complete the 
occupation and consolidation of the area it had 
designated the greater east asian Co-Prosperity 
sphere.2 the attack at Pearl Harbor accomplished 
this aim. In the overall Japanese plan, the south-
ern operation—the army’s offensives toward the 
east Indies and southeast asia—was the main 
military effort. However, for genda, the Pearl 
Harbor attack had to be much more than just a 
tactical strike; it had to be the decisive action of 
the war, and he conceptualized his operational 
plans accordingly.3 a veritable treasure of unex-
amined transcripts of interviews conducted by the 
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historian gordon Prange reveals the depth of foresight and professional wisdom 
of genda’s concept of operations.
between 1946 and 1951 Prange conducted no fewer than fifty-three interviews 
with genda and other key Combined fleet staff planners, especially Commander 
yasuji Watanabe, the staff logistics officer, and Captain Kameto Kuroshima, the 
senior staff officer. the majority of english-language authors researching and 
writing on the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor have cited Prange’s own at Dawn 
we Slept and documents collected by Prange—affidavits and planning materials 
—published after his death.4 few authors have referenced the original genda, 
Watanabe, or Kuroshima interviews. 
a detailed review of Prange’s interviews with genda reveals a singular focus 
on what genda viewed as the centerpiece for any war in the Pacific between Ja-
pan and the United states—that is, Pearl Harbor. genda’s “war winning” strategy 
rested on concentration of military efforts against the americans, with an inva-
sion of the Hawaiian Islands as the opening move. genda realized the military 
potential inherent in Pearl Harbor. the base and its central geographical position 
in the Pacific were the key to winning the war in the Pacific. His original concept 
of operations for attack against Pearl Harbor was designed to deliver the base 
to the Japanese or, alternatively, deny it to the americans. a detailed analysis of 
his original and subsequent plans reveals a depth of professional understand-
ing remarkable for someone of the relatively junior rank of commander as to 
the strategic context of the war that Japan was about to start. Had his propos-
als been followed, the initial conditions in which the United states would have 
been compelled to wage war would have been significantly altered. as it was, 
however, genda’s plans ran counter to traditional Japanese military strategy and 
were considered unpalatable by the other members of the Combined fleet staff. 
Ultimately, the defeat of Japan was culminated before the foresight and validity 
of genda’s original vision could be appreciated. 
to understand better the strategic relevance of genda’s vision, it is necessary 
to grasp the larger context of Japanese military planning and decision making. 
In particular, two issues need to be understood: the unique nature of the mili-
tary within the government, and the role of the Philippines in Japanese military 
thinking. Under the Japanese constitution, the civil and military functions of 
the government were separated, with clearly delineated lines of authority—one 
through the cabinet to the civil agencies of the government, the other through 
the service chiefs to military forces. each was independent of the other and acted 
in the name of the emperor. In actual practice, however, the military exercised a 
veto over the civil government, by virtue of the fact that the war and navy min-
isters could force the resignation of the prime minister and the formation of a 
new government simply by resigning themselves. No cabinet could exist without 
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the war and navy ministers.5 In time of war, moreover, the nation was completely 
dominated by the military—not only militarily but economically and politically. 
the military was divided into two independent entities, the Imperial Japanese 
army (IJa) and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). the two services had their 
own organic air forces and in the interwar years saw the coming conflict from 
completely different perspectives.6 Japan envisioned three enemies: China, rus-
sia, and the United states. the first two were viewed as the IJa’s problem, while 
any war with the United states would be fought at sea and therefore would be, for 
the most part, a matter for the IJN. from the IJa perspective, war began on 7 July 
1937, with the sudden expansion of ongoing fighting in China and commitment 
of a significant portion of the army’s resources there. the number of Japanese 
troops in China rose from 700,000 in 1937 to 850,000 by the end of 1939.7
Continuing the war in China and maintaining the gains won there largely 
underpinned Japanese strategic thinking both politically and militarily. However, 
by late 1941 the success of german armies in europe and the weakened states of 
the Netherlands and britain presented a perfect opportunity to expel british and 
dutch influence from east asia. the conditions, in fact, were favorable for Japan 
to construct, having consolidated its sphere of autonomy and security in China, 
a new order in greater east asia under Japanese rule.8 
operations aimed at securing that new order beyond China would primarily 
be the task of the navy, waged against not only the british and dutch but neces-
sarily the americans as well, and the Philippines would be strategically critical 
for their first phase. the Philippines represented a key factor in the concept of 
the “decisive naval battle” between battleships, which was the centerpiece of IJN 
doctrine and planning in the interwar period. supporters of this theory believed 
that a war with the United states would be decided by one great naval battle. to 
win it, the IJN had two problems: it had to find a way to lure the U.s. Pacific fleet 
into waters close to Japan, where the Japanese planned to fight the battle, and it 
had to reduce the american advantage in battleships. the capture of the Philip-
pines was viewed as the “bait” necessary to entice the americans westward. from 
bases in the Marshalls, Marianas, Carolinas, and other mandated islands, Japa-
nese submarines and aircraft would attack the approaching Pacific fleet to reduce 
its strength. When the opposing forces finally met for the decisive engagement, 
there would be parity, or even a Japanese advantage, in battleships.9 
the other strategic value of the Philippines Islands was their location between 
Japan and the coveted resources of the dutch east Indies. once the dutch east 
Indies were occupied, the bulk of the raw materials needed to sustain the Japa-
nese economy would have to be transported north past the Philippines to Japan.10 
the Japanese faced in this respect an operational dilemma of risk management. 
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two options were available:
•	 option one: attack and take the dutch and british territories only, accept the 
operational risks posed by american forces astride sea lines of communica-
tions, and if the americans engaged militarily, only then attack U.s. assets 
and territories. 
•	 option two: take the Philippines at the outset, reducing the operational risk 
to Japanese sea-lanes, and plan for the war with the United states that this 
action would bring.  
deciding on the first option would mean that such key american possessions as 
Wake and guam could not be attacked at the outset.
on 18 october 1941, emperor Hirohito directed Prime Minister Hideki tōjō 
to conduct a far-reaching and comprehensive policy review of Japan’s position 
from an economic, political, and military perspective. the resulting review con-
sisted of responses to eleven questions posed by the emperor, of which the eighth 
was the most critical: “Could one limit the war adversaries only to Holland or 
only to great britain and Holland?” Politically the answer was yes, but military 
reasoning held sway, and the answer given was no. In the end, the Japanese mili-
tary was unwilling to accept the operational-level risks associated with leaving 
the Philippines in american hands during its initial operations.11 the decision 
was therefore made to take them, for the following purposes, as listed in the 
Japanese plans:
•	 to deny to american ground, sea, and air forces the use of the Philippines as 
an advance base of operations
•	 to secure the line of communications between the occupied areas in the 
south and Japan proper
•	 to acquire intermediate staging areas and supply bases needed to facilitate 
operations in the southern area.12
given that war with the United states was now inevitable, the Japanese had 
to design a campaign that would acquire the territories needed to sustain Japan’s 
economy; destroy the american, british, and dutch ability to project power in 
the Pacific; and then transport the raw materials of the acquired territories back 
to the home islands. It is important to note that there was no broad strategic plan 
to prosecute the war so as to achieve these objectives, coordinating all aspects of 
the effort and the national resources needed. this reality deterred joint campaign 
planning. the IJN and IJa prepared their own plans, negotiating with each other 
only as necessary to execute them. these discussions were limited to specific 
operations and did not generate a national focus. since the IJa was the more 
powerful of the two services, it usually had its way and could veto proposed IJN 
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plans. When consensus was reached on the methodology of a specific operation, 
Imperial general Headquarters issued an “agreement,” not an operational order.13 
Critically, large-scale amphibious operations could not be conducted without the 
consent of the IJa, which would be providing the troops. 
the planning equation was complicated even further by the fact that the Naval 
general staff (Ngs) and admiral Isoroku yamamoto, commander in chief of the 
Combined fleet, had differing views as to the sequencing and priorities of the 
initial operations.14 yamamoto’s greatest priority was the destruction of the threat 
posed by the U.s. Pacific fleet. He wanted its battleships crippled or destroyed as 
early as possible, which would then facilitate operations to the south. the Ngs, 
however, focused on southeast asia and the southwestern Pacific. It wanted all 
effort concentrated on the capture of these areas as soon as possible, so that their 
raw materials could be acquired. In the Ngs plans, the Pacific fleet would be 
dealt with as needed when it decided to appear.15 
the problem for yamamoto was that the Ngs strategy did not deal with 
the major threat posed by the Pacific fleet, then stationed in Hawaii. the Ngs 
plan, operationally offensive in the south, was operationally defensive in the east 
against the americans. It did not include a strike on Pearl Harbor. the Ngs strat-
egy was designed to win early in the south but reflected no clear understanding 
of how to terminate the conflict at that point, with Japanese gains intact. It also 
had the disadvantage of relinquishing the initiative in the Central Pacific to the 
United states. 
yamamoto, however, was convinced that the Japanese could not penetrate 
the southern region successfully without a prior strike against the Pacific fleet.16 
He and a selected group of naval officers who had visited the United states and 
witnessed its industrial capacity knew that Japan could not win a protracted war 
with that nation. they realized that Japan’s operational advantage would be at 
its peak at the very beginning of the war. Its operations, in attacking a decidedly 
stronger opponent, had to maximize the elements of speed, concentration of 
force, and surprise, and above all else they had to retain the initiative. yamamoto 
concluded that he had to do his best to decide the fate of the war at its outset.17 
He believed that this could be achieved only if Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on 
the very first day of the war and destroyed the Pacific fleet there. the task of de-
veloping the plan to attack Pearl Harbor was eventually assigned to Commander 
Minoru genda.
THe “MaD” MinorU genDa 
gordon Prange (writing in 1947) describes genda as follows:
He was quite small in stature with a peculiar filipine [sic] expression and manner in 
his gesture and conversation. I noticed too that he had a pair of sharp penetrating 
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eyes and a quick and agile mind; in fact he impressed me as having somewhat of a 
trigger brain; he thinks much more quickly and more to the point than the average 
Japanese. after he warmed up to the subject [during his interviews with Prange] I 
found that his whole attitude was sympathetic. It is my honest conviction that he was 
truthful in everything he said.
Prange adds that genda seemed a shrewd observer, a keen judge of men and of 
situations, and the possessor of more penetration and liberalness of thought than 
one would expect of a man of the Japanese military caste of that era.18 
genda graduated from the Cadet school in 1924 at the top of his class, listing 
mathematics, strategy, and tactics as his favorite subjects. He had a reputation for 
having a progressive mind and being full of ideas, traits that placed him in stark 
contrast to his typically conservative classmates. In december 1928 he began a 
year of flight training at the Kasumigaura air Corps; subsequently he became a 
member of the naval fighter corps and received numerous assignments to the 
yokosuka air Corps and the carriers akagi and ryūjō.19 
In 1935, genda was selected to attend the Naval War College and in 1936 
submitted a report in response to a call for papers on the theme of a suitable 
armament of the Japanese navy for an encounter with the United states. genda 
proposed that the navy focus on airpower—carriers and land-based bombers 
and fighters should become the new capital elements of the fleet. He advocated 
directing the navy’s expansion efforts toward the enlargement of the carrier, and 
also submarine forces, essentially making battleships irrelevant, by giving op-
posing battle fleets “nothing to shoot at.” In fact, his proposal involved scrapping 
battleships. genda felt that Japan could achieve control of the sea only if it went 
on the offensive and could achieve victory only if it had air superiority over any 
potential enemy fleet or base.20 genda would later claim that the students and 
instructors could not defeat his theories but still called him “mad.” despite the 
obvious unpopularity of his academic writings, however, genda graduated sec-
ond in his class, in July 1937.21 
the idea that the main elements of the Japanese fleet should be aircraft car-
riers protected by lighter ships was suggested almost simultaneously by two 
other sources within the IJN as well: Captain takijiro onishi (commander of the 
yokosuka Naval air force) and several pilots assigned to the Combined fleet. 
While an airpower focus was roundly dismissed by the mainstream IJN, the 
concept motivated the creation of an airpower research Committee to study “air 
effectiveness” for naval operations. In particular, its members were to investigate 
the effectiveness of air attacks against warships with bombs and torpedoes. the 
data obtained from experiments conducted by the committee were later used in 
conceptualizing the attack against Pearl Harbor.22 
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after graduation, genda was sent to China on the staff of the 2nd Combined 
fleet air Corps. the air corps employed thirty-six fighters, thirty-six dive-
bombers, and thirty-six horizontal bombers in operations throughout China. 
during his short tenure in that theater (July–december 1937), the Chinese were 
able to challenge Japanese air superiority. genda experimented with numerous 
ways of using naval fighters to support air operations, in particular as escorts for 
long-range bombing attacks. genda is credited with developing the concept of 
advanced refueling bases close to Chinese lines. such bases extended the shorter 
combat radius of naval fighters, allowing them to refuel on the way either to or 
back from their targets.23 
the lessons learned from the operations over China fundamentally shaped 
genda’s thinking about air warfare. the Japanese were experimenting with the 
projection of naval airpower ashore, utilizing long-range strategic bombing, 
fighter escort, and strafing as deliberate missions.24 the fundamental rule of any 
air battle, in turn, was to gain immediate control of the local air by eliminating 
the defensive activity of enemy fighter planes.25 China convinced genda that 
fighters were a more powerful factor than he had previously realized and that 
they were most effective used offensively, to control the air war: “the most ef-
fective and wise way of making use of fighter units was to use them positively in 
seeking a decisive engagement with enemy fighters in the air. to this end, the use 
of fighters on other missions such as escorting bombers or surface forces should 
be limited as much as permissible.”26 genda’s conclusions reinforced the propen-
sity of Japanese fighter pilots to seek duels with other fighters at the expense of 
protecting bombers. 
the second important lesson that genda learned from China concerned mass: 
“facts evidently proved that piecemeal attacks could not inflict destructive dam-
age; in order to launch effective bombings, a destructive blow should be given in 
a short while [i.e., over a short period of time], using a great number of planes 
at one time.” genda’s China experience reinforced his belief that without a siz-
able air fleet, both carrier- and land-based, Japan could not engage in modern 
warfare.27 
In december 1938 genda was appointed as the assistant naval attaché at the 
Japanese embassy in london. He arrived there in March 1939 and remained 
until september 1940. genda’s mission was to gather as much information as he 
could on british air forces. the outbreak of war in europe and the air combat that 
developed allowed genda to crystallize his thoughts on airpower. once again he 
witnessed the impact of mass, whereby “the Nazis’ use of air forces en masse, in 
one wave or in successive waves, evidently proved very effective in spite of their 
inferior abilities.”28 
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genda was convinced by all this that air superiority was the key to success 
in any campaign, land or sea, and that air superiority was a function of mass 
and possession of superior fighter aircraft.29 (at this point, genda was unaware 
of the existence and performance capabilities of the Japanese Zero fighter.) He 
feared that Japanese naval authorities would draw the wrong conclusions from 
the air war in europe, since Japanese naval officers kept pointing out that even 
germany’s huge air fleets were unable to defeat or damage the ships of the royal 
Navy. genda countered with the fact that german pilots were trained to partici-
pate in land-centric campaigns and not over the seas.30 on his return to Japan, 
genda began a campaign to change thinking about aircraft design. In particular, 
Japanese naval aircraft were not protected by armor; their fuel tanks and pilots 
were exposed. He pointed out that the german planes protected both and argued 
that these changes were necessary for all Japanese planes.31 
In November 1940 genda was posted on board the aircraft carrier Kaga as the 
air staff officer of the 1st Carrier division and tasked with preparing a new train-
ing program for carrier warfare. His experiences in both China and the United 
Kingdom had convinced genda that to attack an enemy effectively, airpower had 
to be concentrated. If carriers were scattered—as they currently were, in different 
fleets—it would be too difficult to concentrate combat power on one objective. 
the carriers had to be grouped together, and they had to maneuver as a unit. He 
reasoned that a massed formation would enhance both the defensive and offen-
sive natures of carrier warfare. Concentration would allow the carriers to pool 
fighter resources for their own defense, making remaining fighters available to be 
used offensively in support of torpedo and bombing planes. 
the new concept of concentrating carriers was accepted by the commander 
of the tateyama Naval air detachment, rear admiral Michitaro totsuka, but 
what “concentration” meant with respect to numbers and tactical dispositions 
of carriers needed to be determined. the concept was tested with the carriers 
Kaga, Hiryū, and Sōryū of the 1st and 2nd air squadrons.32 akagi had begun 
an overhaul in November 1940 and was unavailable. the formal realization of 
carrier concentration came with the formation of the 1st air fleet, composed of 
the 1st (akagi, Kaga), 2nd (Hiryū, Sōryū), and 3rd (light carriers Zuihō, Hōshō) 
Carrier divisions, under the command of vice admiral Chūichi Nagumo, on 10 
april 1941.33 
In february 1941, genda was called to a meeting with takijiro onishi, now 
a rear admiral and chief of staff of the eleventh air fleet. besides enjoying 
yamamoto’s trust and confidence, onishi was rated as one of Japan’s few genuine 
“air admirals.” though primarily concerned at the time with land-based avia-
tion, onishi was a vigorous advocate of carrier warfare.34 yamamoto had asked 
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onishi to begin a study on the possibility of using the air squadrons of the 1st 
and 2nd Carrier divisions for a surprise attack against the american fleet at 
Pearl Harbor.
onishi showed genda a three-page letter that yamamoto had sent him. In 
it yamamoto proposed the use of torpedo bombers on a one-way mission. the 
torpedo bombers were to be launched five hundred miles from Pearl Harbor, a 
distance that was beyond their normal combat radius. once they were launched, 
the carriers would return to Japan. the torpedo planes would complete the at-
tack and then fly back in the direction of the task force and ditch at sea; destroy-
ers would pick up the aircrews. yamamoto wanted to target only battleships. 
He appreciated the importance of destroying aircraft carriers but believed that 
the psychological effect on the american people of destroying all the american 
battleships would be greater than that of the destruction of carriers.35 
genda returned to Kaga and worked on a plan of his own for about two weeks. 
genda supported yamamoto’s concept of a surprise attack but bitterly opposed 
the proposed tactics. a one-way attack would not allow for follow-on attacks, 
which were necessary to achieve decisive effect. Using only torpedo bombers 
made the attack one-dimensional, which meant that if conditions were not perfect 
—if, for example, the weather or visibility were poor or the americans were 
alerted—the effects would be minimized. genda wanted a coordinated attack, 
one that combined torpedo, dive-, and horizontal bombers, protected by fighters. 
His approach provided for multiple methods of attack and could deal with almost 
any situation, including, if necessary, the aircraft having to fight their way in to 
the target. a coordinated attack had greater flexibility and a higher probability 
of success. genda opposed yamamoto’s plan also because he viewed it as a ter-
rible waste of aircraft and probably of highly trained pilots as well (the proposed 
rescues at sea being highly problematic), which Japan could not easily replace.36 
the basic elements of genda’s proposed plan were as follows: 
•	 the main objectives of the attack should be the american carriers (because 
he felt that they would be the real capital ships of the coming war) and land-
based planes. 
•	 the blow had to be strong enough to eliminate the american fleet as a threat 
for at least six months—the time considered necessary to occupy the dutch 
east Indies. 
•	 all of Japan’s carrier strength should be used, without exception. torpedo 
bombers would deliver the main attack, but because it was not known 
whether torpedoes could be successfully launched in the shallow waters of 
Pearl Harbor, shorter-range dive-bombers also had to be employed.
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•	 the range of Japanese carriers was not enough to permit a trip to Pearl Har-
bor and back; therefore Japan had to study and perfect at-sea replenishment 
in the harsh conditions expected of the North Pacific. 
•	 the operation had to be a complete surprise.
genda concluded that the operation would be difficult but not impossible.37 
genda briefed his proposal to onishi, and the two officers discussed it for 
about two hours. genda argued that it was desirable to land forces on oahu im-
mediately after the air raid, thus making the attack decisive by denying the amer-
icans the means to project power across the Central Pacific. onishi dismissed 
the idea, holding that Japan’s power was not sufficient to permit simultaneous 
operations in the Philippines, the Indies, and oahu.38 
onishi submitted genda’s draft unedited to yamamoto, adding his own com-
ments and thoughts separately, in March 1941. onishi’s ten-page (according 
genda in postwar interviews) report does not survive, and it is not clear whether 
—though the paper included all of genda’s recommendations and a few of oni-
shi’s own—the idea of invading oahu was part of it. onishi wanted to target U.s. 
cruisers, in order to unbalance the american fleet. also, he favored horizontal 
bombing over dive-bombing, because bombs dropped by dive-bombing did not 
have sufficient velocity to penetrate the armor of battleships, and horizontal 
bombing would minimize Japanese casualties.39 
While the concept of an attack against Pearl Harbor remained in the fore-
fronts of the minds of those who were aware of what yamamoto was thinking, 
formal, detailed planning for the attack did not happen until the fall of 1941. In 
the interim, the 1st air fleet concentrated on improving the tactical dispositions 
and maneuvering of the carriers and the bombing accuracy and technique of 
aircrews. yamamoto eventually accepted the idea of repeated attacks to achieve a 
decisive result.40 that having been decided, yamamoto did not interfere with the 
planning effort. He now focused on convincing the Ngs to allow him to execute 
the operation.41
THe JaPaneSe Plan For war
Commander yasuji Watanabe, a trusted member of yamamoto’s Combined fleet 
staff, later described the conceptual foundation of the opening Japanese opera-
tions in this way: 
In Japanese tactics we are told when we have two enemies, one in front and one in 
the back, first we must cut in front by sword. only cut and not kill but make it hard. 
then we attack the back enemy and kill him. then we come back to the front enemy 
and kill him. this time we took that tactic, having no aim to capture Pearl Harbor but 
just to cripple it. We might have returned to capture later.42
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the basic Japanese plan for war, placed into effect in december 1941, con-
sisted of three phases: 
Phase one: the seizure of the southern areas; the attack on the United states fleet 
in Hawaii, and the seizure of strategic areas and positions for the establishment of a 
perimeter for the defense of the southern resources area and the Japanese Main-
land. the area to be seized was that within the line which joins the Kuriles, Marshalls 
(including Wake), bismarcks, timor, Java, sumatra, Malaya, and burma.
Phase two: Consolidation and strengthening of the defensive perimeter, and
Phase three: the interception and destruction of any attacking strength, which 
might threaten the defensive perimeter or the vital areas within the perimeter. Con-
currently with intercept operations the activation of plans to destroy the United states 
will to fight. 
through these three phases, the Japanese hoped to attain their strategic goal of 
economic self-sufficiency.43 
the Ngs’s existing orders to yamamoto contained two main tasks: one, the 
destruction of the enemy fleet or fleets; and two, coordination with the army in 
capturing and gaining control of the southern area. the methods to be employed 
in the destruction of the enemy fleet were up to yamamoto, but he could not 
activate any plan without the approval of the Ngs. regarding the second task, 
the duty of the navy was to support the army’s efforts with both its fleet and its 
land-based air force.44 
Japanese military planners were now faced with moving forces rapidly over 
long distances to acquire the key strategic territories of the Co-Prosperity sphere 
while defeating any allied forces present. gains would have to be defended 
against the inevitable allied counterattacks. Having limited warships, transports, 
and ground forces for the tasks envisioned, the planners had to use key forces for 
multiple tasks.45 this necessity resulted in the decision to sequence the elements 
of Phase one. success was dependent on Japan’s ability to seize and maintain the 
initiative. Maximum use would have to be made of airpower to prepare and shape 
the battle space. Phase one was to be completed in 150 days. 
the following critical assumptions guided Japanese planning and decision 
making leading up to the outbreak of war:
•	 that the threat of russia on the Manchurian flank had been neutralized by 
decisive german victories in europe. 
•	 that great britain was in an irretrievably defensive position.
•	 that the forces that the United states and its allies could immediately deploy 
in the Pacific, particularly in the air, were insufficient to prevent Japan from 
occupying within three or four months the entire Co-Prosperity sphere. 
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•	 that China—the burma road having been severed—would be isolated and 
forced to negotiate. 
•	 that the United states, committed to aiding great britain and weakened by 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, would be unable to mobilize sufficient strength 
to go on the offensive in the Pacific for from eighteen months to two years. 
during this time, the perimeter could be fortified and the required forward 
airfields and bases established. the perimeter would be backed by a mobile 
carrier striking force based on truk.
•	 that Japan would speedily extract in the captured territories and ship to 
home islands for processing essential metals to sustain and strengthen its 
industrial and military machine. 
•	 that the weakness of the United states as a democracy would make it im-
possible for it to sustain any all-out offensive action in the face of the losses 
that would be imposed by fanatically resisting Japanese soldiers, sailors, and 
airmen, and the elimination of its allies. the United states would therefore 
compromise and allow Japan to retain a substantial portion of its initial ter-
ritorial gains.46 
Unfortunately for the Japanese, the fifth and seventh assumptions were to prove 
false. 
on 5 November the following operational objectives were issued: 
 a. In the eastern Pacific, the american fleet would be destroyed and her supply route 
and line of operation to the orient severed,
 b. In the Western Pacific, the campaign in Malaya shall be conducted to sever the 
british line of operation and supply to the orient as well as the burma route,
 c. the enemy forces in the orient shall be destroyed, their strategic bases captured, 
and the important areas endowed with natural resources shall be occupied,
 d. strategically important points shall be captured, expanded in area and strength-
ened in defensive forces in order to prepare for a prolonged war,
 e. enemy invading forces shall be intercepted and annihilated, and
 f. successful operations shall be exploited to crush the enemy’s will to fight.47 
the one significant constraint imposed was that Japanese operations had to begin 
before the british and americans could supplement their forces in the theater and 
thereby alter the balance of power.
strategic success would be achieved, because Japan would escalate the ma-
terial and moral costs of war beyond what the Western powers, america in 
particular, would be willing to pay. the strategy was predicated on american 
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rationality—that is, the americans would perform a cost-benefit analysis and 
come to terms with the realities created by Japanese success.48 
the conventional narrative on the Pacific War has it that Japan never intended 
to invade Hawaii. this view asserts that the Japanese leadership felt Hawaii was 
too difficult to capture and retain and that it was in any case outside the desired 
limits of the greater east asia Co-Prosperity sphere.49 However, we now know 
that Hawaii was in fact explicitly included within the sphere in both public and 
classified wartime documents and was the focus of genda’s thinking from the 
beginning.50 
genda understood that Pearl Harbor was the headquarters of the Pacific 
fleet, a crucial logistics and repair facility, a vital intelligence center, and an ideal 
springboard for any counteroffensive against Japan. Hawaii was also the anchor 
for air and maritime communications between the United states and the south-
western Pacific. from the moment genda began preparing his draft, he favored 
a full-scale landing of Japanese troops on oahu. “We should follow up this attack 
on Hawaii with a landing,” he said. “If Hawaii is occupied, america will lose her 
largest and best advance base and, furthermore, our command of future opera-
tions will be very good.” american fighting forces on Hawaii would have to retire 
to the West Coast, and Japan would dominate the Central Pacific.51 genda’s con-
ceptualized plan, that is, took yamamoto’s intent one step farther—to take Pearl 
Harbor away from the americans and thereby eliminate their ability to project 
power from the Central Pacific. once in Japanese hands, the Hawaiian Islands 
could be used militarily to threaten the continental United states and, politically, 
as a bargaining chip in negotiations to end the war.52 the key to genda’s vision 
was not what Japan would gain by acquiring the islands but what the United 
states would lose. 
It is in this plan that the true nature of genda’s operational-level thinking is 
manifest. genda believed that without seizing and holding oahu, Japan could 
not hope to win the war. oahu had to be taken at the outset of the conflict, while 
surprise and initiative still worked in Japan’s favor. once it had been occupied, 
conditions would be favorable for subsequent operations in the south, and Japan 
would have time to figure out how to maintain and resupply the islands. genda 
believed that Hawaii, not the Philippines, should have been Japan’s major mili-
tary objective at the outset. Where yamamoto saw a delaying action, genda saw 
a knockout punch—the annihilation of the enemy’s operational center of gravity 
with one decisive, joint operation.53 
assuming that the initial air strikes were successful and that the Japanese had 
air superiority and given intelligence estimates of approximately two american 
divisions on oahu, genda believed ten to fifteen thousand well equipped troops 
would suffice for its capture.54 genda realized the risks involved in moving a large 
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task force across the North Pacific to attack oahu, but he felt that even if (as the 
Japanese expected) a portion of the force was destroyed, the loss of shipping and 
troops would not materially impact operations in the south.55 
Predictably, so innovative a plan, coming originally from a mere commander 
(though possibly over the signature of a rear admiral), did not survive contact 
with the senior planners of the Combined fleet staff, particularly at a time when 
the concept of a carrier air attack, backed by yamamoto himself, was itself expe-
riencing stiff opposition. but during naval war games to test the planned Phase 
one operations in september 1941, the idea of invading oahu resurfaced. In 
preparation for the event, Commander Watanabe conducted a detailed study of a 
possible invasion of oahu. He estimated that a successful invasion would require 
at least two Japanese divisions, about thirty thousand men. transporting them, 
with their equipment and supplies, would require eighty transports and escort 
vessels, including thirty-two destroyers, eight cruisers, four battleships, two air-
craft carriers, six to eight submarines for reconnaissance, and ten tankers. these 
would be in addition to the carrier strike force.56
Watanabe laid out two landing sites: one on the northwest coast on both sides 
of Haleiwa, the other in the area of Kaneohe bay. the southern coast was best 
suited to an invasion, but it was also the most heavily defended area of oahu. the 
west coast was eliminated, because the U.s. Navy had held invasion maneuvers 
off the west coast a year before, and the americans were likely well prepared to 
defend that part of the island.57
the two landings would happen simultaneously at midnight of 7/8 december. 
Half a division would land at Haleiwa, to take schofield barracks. the objectives 
of this attack were not only to take the barracks but to draw american forces 
northward, by giving the impression that it was the main effort. the actual main 
attack, however, was planned for the east coast, at Kaneohe bay, with one and a 
half divisions. two-thirds of this force would occupy that, the remainder the re-
gion below laie. the objective was to cross the Koolau range, using horses, and 
then descend on Pearl Harbor, cutting off any retreat to the mountains of oahu. 
the Japanese knew from intelligence that the Koolau mountains were not forti-
fied and in fact were open to the public. given complete air superiority, Watanabe 
estimated, it would take from two to four weeks to capture the island.58 
Watanabe tried to discuss the study with Captain Kuroshima but the latter 
was not interested, considering an invasion infeasible and to be going against the 
concept of operations for Phase one. after the war, Kuroshima would declare 
that the “biggest mistake” of his life was this refusal to consider invasion of oahu 
after the carrier attack.59 genda’s and Watanabe’s superiors, for their part, always 
considered the idea in the context of the invasions of the Philippines and Malaya, 
also to be accomplished at the outset. Considered accordingly, an invasion of 
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oahu was easily dismissible from a resource perspective. genda himself, in con-
trast, viewed the invasion as either instead of or before the Philippine operation, 
with the intent of denying american ground, sea, and air forces the use of the 
Hawaiian Islands as an advance base. 
regardless, any invasion of oahu would have needed the support of the army, 
which was firmly focused on China and willing to provide only the smallest 
number of divisions necessary to acquire the territories identified in Phase one. 
In fact, the IJa planned to commit only ten of its fifty-one divisions and four of 
its fifty-nine brigades to the southern army for these operations.60 Notably, how-
ever, and reflecting the important role envisioned for airpower, the IJa allotted 
seventy of its 151 air squadrons to support the southern operation.
the mistrust that existed between the two services is evident from the fact that 
the Combined fleet never approached the IJa to discuss a Hawaiian invasion op-
tion. the Combined fleet was so concerned with the secrecy of the Pearl Harbor 
carrier attack that it did not want to divulge the plan to the army. the Combined 
fleet’s fear was based on the IJa’s strong influence over governmental decision 
making—if the IJa objected to the attack, it could easily force its cancelation. 
Watanabe lamented that “once they [IJa] rejected something, nothing could be 
carried out.”61 
for all these reasons, and despite repeated attempts by genda to drive home 
the importance of taking the islands, the idea of invading oahu as part of the 
initial attack was dead. Knowing that there was no stomach for invading oahu as 
he had wanted, genda moved to the next best course of action available, which 
was to design a plan that would deny Pearl Harbor to the americans, through the 
destruction of the base and its facilities. “In my opinion, Japan had to neutral-
ize american bases in the Pacific if she was to carry on the war successfully.”62 
genda’s modified plan involved repeated attacks against the infrastructure of 
Pearl Harbor and the Pacific fleet at its moorings, and a possible fleet engagement 
against any american warships found outside the harbor. a significant problem 
for genda was that vice admiral Nagumo, who commanded the 1st air fleet, 
had little faith in or understanding of naval airpower or the potential of the air 
arm at his disposal.63 
Nagumo was aligned with the IJN’s “fleet faction.” these officers—politically 
right-wing, pro-axis, virulently anti-british and anti-american—were ardent 
expansionists and favored the rapid buildup of Japan’s naval strength. they be-
lieved in the supremacy of the battleship in naval warfare, were deeply schooled 
in the theories of alfred thayer Mahan, and were committed to the vision of 
decisive battle by surface fleets.64 since 1934 they had purged the Japanese naval 
hierarchy and now held almost all the key command and institutional positions, 
particularly in the Ngs. 
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the conventional explanation of the decision to give Nagumo command of 
the 1st air fleet is that it came down to seniority, not expertise. Nagumo was a 
surface fleet officer and specialist in torpedo attack. even his longtime friend ad-
miral tsukahara Nishizo, later commander in chief of the 11th air fleet, would 
recall, “He [Nagumo] was wholly unfitted by background, training, experience, 
and interest for a major role in Japan’s naval air arm.”65 In fact, the feeling of many 
in the carrier community, including key members of the Combined fleet staff, 
was that Nagumo’s background and personality made him completely unsuitable 
as the commander of the Japanese carriers. Nagumo’s appointment, however, was 
made by the Ngs, not the Combined fleet. yamamoto’s choice was vice admiral 
Jisaburō ozawa, but at this point yamamoto did not have a strong enough case to 
induce the Ngs to remove Nagumo. 
the Pearl Harbor portion of the Combined fleet plan met stiff opposition 
from all quarters, including the Ngs, Nagumo, and Nagumo’s chief of staff, rear 
admiral ryūnosuke Kusaka. they viewed the plan as too risky, as beyond the 
technical capability of the IJN (primarily because of the need for at-sea refueling), 
and as denying carrier airpower to the vital Philippines operation. genda realized 
that there were significant tactical issues to be resolved but felt that they were not 
insurmountable.66 It would be early November, however, before the attack was 
finally approved at the joint and thus national level. 
the IJN held a series of war games from 5 to 17 september 1941 to test Phase 
one of its operational plan. two days were set aside for a separate and secret test 
of the proposed outline of the Pearl Harbor plan. genda had yet to complete any 
detailed planning, but at this point the plan used all six “fleet carriers”—that is, 
Hiryū, Sōryū, akagi, Kaga, Shōkaku, and Zuikaku. the Pearl Harbor game sug-
gested that the attack was feasible but involved significant risk and would very 
likely result in the loss of Japanese carriers.67 Ultimately, however, these results 
were overshadowed by a greater operational concern raised by the main war-
game series—air superiority over the Philippines. 
at the conclusion of the games, 11th air fleet representatives raised serious 
concerns over their ability to supply sufficient strength, especially fighters, for the 
southern operation. air superiority was in jeopardy, because the distances be-
tween the Philippine targets and Japanese bases were beyond the combat radius 
of the Zero fighter.68 on 24 september, senior officers of the Combined fleet, 1st 
air fleet, and Ngs met to discuss this problem. the 1st air fleet chief of staff, 
Kusaka, and senior members of the Ngs spoke out against the Pearl Harbor plan, 
arguing that naval strength assigned to the southern operation was insufficient 
and that all air resources, including the 1st air fleet, should be concentrated on 
that.69 admiral onishi, formerly the conduit for the Pearl Harbor attack concept, 
now vehemently opposed it. He too argued that the carriers were needed by the 
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southern operation. the Ngs subsequently directed that fleet carriers from the 
1st air fleet be made available to support the southern attacks. 
It is important at this point to take a quick step backward in time. on 19 au-
gust 1941, genda met with the senior staff officer of the 11th air fleet, Captain 
Chihaya takahashi, to discuss the overall strategy for air operations, both Pearl 
Harbor and the southern operation.70 the IJa and IJN agreed that the major role 
in the Philippine air campaign was the responsibility of the IJN, because of the 
greater combat range of naval aircraft. army fighters had been designed to fight 
on the mainland of China and had a nominal combat radius of three hundred 
miles. army bombers, carrying a normal bomb load, could not make the round 
trip between southern taiwanese bases and lingayen gulf, the principal landing 
point on luzon.71 Consequently, it had been agreed between the two services that 
IJa planes would be responsible for targets north of the sixteenth parallel (which 
crosses luzon north of Manila), while IJN air forces would take care of targets 
south of that line. the major american air strength, some 208 fighters and bomb-
ers, was stationed below that line and therefore the responsibility of the IJN.72 
the Philippine invasion air plan involved virtually every Zero fighter the navy 
had except for those of the 1st air fleet. the Zero possessed a combat radius in 
excess of 420 miles, but there were serious doubts that it could support attacks on 
targets in the Manila area, 550 miles from Japanese bases on taiwan. Navy plan-
ners now found themselves confronted with an urgent operational problem, for 
which two possible solutions presented themselves. either the fleet aircraft car-
riers had to provide the necessary fighter cover, the more likely option, or means 
would have to be found to increase the Zero’s range, which seemed improbable.73 
either way, fighter cover for the bombers was imperative, if Pearl Harbor was 
to be attacked on the first day of the war. the Philippine air attack had to hap-
pen in daylight, and there was a five-and-a-half-hour time difference between 
there and Pearl Harbor. Consequently, the Japanese expected that Philippine- 
american defenses would be ready for any Japanese attack on 8 december. 
the conflict over the simultaneous requirements for air superiority over Pearl 
Harbor and the Philippines came to a head in october.74 during the final war 
games held on 4 and 5 october, the Ngs directed that the fleet carriers be split, 
with the 2nd Carrier division (Hiryū and Sōryū), plus akagi, supporting the 
Philippine invasion and the remaining three carriers attacking Pearl Harbor. the 
Ngs wanted more airpower for the Philippine attack and held that it had prior-
ity. the results of the war games indicated, however, that three carriers could not 
generate enough combat airpower to achieve the desired results at Pearl Harbor. 
If the Pearl Harbor attack were to be forced to use only three carriers, genda 
recommended that it be scrapped.75 
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repeated attempts by the Combined fleet to have all six carriers reassigned 
to the Pearl Harbor attack failed, until on 17 october yamamoto sent Captain 
Kuroshima to Ngs headquarters in tokyo to convey the message that if the Pearl 
Harbor plan were not approved with six carriers, yamamoto and his entire staff 
would resign. on 22 october, rear admiral Matome Ugaki, yamamoto’s chief 
of staff, recorded that Kuroshima had returned with the plan approved as the 
Combined fleet wanted it.76 Most narratives have taken yamamoto’s threat of 
resignation as the major factor in the decision of admiral osami Nagano, chief of 
the Imperial Japanese Navy general staff, to approve, at the navy level, the Pearl 
Harbor plan with six carriers. 
but if taking the carriers of the 2nd Carrier division away from the Philippine 
operation solved the Pearl Harbor problem, it did not resolve what was in the 
minds of the Ngs the more critical operational problem: the need to attain and 
maintain air superiority over the Philippines. It is not reasonable to infer that 
admiral Nagano would have knowingly placed his top priority, the Philippine 
operation, in jeopardy by removing the carrier airpower that had been regarded 
as vital for supporting its initial attacks. We must therefore look elsewhere to 
determine why Nagano changed his mind—and why, therefore, genda’s plan was 
actually carried out. 
the operational requirement on 8 december was fifteen minutes of combat 
time for Zeros over Clark airfield, the main american airfield in the Philippines. 
by mid-october, experimentation by the 11th air fleet had achieved a combat 
radius of five hundred miles for its Zeros without any modification to the plane’s 
engine or equipment. this was accomplished by reducing cruising speed, adjust-
ing propeller pitch, and setting the fuel mixture as lean as possible. Pilot skill 
would be counted on to deliver the remaining fifty miles to the target. Plans were 
made for the occupation of batan Island, 125 miles north of luzon, on the morn-
ing of 8 december so that the Zeros could make an emergency fueling stop there 
on the return trip if necessary. 
the Zero was now capable of providing the requisite air cover for the initial 
attacks from taiwan.77 this development is more compelling than yamamoto’s 
threat of resignation as a reason why Nagano changed his mind. the Japanese 
could now simultaneously commit the six fleet carriers to the Pearl Harbor op-
eration and provide the required Zero cover over the Philippines. 
on 29 october, two officers of the Ngs—Captain sadatoshi tomioka and 
Commander yugi yamamoto, of the operations section—visited admiral ya-
mamoto on board the battleship nagato. they brought the general war instruc-
tions of the Ngs and the relevant “agreement” between the navy and the army. 
the attack on Pearl Harbor was not part of this document. on 3 November, 
the staff of the Combined fleet flew to tokyo to put the finishing touches on 
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Combined fleet order No. 1. there, on 3 November, yamamoto talked to Nagano; 
the final decision to allow the attack on Pearl Harbor was made on that day.78
the evolution of the detailed Pearl Harbor attack plan needs to be clarified. 
Until the end of september the plan existed as a conceptual attack that began with 
a two-wave integrated assault using dive-bombers, torpedo bombers, horizontal 
bombers, and fighters. the main targets were to be the airfields, carriers, and 
battleships. little detail existed beyond that. Commander Mitsuo fuchida was 
told of the plan and target on 1 october. genda and fuchida began putting details 
to the attack during october. their plan involved all six fleet carriers, but as noted 
above, this was not a foregone conclusion. 
on 2 November, Nagumo informed the senior commanders of the 1st air 
fleet of the intent to attack Hawaii and had fuchida and genda brief the “general 
plan.”79 the general concept was tested by the 1st and 2nd Carrier divisions dur-
ing Combined fleet maneuvers on 3 and 5 November. lessons learned from the 
attacking formations and observations from genda, fuchida, and the Combined 
fleet staff were then used to refine the plan. there were many technical details 
that had yet to be resolved. Chief among these was the fact that the torpedoes 
were still running too deep to be effective in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. 
the final details were hammered out at Hitokappu bay just prior to departure. 
genda conceptualized the plan (answering the “who, what, and why” questions), 
identified and worked to resolve the technical deficiencies in torpedoes and 
bombs, and organized the training along functional lines to facilitate the attack. 
the details of the “how” portion of the attack for each aircraft type were left to 
the respective flight commanders. lieutenant Commander shigeharu Murata 
worked out the torpedo attack plan, lieutenant Commanders takashige egusa 
and Kakuichi takahasi the dive-bombing attacks, and lieutenant Commanders 
shigeru Itaya and saburo shindo the fighter attack plan. fuchida and lieutenant 
Commander shigekazu shimazaki worked out the horizontal-bombing plan.80 
these inputs were then integrated by genda to form the finalized plan.81 the 
final attack plan was briefed to all aircrews at Hitokappu bay on 23 November. 
the 1st air fleet departed for Pearl Harbor at six o’clock in the morning of 26 
November.
THe aTTacK anD iTS iMMeDiaTe SeqUel 
Nagumo, in command of the 1st air fleet, had opposed the attack on Pearl Har-
bor from the very beginning and was not comfortable with his responsibility in 
executing it. He was being ordered to carry out a plan that he did not believe in. 
Japanese naval doctrine, however, allowed considerable latitude to on-scene com-
manders to modify plans as they saw fit; Nagumo, unbeknownst to anyone on the 
Combined fleet staff, decided even before leaving Japan that he would execute 
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the plan to the minimum extent possible, making the american battleships the 
primary targets. Nagumo was unprepared to go beyond his doctrinal comfort 
zone to make the conceptual leap that genda’s plan envisioned. 
Nagumo’s personal and professional inclinations convinced him that his job 
was to inflict enough damage on the american battleships to make them unable 
to interfere with Japanese operations in the south. genda, the visionary and air-
power advocate, had designed the attack to eliminate the base at Pearl Harbor and 
thereby deny the americans the use of the base and its inherent ability to support 
the projection of power across the Central Pacific. genda’s focus comprised the 
base and aircraft carriers. the planner and the executor were driving toward dif-
ferent ends. Unfortunately for genda and ultimately the Japanese, Nagumo, as 
the tactical commander, would decide what conditions or results defined success.
the preamble to Carrier striking task force operations order No. 3, issued 
on 23 November 1941, includes the following statement:
Immediately after the return of the first and second attack units [the “waves” con-
stituting the first attack], preparations for the next attack will be completed. at this 
time, carrier attack planes capable of carrying torpedoes will be armed with such as 
long as the supply lasts. If the destruction of enemy land-based air strength progress-
es favorably, repeated attacks will be made immediately and thus decisive results will 
be achieved.82
this order, over Nagumo’s signature, was probably written by genda and there-
fore congruent with genda’s concept of operations for the attack. Most impor-
tantly, it conveys the expectation of repeated attacks. the contradiction between 
what Nagumo issued as his intention in this order and his personal conviction to 
launch only the first attack is evident and has caused confusion. 
the order was issued while the 1st air fleet was still in Japanese waters. this 
means that the Combined fleet would have been aware of, and approved of, its 
contents. It is quite possible that Nagumo was content to make it appear that he 
intended to act aggressively in executing his orders until he left the home islands 
and the scrutiny of the Combined fleet. rear admiral Ugaki had chastised both 
Nagumo and Kusaka for their lack of support for the Pearl Harbor plan and 
had declared that if they “were not prepared yet to advance in the face of death 
and gain results two or three times as great as the cost by jumping into the jaws 
of death with his [sic] men,” they both should resign.83 once the task force was 
sequestered in the Kuriles, at Hitokappu bay, Nagumo made it known to genda 
that he would launch only the first attack.84 
en route to Pearl Harbor genda tried three times to persuade Nagumo that 
more than one attack would be needed. on the day of the attack, when Com-
mander Mitsuo fuchida, leader of the strike, landed on akagi after the first two 
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waves had returned and reported two battleships sunk and four battleships and 
four cruisers severely damaged, Nagumo determined that he had accomplished 
his task and decided to retire, leaving the base and its vital infrastructure intact.85 
the missing carriers would have to wait for another time.
Conceptually, genda had designed the first two waves to achieve two aims: to 
gain air superiority over oahu and to deny the americans the ability to hit back 
at the Japanese task force. for these purposes, carrier-based and land-based air 
forces were the priority targets, then carriers, battleships, cruisers, etc., in de-
scending order. over half of the attacking aircraft in each wave were committed 
to the air-superiority task, as providing combat air patrol or attacking airfields.86 
the war diary of the 5th Carrier division (Shōkaku and Zuikaku) reported, “the 
division’s air force attacked enemy air bases on oahu Island, destroying most of 
the enemy air forces and hangars. thus enemy fighter interception and counter-
attacks upon our force was crushed.”87
genda’s plan envisioned, air superiority having been established and the 
americans denied the means to strike back, follow-on attacks to deny the use of 
Pearl Harbor as an operating base. their targets were the naval installations first, 
then the remaining ships (genda did not specify the oil- or fuel-storage tanks as 
specific targets). genda felt that the potential reward of the follow-on attacks was 
worthwhile even if they cost another hundred planes.88
In the event, the extent of the damage that the two attack waves had inflicted 
on the U.s. air forces in Hawaii would not be known for a number of days.89 the 
Japanese battle-damage assessment listed sixteen hangars and 222 parked air-
planes set on fire, and fourteen planes shot down, with a total of 450 airplanes on 
fire.90 the Japanese after-action study of the Pearl Harbor operation concluded 
that 265 planes had been completely destroyed or shot down.91 before the attack 
the United states had had over four hundred planes of all types on oahu, includ-
ing twelve b-17 heavy bombers and over a hundred P-40 fighters. Immediately 
after the attack it could count only four b-17s and twenty-seven P-40s as combat 
ready.92 the Japanese attacks had significantly degraded the oahu-based air 
forces, leaving the american carriers as the only remaining threat to the Japanese 
task force.
genda’s original plan had the carrier task force staying in the area of the 
Hawaiian Islands for several days, continually pounding Pearl Harbor and run-
ning down any american surface ships at sea. to ensure unity of command, the 
operation orders had placed a submarine force of some twenty-four boats under 
Nagumo’s command for a three-day period after the initial attack. It anticipated 
that the two forces would be operating together in the Hawaiian area for that time.93 
these details confirm the high, operational-level aims of the original plan, in con-
trast to the much lower, tactical aim of the strike ordered by admiral Nagumo.
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the Combined fleet had known from intelligence reports that the american 
battleships and carriers alternated weekends in port at Pearl Harbor. genda ex-
pected that the attack would be timed to take place when the battleship group 
was in harbor.94 Consequently, during october and November 1941 genda had 
formulated two plans for searching out and dealing with the american carriers 
if they were not found in Pearl Harbor, having had calculated that there were 
enough fuel and ammunition after the initial attack for at least forty-eight hours 
of further operations.95 
the first was to stay close to Pearl Harbor and control the air over oahu. He 
felt that the Japanese force could not engage successfully the american carriers in 
the vicinity of Pearl Harbor if it had simultaneously to fight an american carrier 
group and land-based planes. to prevent that, the task force would close oahu 
and blanket it with fighters to maintain complete air superiority over the island 
while the american carriers were engaged.96 the other plan was to search out the 
american carriers and attack them beyond the range of american land-based 
bombers. this plan too was designed to avoid air attacks from multiple sources. 
extensive patrols were to be carried out on 8 december to find the american 
carriers. If they were found, the Japanese would attack them regardless of their 
location or distance. If they were not found, the task force would return to Japan, 
via the Marshall Islands. 
genda’s job during the attack was to coordinate all information from the 
planes and submarines and to prepare contingency plans in case of a counterat-
tack. genda knew from the advance aerial reconnaissance report that the U.s. 
carriers were not at Pearl Harbor, and search planes had already been sent out 
to find them. In preparation for the expected news that one or more had been 
sighted, the returning horizontal bombers were rearmed with torpedoes for use 
against the carriers. even the onset of darkness had been accounted for. the Japa-
nese had trained night torpedo-bombing teams on the veteran carriers akagi, 
Kaga, Sōryū, and Hiryū; twelve bombers on each of the first two ships and eight 
bombers on each of the latter were certified in night attack.97
rough seas prevented the strike aircraft from being recovered in a timely man-
ner. genda felt that, even if Nagumo could have been persuaded to order one, it 
was virtually impossible to launch another attack on Pearl Harbor that day un-
less the force proceeded southward, closer to oahu. that would take maximum 
advantage of the remaining daylight. genda was intent on instigating a running 
battle with american targets using smaller groups of aircraft, even at night if 
necessary.98 beyond that prospect, he had articulated three options for the with-
drawal of the carrier task force from the Pearl Harbor area: 
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•	 a withdrawal in the direction from which it had approached (i.e., to the 
north and then west) 
•	 Westward, passing north of Midway
•	 southward, passing west of oahu, then to the Marshall Islands. 
genda preferred the last option. this route allowed repeated attacks against 
Pearl Harbor over the next three days as the Japanese steamed southward, and 
it offered the best chance of engaging remaining elements of the Pacific fleet. 
Consistent in all his plans for the initial attack’s sequel was the notion of the task 
force remaining in the area of oahu for several days to exploit whatever situation 
arose.99 Nagumo, however, chose the first option, since it quickly put his carriers 
beyond the reach of counterattack. 
the Combined fleet headquarters in the home islands received many of the 
attack reports within minutes of their transmission. a weighty discussion oc-
curred among the staff members as to whether yamamoto should order Nagumo 
to carry out the “second attack.” Captain Kuroshima, along with most of the staff, 
felt that not enough damage had been inflicted—Pearl Harbor had to be hit again. 
yamamoto felt that the tactical-level commander was in a better place to judge 
whether a second attack was possible or required and denied Kuroshima’s request 
to issue the second attack order. Kuroshima remained convinced, however, that 
the Pearl Harbor attack was incomplete and told yamamoto later that Nagumo 
was not a suitable commander for the 1st air fleet.100 
Indeed, the initial jubilation over the results of the Pearl Harbor attack soon 
faded. While the damage inflicted against the Pacific fleet had created the condi-
tions that would allow the southern operation to be carried out without imme-
diate interference from it, yamamoto and his senior staff realized that they had 
missed an excellent opportunity to seize Hawaii. on 9 december 1941, less than 
forty-eight hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, yamamoto ordered his staff to 
prepare plans for an invasion of Hawaii.101
the new Japanese plan, known as the eastern operation, was designed to 
establish Japanese dominance in the Central Pacific. Its timeline began with 
the capture of Midway in June 1942 and ended with the occupation of oahu in 
March 1943.102 In this process, rear admiral Ugaki ordered Watanabe to conduct 
another study of an invasion of oahu. the new study concluded that Japan would 
now need four divisions and 1.5 million tons of shipping to capture the island, as-
suming that the american carriers had been eliminated as a threat beforehand.103 
this new staff assessment, conducted in mid-January 1942, highlighted the enor-
mousness of the opportunity missed on 8 december. 
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oPPorTUniTY loST
genda observed after the war, “In my opinion, Japan had to neutralize american 
bases in the Pacific if she was to carry on the war successfully. air bombardment 
alone would not neutralize an enemy base; complete neutralization could only 
be achieved if it was occupied by ground troops.”104 He realized even at the time 
that the effects of the Pearl Harbor attack would be transitory and that further 
strikes were needed immediately. even after Nagumo ordered the task force to 
retire, genda continued to urge him to stay in the area, to carry out an all-out 
search for the U.s. carriers and, finding them, to attack them day or night.105 His 
protests were to no avail.
during the return trip to Japan, however, genda presented Nagumo with an-
other plan to strike while the Japanese had the americans off balance. the Japa-
nese 4th fleet had run into unexpected opposition in its initial attempt to occupy 
Wake Island on 11 december. the assault had had to be called off, and the 4th 
fleet had asked for immediate assistance. Instead of returning directly to Japan, 
genda’s new plan was to take the entire carrier task force to truk; refuel, resupply, 
and pick up there the landing troops that had occupied guam, plus those used in 
the first attempt at Wake and the south seas fleet troops earmarked for the sei-
zure of rabaul; and then swiftly invade and occupy Wake, Midway, and Johnston 
Islands. troop transports had already assembled at truk for other operations and 
could be easily reassigned.106 genda’s new plan employed all of the 1st air fleet’s 
considerable power in a manner consistent with the concept he had employed in 
designing the attack on oahu—concentration for maximum impact.
the entire strength of the 1st air fleet would engage any american ships 
that tried to oppose it. With Johnston Island and Midway in Japanese hands, air 
coverage could be pushed out to interdict routes across the Central Pacific, and 
land-based aircraft would be within striking distance of oahu. these islands 
could be used as stepping-stones for the future occupation of Hawaii, which 
genda thought could be undertaken in 1942, after the occupation of the southern 
area.107 the scale of genda’s plan and his confidence in the flexibility of Japanese 
naval power are clear indications of his impressive ability to connect the strategic 
imperative with the tactical necessity. 
the Japanese carriers were several hundred miles north of Midway when 
genda discussed his new plan with Nagumo. the admiral was at first in favor of 
the plan and took steps to execute it.108 on 13 december Nagumo signaled his in-
tent to the carrier task force. His message, issued at 8:20 that morning, conveyed 
two options: the “first Plan” stated that after refueling the force would “speed 
down to south, and, in cooperation with the fourth fleet, invade Wake. then 
Midway, Johnston and Palmyra will be occupied, enemy land based air forces 
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destroyed, paving the way for an invasion of Hawaii.” the “second Plan” was to 
return straight to Japan.109 
there is no indication that the Combined fleet was aware of this new idea. 
Kusaka, Nagumo’s chief of staff, was against it; he wanted the carriers to return 
immediately to Japan. genda planned to fly to tokyo while the carriers were 
replenishing at truk to brief yamamoto and the Combined fleet staff on the pro-
posal. on 15 december, however, Nagumo received orders from the Combined 
fleet to support a planned new attempt to invade Wake Island, by destroying 
enemy forces with “an appropriate air force.”110 Nagumo that day issued task 
force order No. 32 to proceed to truk, where the force was to arrive on or about 
22 december, refuel, and then attack Wake Island.111 Nagumo also canceled an 
attack on Midway that had been ordered (without genda’s input) by the Com-
bined fleet. 
However, on 16 december Nagumo changed his mind completely. He canceled 
all previous orders, now directing only the 2nd Carrier division and supporting 
units to attack Wake Island, the remaining ships to return back to Japan.112 His 
sudden change of mind did not result from direction from Combined fleet head-
quarters; it can only be assumed that Kusaka had swayed him. 
from an operational perspective, by 13 december the main air and sea threats 
to Japanese expansion in the south had been eliminated. british force Z—the 
battleship Prince of wales and the battle cruiser repulse—were sunk on 10 de-
cember. the american air forces in the Philippines, in particular the b-17 bomb-
ers, had been hard hit. the remaining dutch, british, and american naval units 
in the southern region, lacking direction or cohesion, did not represent a serious 
problem. the only remaining credible naval threat was that of the carriers of the 
Pacific fleet.
the Japanese plan of seizing airfields and then moving air units progressively 
forward to cover subsequent invasions of new territories worked perfectly. the 
Japanese enjoyed the advantage of air superiority across most of the theater, and 
their amphibious and land operations proceeded as anticipated. the temporarily 
thwarted invasion of Wake Island had been the only setback.113 given the reality 
of the operational environment on 16 december when Nagumo ordered the re-
turn to Japan, genda felt that Nagumo’s force had to remain in the Central Pacific 
to concentrate on the U.s. Navy and its carriers. once they were dealt with, “the 
rest of the Pacific would fall like ripe fruit.”114 events were to show that once more 
he had an impressive grasp of the situation.
Meanwhile, admiral Husband e. Kimmel, Commander in Chief Pacific fleet, 
had ordered carriers to support the movement of troops and aircraft to reinforce 
Wake. the United states had three carriers available in the theater, but each was 
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operating as a single-carrier task force.115 Unfortunately for the garrison on Wake, 
Kimmel was relieved on 17 december, and the new acting commander in chief, 
vice admiral William s. Pye, was not willing to commit his carriers against the 
Japanese 2nd Carrier division, which was known to be supporting the renewed 
invasion of Wake.116 Pye had to choose between the relief of Wake and the protec-
tion of Hawaii from possible further attack. Pye chose to conserve the carriers for 
future operations and abandoned Wake Island. 
the implementation of genda’s new plan would have posed a very interesting 
dilemma for Pye and his successor (from 31 december), admiral Chester Nimitz. 
Instead of just one carrier division, the Pacific fleet would have confronted all six 
Japanese carriers, working with a now-proven doctrine for mass carrier airpower. 
successive invasions of Wake, Midway, and Johnston Islands in december 1941 
and January 1942 would have forced Nimitz to choose between conserving his 
carriers and protecting Hawaii, in which case not only Wake but Midway and 
Johnston Islands as well would have fallen, or committing his carriers to protect 
one of or all these islands before his theater had received any appreciable rein-
forcements in men, planes, or ships. Japanese control of the three points, let alone 
the destruction of any of or all the american carriers in december 1941 or early 
1942, would have altered the course of subsequent events in 1942. 
Nagumo’s order tasking only the 2nd Carrier division to attack Wake Island 
is telling. His actions reflected a fundamental misunderstanding of the Japanese 
operational-level center of gravity—the six-fleet-carrier task group. as long as 
the Japanese kept their six fleet carriers operating together, they could defeat any 
combination of american carriers then available. reverting to two-carrier divi-
sions, as was done at Wake and in a number of other operations in Phase one, 
negated that operational advantage and demonstrated that neither the Combined 
fleet nor Naval general staff yet understood the fundamental concepts of carrier 
warfare. Had vice admiral Pye acted in a more aggressive fashion in the relief of 
Wake Island and reached it before the second landing on 23 december, admiral 
yamaguchi’s carriers would have been outnumbered three to two, and the ameri-
cans would have had a two-to-one advantage in aircraft.117 
only genda realized the importance of keeping the fleet carriers together. In 
essence, the Japanese should have recognized two types of operations—those of 
enough value to commit all six fleet carriers, and all the others.118 
but genda’s influence over future Japanese operational plans ended when 
Nagumo canceled the move to truk. genda remained on board akagi and 
planned air operations for the 1st air fleet until april 1942. Interestingly, the 
mistake of failing to attack shore installations was corrected in attacks on british 
bases at darwin, australia, in february 1942, and in the Indian ocean, in March 
and april. also of note in subsequent Phase one carrier operations was the 
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Combined fleet’s tactic of deploying a lightly screened carrier division ahead of 
heavy surface units.119 for example, on 16 January the 2nd Carrier division, with 
one heavy cruiser and two destroyers, was sent into the banda sea to spearhead 
the assault against amboina, while vice admiral Nobutake Kondō’s force of two 
battleships, three heavy cruisers, and six destroyers patrolled an outer ring well 
to the rear, between Mindanao, Palau, and northern New guinea. this tactic of 
deploying carriers as screening forces, however, would cost the Japanese dearly 
at the battle of Midway. 
genda was not available to provide his airpower perspective for the follow-on 
Japanese operations planned for Phase two, including the renewed Ngs and 
Combined fleet operations to do what genda had originally intended after Pearl 
Harbor—to take Midway and Johnston Islands. In particular, the Combined 
fleet plan for Midway, put together by Kuroshima and Watanabe, violated two 
of genda’s cardinal rules—concentration of force and advancing under air cover. 
these oversights contributed to the Japanese disaster at Midway.120 
the opening Japanese operations of the Pacific War were complex but well 
coordinated. they were characterized by innovative tactics, phased operations, 
and rapid exploitation of success. although Japanese forces were not strong 
everywhere, elements of the IJa and IJN were able to combine when required to 
provide local superiority. they achieved the strategic intent, acquiring the main 
area of the Co-Prosperity sphere by the end of Phase one. but they had not de-
stroyed the combat capability of the Pacific fleet. When the Japanese once again 
faced frontward to finish off their wounded adversary, they found the americans 
much more capable, organized, and willing to engage. 
Minoru genda realized that Japan’s long-term success depended on bases but 
also, most importantly, on Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Islands. Hawaii in 
Japanese hands was a safeguard against american power projection into the 
Central Pacific. genda felt that Japanese control over the Hawaiian Islands, and 
only that, would set the conditions for a favorable settlement to the war.121 While 
others in the IJN understood the importance of the Hawaiian Islands to a war in 
the Pacific, only genda had the vision and foresight to conceptualize a means of 
delivering them to the Japanese or, alternatively, denying them to the americans. 
genda saw Pearl Harbor as what we would now call the operational center of 
gravity for the war in the Pacific. He generally framed his thoughts in this way: 
he who controls or denies Pearl Harbor to the other side wins the war. there were 
actually three plans for the attack against Pearl Harbor: two developed by genda 
and the one actually executed by Nagumo. the earlier of the two produced by 
genda called for the carrier task force to remain near Pearl Harbor for a number 
of days to support the landing of Japanese troops on oahu on 8 december. this 
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plan was in keeping with genda’s firm belief that the base was the target, not the 
Pacific fleet. When the senior members of the Combined fleet refused to con-
sider this option, genda switched to a plan to deny the use of Pearl Harbor to the 
americans by destroying its base and infrastructure. 
genda later felt that the failure to attack Pearl Harbor repeatedly and to oc-
cupy Midway and Johnston Islands in the first months of the war were two of 
Japan’s greatest “tactical” errors. genda believed at the time that his Pearl Harbor 
plan held the greatest chance for Japanese success. When that opportunity was 
missed he tried to capitalize on the tactical situation to maintain the initiative 
and occupy Midway and Johnston Islands as quickly as possible.122 this clear and 
immediate threat would have forced Nimitz to respond, fundamentally changing 
the course of events in 1942.
Had the Japanese followed either of genda’s original plans, the progress of the 
initial stages of the Pacific War would have been significantly different. What 
would have come next is unknowable, and the final outcome would have been the 
same. but within genda’s operational vision was the best possible “war winning” 
strategy for Japan. However, only after a considerable period of reflection after 
the war would the true brilliance of genda’s vision be understood. 
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RESEaRCH & DEBaTE
WaS THERE SOMETHING uNIquE TO THE JaPaNESE THaT LOST THEM 
THE BaTTLE OF MIDWaY?
James P. levy
We military historians have a tendency to obsess over the causes of victory and 
defeat in war. like economists, we have a profound desire to identify those ac-
tions that ensure success or generate failure, and like economists we are not 
overly good at it. at best, we can state the obvious, as when the disparity of forces 
between two opponents is extreme, or ascertain certain verities, like “It is good 
to have the better trained troops,” or “Keep your troops better equipped, fed, and 
rested than your opponent’s.” at worst, this obsession with winning and losing 
can lead to a lot of shameless Monday-morning quarterbacking and counterfac-
tual historical speculation. 
the battle of Midway is a prime example of this profound desire to identify 
such causes and, as its usual concomitant, to attribute blame for defeat. the vic-
tory of the U.s. Navy over the Imperial Japanese Navy on 4 June 1942 was both 
clear and unexpected. since by many criteria the Japanese fleet was both quali-
tatively and quantitatively superior to its U.s. counterpart, historians have felt a 
great need to explain the outcome of the battle. one of the most popular books on 
the subject describes the victory as a “miracle,” and this quasi-supernatural hint 
at an explanation lies close to the surface of many popular accounts of the battle 
of Midway.1 americans are, like everyone else, often quite content to believe that 
god is on their side.
However, let us put aside popular perception 
to see what naval historians have to say about 
the outcome of the battle. Many explanations 
have been proffered. Paul dull finds the key to 
the outcome of the battle in what he perceives as 
James P. levy is a fellow of the royal Historical So-
ciety and an independent scholar living in the Berk-
shires, Massachusetts.
naval war college review, winter 2014, vol. 67, no. 1
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the adoption by admiral Isoroku yamamoto and his planning staff of a best-
case scenario. He cannot understand why yamamoto did not assume that the 
americans would be exactly where they were on the morning of 4 June—a 
claim I find baffling.2 such an assumption would have required not genius but 
clairvoyance. ronald spector quotes admiral Matome Ugaki’s famous lament 
that the Japanese had been too “conceited,” but this is surely more an excuse 
on Ugaki’s part than an explanation of what happened.3 douglas smith sees 
the root cause of Japanese failure in admiral Chūichi Nagumo’s “arrogance and 
intransigence”; H. P. Willmott accuses the Japanese of suffering from “victory 
disease,” an ailment whose symptoms he describes as “illusion,” “confusion,” and 
“self-deception.”4 Harry gailey is a bit vague in his attribution of blame but does 
point to Nagumo’s decisions as “contributing” to Japan’s defeat, and he describes 
yamamoto’s plan as “complex” and “grandiose.”5 a recurring assumption about 
the battle appears to be that the Japanese did as much to lose the battle as the 
americans did to win it, or more.
the latest and in many ways most complete account of the battle is Parshall and 
tully’s Shattered Sword (2005).6 While a work of fine research and well informed 
analysis, it is obsessed with debunking perceived “myths” about the battle, shoot-
ing down Mitsuo fuchida’s account of the battle in particular, and demonstrating 
the faults the authors believe existed in Japanese practice and doctrine. Parshall 
and tully lay on blame with a trowel. Minoru genda’s plan, they maintain, was 
flawed; Nagumo was rigid and uninspired, lacking a firm grasp of the technical 
intricacies of his carrier force; while yamamoto is portrayed as simply inept. In 
their efforts Parshall and tully throw around some pretty robust anthropological 
assertions. Nagumo was not just personally a drone but the product of a culture 
that “valued conformity and obedience over creativity or personal initiative.”7 In 
direct contradiction to this claim, it would appear that yamamoto and his staff 
(and admiral toyoda later in the war) were too creative, dreaming up intricate 
“monstrosities” in their febrile asiatic heads. the authors go even farther, saying, 
“It is clear that in this regard that Japanese naval strategy was influenced from its 
very inception by oriental philosophies on the conduct of war.”8 leaving aside 
the fact that no one uses the term “oriental” anymore, it is hard to reconcile the 
belief that a society can both be wedded to “conformity and obedience over cre-
ativity and personal initiative” and still be the heir of sun tzu. be that as it may, 
in the end Parshall and tully simply opine that Japanese strategy was “warped.” 
Well, perhaps it was warped. Perhaps the Japanese were conceited, arrogant, 
confused, grandiose, inept, rigid, and taken in by what must be wrongheaded 
“oriental philosophies on the conduct of war” that undermined their profession-
al judgment. yet maybe, just maybe, the Japanese did not lose the battle. Perhaps 
the americans, who were very good and very lucky, won it, which leads me to ask 
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whether any such explanations and approbation as historians have meted out are 
needed to understand what the Japanese were doing during operation MI—their 
campaign to capture Midway and defeat the american fleet. I do not believe we 
do need them. the plan to use an assault on Midway to provoke a fleet engage-
ment was not at all foolish. Japan still enjoyed a marked superiority over the U.s. 
Navy in the Pacific. to surrender the initiative would have been dangerous and 
demoralizing. to wait around for the americans to shift the carriers wasp and 
ranger to the Pacific and repair Saratoga would have been unconscionable, and 
to give them a chance to bring the fruits of the Naval act of 1938 (the second 
vinson act) off the slipways and into battle would have been suicidal. so in the 
spring of 1942, it was imperative to attack the americans as soon as possible. 
by examining the details of the battle, one can argue that certain actions for 
which the Japanese have been chastised were in no way bizarre or patently incor-
rect. dividing the fleet into several dispersed subunits was not reckless or bizarre, 
and in fact the decision to disperse the fleet was unavoidable, for three reasons. 
first, the Imperial Japanese Navy was in 1942, like all other major navies, a hybrid 
force of older, slower ships and newer, faster ones. the carrier force could not 
be and should not have been combined with the battle fleet. the americans did 
not combine fleets in 1942, and neither should have the Japanese. the surviving 
battlewagons of Pearl Harbor were never shackled like a ball and chain to the fast 
carrier task forces. this reality also applies to using the carriers Junyo and ryuho 
with the fast carriers of Nagumo’s Kido butai—they were too slow. second, the 
Midway operations involved both a convoy escort and an invasion force, as would 
the U.s. operations against both tarawa and guam, to give two examples. this 
meant the necessary division of the force into a carrier group, a covering group, 
and a landing group, at least. third, given the vast expanse of the Pacific and the 
desire to grapple with the enemy, it was inevitable that forces would be dispersed 
to increase their chances of finding and engaging the american fleet. an overly 
compact disposition would have left too much of the ocean uncovered and given 
the americans more room both to maneuver and to escape. 
only a dogmatic, tinkertoy, popularized version of Mahan insists on a 
complete and permanent concentration of a fleet.9 one can as easily invoke 
the history of the royal Navy, which the Japanese knew well, and the theories 
of sir Julian Corbett, as any attachment to esoteric asian military theory to 
understand why the Japanese might disperse their forces to coax an inferior 
enemy to battle.10 for the royal Navy, a key strategic problem had historically 
been how to entice recalcitrant enemies like spain, france, Italy, and germany 
to come out and fight. anyone with a cursory knowledge of the campaign of 
trafalgar would know that the royal Navy was never averse to dividing the 
fleet to increase the chance of intercepting and engaging the enemy. the british 
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had divided their forces strategically between admiral sir William Cornwallis 
in the english Channel and admiral lord Nelson off Cádiz to keep the enemy 
fleet divided. Nelson then tactically divided his fleet in the face of a numeri-
cally superior enemy the better to crush the franco-spanish fleet between two 
fires at trafalgar. Jutland, the most studied battle of the interwar period, was a 
stark example of the problem of a massed fleet forcing an enemy to fight when 
that enemy knew he was outnumbered. on 31 May 1916 both admirals John 
Jellicoe and reinhard scheer divided their fleets in the hope of drawing part of 
the enemy fleet into a tactical trap. once scheer fully comprehended that the 
grand fleet was out, he successfully ran for home, leaving a rigidly united british 
fleet to deal rather poorly with his evasions. 
as for yamamoto, since forcing an engagement was his primary objective, 
he was going to have to take some risks to bring it about. dividing his fleet into 
dispersed subunits was just such a risk. the british had run similar risks in their 
naval war in the Mediterranean during the period 1940–42.11 that the ameri-
cans would respond more aggressively than britain’s historical adversaries was 
something on which the Japanese were counting. Nevertheless, if the americans 
discovered the entire Imperial Japanese Navy in one tight formation, they might 
easily have balked at the odds. again, the Japanese wanted to fight a battle but 
were concerned that the americans might not oblige. the Japanese, however, 
were not aware that the americans knew of their plans and had responded pre-
emptively with characteristic aggressiveness. thus american diligence, not Japa-
nese arrogance or incompetence, was the deciding factor.
this brings us to the issue of the conceit, arrogance, or overconfidence of the 
Japanese as crucial to explaining their failure at Midway. We have seen that this 
theme appears in the work of such capable authors as ronald spector and H. 
P. Willmott. yet I would argue that these terms are meaningless as descriptors 
of causal agency. any perusal of history will show that successful commanders 
from Julius Caesar to george Patton, from alexander of Macedon to Nelson of 
trafalgar, displayed personality traits that could by any definition be construed as 
conceited and confident in the extreme. overconfidence, or excessive arrogance, 
is an ex post facto judgment, not an identifiable trait that can be disassociated 
from the knowledge that a confident or arrogant person has failed. If the duke of 
Wellington had lost Waterloo or robert e. lee Chancellorsville, you can bet your 
bottom dollar that they would have been pilloried by historians after the fact as 
having shown conceit and overconfidence. If you need to know the results of an 
action to hand down a verdict of “overconfident,” one can legitimately contend 
that the term has no explanatory power.
given this assessment, there is not much that the Japanese can be blamed for 
doing wrong in the planning and execution of operation MI. on an abstract 
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level, fault can be found in the rigidity of Japanese carrier doctrine, designed as it 
was to deliver massed, integrated, and coordinated blows against a given target. 
When the tactical doctrine was given two things to do simultaneously, as it was 
at Midway (neutralize the island and the american carrier force), trouble arose. 
However, since the doctrine of massed strikes for decisive results is that espoused 
as the correct one by carrier enthusiasts then and now, and since the british have 
been roundly criticized for not adopting such a doctrine, it is a bit disingenuous 
for historians to blame the Japanese for sticking to it. 
on a practical level, yamamoto should very likely have pushed up the dutch 
Harbor raid by a day, to give the americans more time both to worry about its 
implications and to organize a response. Nagumo and his staff should have in-
creased the dawn search by as many as six more Nakajima bsN (Kate) torpedo 
bombers acting in a reconnaissance role. all Japanese commanders should have 
immediately broken radio silence once it became obvious that the fleet had been 
sighted and surprise was no longer a consideration. all these actions would have 
been prudent, but none would likely have changed the outcome of the battle, 
because the americans did very many things right. brilliant code breaking was 
combined with an outstanding application of the intelligence thus obtained. 
admirals Jack fletcher and raymond spruance bravely and correctly launched 
their strikes before all the relevant information was in, and at an uncomfortably 
long range. once success had been gained, the americans acted with admirable 
caution. When you add in elements like long-range Catalina flying boats, radar, 
and luck, the americans had more than enough factors working in their favor to 
win the battle. No cultural traits or ethno-racial characteristics need be invoked 
to explain the outcome.
What are my conclusions? first, military historians collectively, as a profession, 
are too often quick to apportion blame. I would posit as a model for avoiding this 
habit eric grove’s excellent account of the battle of the Philippine sea, wherein he 
praises both spruance and admiral Jisabūro ozawa while stressing—and thereby 
hitting the nail on the head—the differences in technology and training as having 
been decisive.12 second, we military historians can be too eager to adopt cultural 
explanations, the wholly inadequate expedient of positing “national character,” or 
some other vague formulation as an explanatory force. as I like to ask my classes: 
Was french national character expressed in 1805–1806 or in 1870–71? Who were 
the “real” frenchmen, the victors on the Marne in 1914 or the losers at sedan in 
1940? some historians may take comfort in such “explanations,” but this author 
does not find them powerful or persuasive. 
on a final note, I believe military historians are too often wary of invoking an-
other power—the power of chance and contingency. It is understandable, and in 
many ways laudable, to try to determine causality and the factors that contribute 
128
Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 1, Art. 20
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss1/20
 1 2 4  Nava l  Wa r  C o l l e g e  r e v I e W
to victory and defeat, but we can be fooled into adopting an overly Newtonian 
view of battle, as if victory were controlled by iron laws of discrete cause and ef-
fect. In short, no matter how disquieting or unsatisfactory it may sound, luck (by 
which I mean unplanned or unexpected events that take place in an unintended 
manner without or outside human control) can play an explanatory part in as-
sessing the causes of victory and defeat. the smile of the goddess of battle may 
be a more powerful metaphor than we would like to believe for the random or 
chance factors that influence the course of battle. 
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STRENGTH IN NuMBERS The RemaRkable PoTeNTial of (Really) Small 
CombaTaNTS
Jimmy Drennan
you are a tactical commander tasked with a mission to seek out and destroy one 
of the enemy’s premier capital ships in his home waters. you have two potential 
striking forces at your disposal: a world-class surface combatant of your own with 
a 99 percent probability of mission success (Ps = 0.99) or a squadron of eight in-
dependently operating, missile-carrying small combatants, each with a chance of 
successfully completing the mission no better than a coin flip (Ps = 0.5). do you 
go with the almost sure thing and choose to send in your large combatant? as it 
turns out, the squadron of small combatants has an even higher overall Ps but let 
us now assume that you have advanced to operational commander. you might 
have more concerns than just overall Ps. What are the defensive and logistical 
requirements for each option? How much fleet investment are you risking with 
each option? What will it cost to replace the asset(s) if lost? What capability does 
the striking force have after successful enemy action (i.e., resilience)? an analy-
sis of these factors, intentionally designed to disadvantage small combatants, is 
actually overwhelmingly in their favor. the results verify what naval strategists 
and tacticians have long known—that for certain offensive missions, an indepen-
dently operating group of even marginally capable platforms can outperform a 
single large combatant at lower cost and less risk to the mission.
THe war-aT-Sea FloTilla: a TeST caSe 
retired U.s. Navy captains Jeff Kline and Wayne Hughes introduced “between 
Peace and the air-sea battle: a War at sea strategy,” in which they describe a flo-
tilla of small, missile-carrying surface combatants designed to challenge Chinese 
aggression in east asian waters.1 the flotilla ships would utilize largely indepen-
dent tactics that relied little on networked command and control, to produce a 
powerful cumulative combat capability.
What would the flotilla look like? In rough terms, 
we envision individual small combatants of about 
six hundred tons carrying six or eight surface-
to-surface missiles and depending on soft kill 
and point defense for survival, aided by offboard 
manned or unmanned aerial vehicles for surveil-
lance and tactical scouting. to paint a picture of 
lieutenant Jimmy Drennan is a surface warfare of-
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possible structures, we contemplate as the smallest element a mutually supporting 
pair, a squadron to comprise eight vessels, and the entire force to be eight squadrons, 
of which half would be in east asian waters. the units costing less than $100 million 
each, the entire force would require a very small part of the shipbuilding budget.2 
this flotilla concept provides an ideal test case to compare against a world-class 
surface combatant, but first we must establish a few key assumptions on which 
this analysis is based.
Statistical independence. the math behind this analysis hinges on the idea that 
the outcome of one small combatant’s engagement has no effect on the others in 
the squadron. While true statistical independence is nearly impossible to achieve 
in real-world naval operations, the “war-at-sea flotilla” concept is modeled close-
ly with independently operating units, the potential for various ship classes, and 
the inclusion of allied navies, which may use different tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (ttPs). this concept of operations is a major departure from today’s 
heavily networked forces that generate combat power through the integrated ac-
tions of several units. In those forces, the actions of one unit can have profound 
impact on the effectiveness of another. 
Defensive and Logistical Requirements. for the purposes of this analysis, we will 
assume that the defensive and logistical requirements are roughly equivalent for 
both the small combatant squadron and the large combatant. both would require 
defensive support in warfare areas not directly related to the current mission. 
even a multimission, blue-water combatant would employ nonorganic support, 
such as maritime patrol aircraft or early-warning assets, to watch its back while 
conducting a focused offensive mission. as for logistics, any surface asset would 
need an oiler nearby to conduct sustained operations in enemy waters. a nuclear- 
powered aircraft carrier would still require periodic support to replenish its stores 
of jet fuel. the logistics tail would be shorter for a large combatant than for a flo-
tilla, since it carries much of its own maintenance and supply support, but that 
can be a detriment in a mission involving an exchange of missile salvos. While 
the structure of defensive and logistical support may differ greatly between the 
flotilla and the large combatant, one can assume the drain on resources would be 
about the same for both options.
Unit Cost. Hughes and Kline estimate the unit cost of the flotilla small combat-
ants to be at eighty million dollars. therefore, a squadron of eight combatants 
would cost $640 million. the unit cost of the large combatant is assumed to be a 
billion dollars, which is an underestimate for relevant U.s. Navy platforms. the 
cost estimates in this analysis are intentionally set up to work against the flotilla 
concept in order to emphasize its potential for savings.
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Enemy Capabilities. to disadvantage further the flotilla concept, let us assume 
the small combatants are significantly overmatched by the enemy combatant. In 
a first strike, the enemy combatant is capable of simultaneously targeting six of 
the eight squadron combatants. against the large combatant, it is capable of con-
ducting a devastating mission kill in which the ship may not be sunk but the cost 
of repairing it to full mission capability would be comparable to the unit cost. as 
a starting argument, we will presume in either case the enemy can achieve a mis-
sion kill with 10 percent probability (Pmk = 0.10), since both striking forces have 
similar levels of defensive support. one might argue that Pmk should be lower 
for the large combatant, because it possesses superior self-defense capabilities; 
however, it could also be argued that the mobile, distributed nature of the small-
combatant squadron compensates for each ship’s lack of self-defense by compli-
cating the enemy’s targeting process. It may be relatively easy for the enemy to 
target one or two of the small combatants, but it remains a challenge to eliminate 
at one stroke the entire squadron. 
SelecTing THe rigHT STriKing Force: analYSiS reSUlTS
Using the generic introductory scenario, we can compare the small combatant 
squadron with the large combatant in terms of performance, cost, and risk.
Overall Effectiveness. We are given the overall effectiveness of the large combat-
ant as Ps = 0.99 and the individual effectiveness of the small combatants as Ps,ship = 
0.5. to determine the overall effectiveness of the squadron, it is easiest to first es-
timate the probability that none of the small combatants successfully accomplish 
their mission. the probability that any one small combatant will not accomplish 
the mission is
1 − Ps,ship = 0.5.
since the outcome of each engagement is estimated as independent of one 
another, the probability that none of the eight small combatants accomplish the 
mission is
(1 − Ps,ship)8 = 0.004.
the probability that at least one of the small combatants accomplishes the 
mission is the converse of the previous result, or 
1 − (1 − Ps,ship)8 = 0.996.
In other words, the squadron has a 99.6 percent probability of success vice 99 
percent for the large combatant. this may not seem like much of an improve-
ment, but it is more remarkable when considering the unit cost of each option.
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Cost-Effectiveness. the unit costs are given as one billion dollars for the large 
combatant and eighty million for the small combatant, so the squadron of eight 
small combatants is the more affordable option, at $640 million. In addition, it 
has been established that the squadron can outperform the large combatant for 
this particular offensive mission, in which the individual squadron ships are ac-
tually overmatched by the enemy. the squadron not only is more cost-effective 
than the large combatant but actually delivers better performance at lower cost. 
as a commander, would you rather invest a billion dollars in a striking force 
that fails ten times in a thousand attempts or save $360 million with a striking 
force that fails only four times in a thousand attempts? to put it another way, 
if you were to invest the same billion dollars in twelve small combatants, you 
could deliver a striking force that failed only two times in ten thousand attempts 
(Ps = 0.9998).
Resilience after Enemy action. one way to consider risk is to look at the impact 
to the mission if the enemy is able to consummate successfully a first attack. We 
have assumed the enemy is equally capable of attacking the large combatant and 
the squadron of small combatants. If the enemy combatant achieves a simulta-
neous mission kill against six of the small combatants, only two will remain to 
continue the mission. these two small combatants have a combined 75 percent 
probability of successfully completing the mission. on the other hand, if the en-
emy successfully conducts a mission kill against the large combatant, the prob-
ability of successfully completing the mission is 0 percent, and you lose the other 
warfare-area capabilities that the large combatant could bring to bear in other 
missions. the additional investment required to provide onboard logistics sup-
port is also lost.
another way to look at this risk is to calculate the expected damage cost of 
each option in the long run. assuming the enemy is able to conduct devastating 
mission kills (in which the repair costs are comparable to the unit cost) a conser-
vative 10 percent of the time (Pmk = 0.1) for both the large and small combatants, 
then the expected damage cost for the large combatant is
e(cost)large = (0.1)($1b) = $100 million.
likewise, the expected damage cost for the squadron of small combatants is 
e(cost)squadron = (0.1)($80M · 6) = $48 million.
In the long run, the enemy is expected to cause fifty-two million dollars less 
damage per mission in the case of the small combatants. even if the enemy were 
more likely to succeed in targeting six small combatants simultaneously, how 
much would you as a commander be willing to pay for 75 percent follow-on 
capability vice 0 percent?
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leSS coMMUnicaTionS, leSS coST, More coMBaT Power: 
analYSiS inSigHTS
the results of this analysis seem to indicate that the squadron of small combat-
ants is an obvious choice for naval missions involving direct action against the 
enemy fleet. yet the scenario described is quite generic and says nothing about 
the actual ttPs and systems the squadron will utilize in prosecuting the enemy. 
How can such a generic scenario really prove anything about the effectiveness 
of small combatants? the key is that two fundamental principles underlie this 
analysis and can be applied in much broader terms.
first, independently operating, redundant, and at least marginally capable 
units will greatly increase any system’s overall effectiveness, primarily because 
unit faults and errors are not permitted to propagate through the system as they 
would in net-centric warfare (e.g., flawed group tactics or a false link track). 
for surface combatants, an individual effectiveness of 50 percent is sufficient to 
produce affordably a formidable striking force. for less expensive systems, that 
number may be even less. Ultimately, this kind of system is so effective because 
it is highly unlikely that none of the individual units will successfully complete 
the mission.
the second principle that contributes to the appeal of the small combatant 
squadron is that the price of military systems increases exponentially as you 
attempt to improve individual unit performance closer and closer to perfec-
tion. Most of our warships today are designed well past the “knee” in the cost 
curve. small combatants can be built with marginal capability at (relatively) low 
cost. one new concept illustrates how less-capable ships can affordably produce 
equivalent performance to that of more capable ones in certain situations. In his 
essay “buy fords, Not ferraris,” Captain Henry Hendrix, UsN, proposes “influ-
ence squadrons,” composed of light amphibious ships, large combatants, littoral 
combat ships (lCss), and small combatants, to alleviate the need for some carrier 
strike groups, with a smaller price tag.3 the purpose of the war-at-sea flotilla, 
however, is not to replace current fleet assets but to fill a vital niche not now 
covered to fight a war at sea in littoral waters. therefore, the cost must be small. 
Hughes and Kline suggest the cost of maintaining a fleet of sixty-four flotilla 
ships, steady state, should be less than 3 or 4 percent of the shipbuilding budget.4
THinK SMall: analYSiS conclUSion anD recoMMenDaTionS
one look at the writings of sir Julian Corbett or Captain Hughes’s Fleet Tactics 
and coastal combat will show the reader that the benefit of small combatants in 
certain aspects of naval warfare is not a new discovery.5 In fact, this analysis may 
seem like the kind of thinking that led to the development of the lCs, which was, 
after all, war gaming and analysis that advocated small combatants.6 the lCs 
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program is not, however, a realization of the principles discussed in this analysis. 
both Freedom- and independence-class lCss are large, multimission warships (al-
beit one mission at a time) in which mission packages cost a premium to achieve 
high probabilities of success. the war-at-sea flotilla, if constructed as Hughes and 
Kline recommend, would exemplify the advantages of independently operating 
small combatants.
None of this is meant to condemn the lCs or any other ship class. every ship 
in the U.s. fleet, along with the distributed networks that multiply its combat 
power, has an important role in the mission of winning the nation’s wars, deter-
ring aggression, and maintaining freedom of the seas. the purpose here is to 
provide an analytical basis for including independently operating squadrons of 
small combatants in the discussion for future force structure. for targeted offen-
sive missions at sea, concepts such as the war-at-sea flotilla can provide higher 
performance than large combatants at lower cost and with greater resilience 
with respect to enemy action. In today’s fiscal reality and tomorrow’s projected 
operational environment, that is a combination Navy leaders should not ignore.
DeBaTing THe war-aT-Sea FloTilla: analYSiS criTiciSM 
anD reSPonSe 
When this article originally appeared on the blog information Dissemination in 
april 2013, it generated intense debate on various discussion boards. the fol-
lowing is a representative sample of the most common composite criticisms of 
the war-at-sea-flotilla concept and associated analysis. Not included here are the 
comments that focused on the merits of the war-at-sea strategy itself. although 
this analysis is intended to support the war-at-sea strategy, it is not meant to be its 
defense. other, more effective strategic options may certainly exist. the merits of 
Hughes and Kline’s work are taken at face value for the purposes of this analysis. 
this article analyzes the tactical implications in a very focused and basic scenario 
to show that a squadron of small combatants, which do not exist in today’s fleet 
inventory, could be more effective than a large combatant in certain offensive 
missions against an enemy fleet.
The analysis is fine as far as it goes; however, like Hughes’s work, it considers the 
engagement in isolation. Today’s militaries, including the obvious target of china, 
fight in a combined-arms environment. For instance, the impact of airpower is 
ignored. Small combatants are extremely vulnerable to aircraft and would be sus-
ceptible to defeat in detail long before reaching engagement range. 
the impacts of combined arms and supporting assets, from both the en-
emy and friendly perspectives, are actually embedded in this analysis. on the 
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offensive side, the type of attack need not be specified. although antiship cruise 
missiles are the obvious choice, deception tactics used to get close to the enemy 
combined with a single torpedo may also be very effective. on the defensive 
side, both the large and small combatants would require area-defense support 
(in all warfare areas). Certainly the large combatant would be more capable of 
self-defense but, in the case of an aegis-equipped destroyer/cruiser, it is exactly 
this added defensive capability (in addition to other warfare capabilities, such as 
ballistic-missile defense and antisubmarine warfare) that requires area-defense 
support. as a commander, would you risk losing an aegis combatant by sending 
it on an offensive mission in hostile territory alone and unafraid? as for the en-
emy, any supporting capabilities that can be brought to bear on the striking force 
are accounted for in the intentionally generalized probability of mission success 
(Ps). the individual small combatant only succeeds half the time (Ps = 0.5), not 
just because of its own limitations, but also because of the enemy’s capabilities. 
a larger combatant, such as an arleigh burke–class guided-missile destroyer, 
would have a better chance of survival to engagement. 
granted, the large combatant may be more capable of preventing missile im-
pact (although small combatants have an inherent stealth advantage and soft-kill 
techniques continue to level the playing field), but even if the small combatants 
were much more likely to take missile hits, the resilient capability of the overall 
squadron may very well be worth the premium paid in damage costs.
How do you convince the american public that people who join the navy are to 
serve on ships that we know will die fast in a war? Do you tell them that it is cost-
effective to lose six of eight ships, as long as they kill one of the enemy’s? 
Consider which is worse: a large combatant goes toe to toe with an enemy 
combatant, takes a devastating missile salvo that kills a significant portion of 
its crew, and gets put out of the fight for months with extreme damage repairs 
while the enemy continues on its way; or a squadron of eight small combatants 
loses six ships but manages to accomplish the mission with the remaining two by 
destroying the enemy combatant. these are not “ships designed to lose”; this is a 
squadron, and therefore a Navy, designed to win.
These small ships must rely on networks to be effective. what happens when the 
chinese jam/spoof U.S. networks on the opening day of conflict? 
It is precisely the opposite that makes the war-at-sea flotilla so effective. since 
the flotilla ships are not connected in a network, their operations can be consid-
ered independent, which leads to the high overall Ps described in this analysis. 
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It is the independent nature of the small combatants from which the squadron 
derives its power. In fact, the lack of an elaborate network reduces the flotilla’s 
electromagnetic signature, further increasing its combat effectiveness by making 
it harder to detect.
i just don’t see eighty million dollars being the price per unit at the end of the day. 
a common criticism was that eighty million dollars is a gross underestimate 
for a small combatant. even if the estimate were off by 100 percent and the actual 
unit cost were $160 million, the entire squadron of eight ships would cost $1.28 
billion—still less than an arleigh Burke guided-missile destroyer. for argument’s 
sake, assume the costs were equal. at that point, the squadron would yield higher 
effectiveness and more resilience for the same price (for the particular mission 
in question). 
Surface combatants serve as a mobile base for maritime helicopters and increasingly 
capable vertical-takeoff unmanned aerial vehicles. a large helicopter deck and han-
gar are arguably the primary strengths of a modern surface combatant. Yet nowhere 
does one see that the author’s proposed “eighty-million-dollar small combatant” 
would be capable of supporting a “helo” or even a Fire Scout. 
While this is certainly a narrow view of surface warfare, it is often valid in to-
day’s operations. the war-at-sea flotilla, however, is predicated on the notion that 
at some point in the future the U.s. Navy will be called on to conduct offensive 
operations against modern enemy combatants at sea. the primary strength of the 
small combatants described here would be their ability to launch a devastating 
salvo of next-generation cruise missiles. If an organic air asset were deemed to 
be absolutely mission critical, unit cost would certainly increase, but it would not 
invalidate the concept (refer to the unit-cost criticism above).
if we are focused on launching cruise missiles better, we can do it better and 
cheaper from a dedicated navy ship. Drones can provide comparable endurance, 
less cost and risk, and larger launch envelopes. an international organization for 
Standardization–sized container of cruise missiles could be put on any allied ship with 
a navy team and become another launch node. letters of marque could be issued, and 
this same modular payload could be operated by navy technicians on eager Philippine 
and vietnamese ships. if we take the chief of naval operations’ direction to heart— 
payloads over platforms—we really just need a box of missiles and need to focus on 
the Pmk of the missile. 
drones and converted containerships are both intriguing ideas for potential 
launch platforms, although each has its drawbacks. achieving persistent presence 
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with land-based drones comparable to that provided by a flotilla may be a chal-
lenge, whereas naval drones are simply extensions of ships, which brings the 
discussion back to large versus small combatants. Containerships could cer-
tainly be inexpensive alternatives to purpose-built combatants, but the rules of 
engagement and political challenges to the use of neutral shipping as a cover to 
engage the enemy may be too great to overcome. Nevertheless, both ideas speak 
to the heart of this analysis: it is not really about small ships but about redundant 
systems of inexpensive nodes operating independently to produce impressive 
combat effectiveness.
Smaller ships need a logistics force to support their operations or an advanced base 
from which to operate close to the chinese coast. 
all ships need logistics forces to support their operations. the logistical re-
quirements of a flotilla of small ships are only more pronounced, because the 
ships carry fewer organic logistical capabilities on board than do large combat-
ants. However, the added logistical capabilities of large combatants can be a li-
ability in open hostilities, because more personnel and resources in the overall 
supply chain are lost when the ship takes damage. When a small combatant is hit 
by the enemy, the overall supply chain is barely affected. 
Doesn’t the U.S. navy already have a small, eighty-million-dollar antiship platform 
in the guise of the F/a-18e/F Super Hornet? 
the comparison to naval aviation might be compelling, except that a naval 
tactical aircraft has to launch from an aircraft carrier, which would be the rel-
evant unit to compare against the squadron of small combatants. the tactical 
range of the f-18 does not allow for the argument that the carrier itself would not 
be involved in the engagement. even if the carrier’s probability of success were 
99.999 percent, the expected damage cost in the long term (in both financial and 
strategic terms) would be prohibitive.
This type of analysis, essentially identical to Hughes’s approach, is extremely sim-
plistic, so much so that meaningful conclusions cannot be drawn. in fact, the results 
can be misleading if the limitations are not clearly recognized. 
simple analyses can produce valuable insights that can be developed into inte-
grated courses of action. of course, strategy is not the summation of tactics, but it 
is important to start simple, or else one is left with a Navy that goes nowhere—or 
worse, a Navy that does not understand where it is going.
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COMMENTaRY
REFLECTIONS ON LEaDERSHIP
christopher H. Johnson
leadership—this word has such a rich meaning. yet in this the twenty-first 
century, does anyone fully appreciate it? are we a nation that still honors leader-
ship’s inherent value to our society? do we still strive to embody its principles in 
everyday life, or are we a nation—with perhaps even a military—that truly does 
not understand the meaning of the word? Have we, as a result, begun to embrace 
management as the new ideal?
I have been observing both leaders and managers for over forty years, during 
my Navy career, my time in the private sector, in church, and in several nonprofit 
endeavors. this is a summary of what I have learned. 
leaDerSHiP verSUS ManageMenT
Management is the science of creating and controlling a successful organization. 
It drives an organization into a groove of tried-and-true methodologies that make 
it orderly, lean, efficient, stable, mechanically correct, fiscally disciplined, highly 
analytic, well behaved, and productive. Manage-
ment seeks success through implementation of 
disciplined habits, repeatable processes, and ana-
lytic decisions. Management is the organized pur-
suit of everyday achievements and success.
leadership, on the other hand, looks beyond 
the everyday. It is the art of igniting an organi-
zation to achieve something new, different, and 
sometimes radical. leadership is about under-
standing how, when, and where to break out of 
the comfort (and the shackles) of the management 
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groove and be bold, responsive, innovative, and even revolutionary. leadership 
encourages individuals to attack problems rather than just manage them, to seek 
breakthroughs and pursue blockbuster ideas, to challenge limits and leap over 
obstacles, to embrace risk and change, and to grasp victory at critical moments 
against all odds.
a leader is one who practices good management but simultaneously feels a 
constant compulsion to pursue something extraordinary. a leader is one who has 
wisdom and sense of timing to know when the moment is right to break out of 
that management groove and strike down a new path, someone who has nurtured 
within the inherent vision, courage, selflessness, humility, and fortitude to pursue 
that path to an extraordinary and often game-changing conclusion.
Management and leadership may sound like kindred concepts, but they are 
in fact radically different approaches to solving problems and moving forward. 
Management creates competence and then rides that competence to success. 
leadership pursues greatness. leaders frequently emerge during life’s most peril-
ous moments when managers have already thrown up their hands in despair of 
finding a reliable and safe solution. 
How do leaders enable greatness? by doing what managers are taught not to 
do. leaders are ceaseless and daring in the pursuit of progress. they are willing 
to be inventive and unconventional, to trust their intuition and take risks, to 
embrace innovation, to follow dreams and visions, and to stand tall in the most 
difficult circumstances. leaders persistently challenge organizational resistance, 
regimentation, and inertia. they put thought into action more passionately and 
effectively, with a much richer feel for teamwork, and with a deep sense of obliga-
tion to their subordinates.
In practice, of course, the world earnestly needs both managers and leaders. 
However, it is critical to understand that when, in extraordinary circumstances, 
change is absolutely necessary, and we need people who can be in charge, then 
we are looking for leaders.
In 1776, george Washington’s Continental army was driven out of New york 
and almost captured. the fledgling american revolution was on the verge of 
collapse. this army, though hounded by british troops on its trek through New 
Jersey, eventually escaped to northeastern Pennsylvania, where it moved into 
winter camp, presumably to rearm, resupply, lick its wounds, and prepare for re-
engagement in the spring. We might call that a management-driven approach—
steady, sure, and logical. However, Washington had a bolder plan. He led his 
army across the delaware river in small boats on Christmas day, surprising the 
british, winning an improbable victory, and capturing muskets, powder, artillery, 
and a thousand prisoners. He reestablished the americans as a fighting force with 
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which to be reckoned, and he ignited his army to a great achievement that made 
an imprint on history. george Washington was a leader.
being a leader does not always imply initiatives as dramatic or historic as 
Washington’s crossing of the delaware. even small, everyday departures from the 
norm can be extraordinary, for they drive us toward progress, new thinking, and 
renewal. that is the effect we expect from leadership. 
ToDaY’S cHallenge
for over two hundred years leadership has been a unique hallmark of american 
culture and arguably a significant component of its success. from the founding 
fathers and pioneers forward, leaders have consistently thrust our nation into 
new endeavors and advances. from Washington to President Harry truman, 
from the purchase of alaska to landing a man on the moon, from inventing the 
lightbulb to developing the personal computer, leaders have consistently chal-
lenged and bypassed conventional thinking. In significant ways, america has 
always embraced the vitality and vision inherent in good leadership. 
yet leadership can also lead to failure. the willingness to take a risk can also be 
an invitation to fail. failure, however, is often the route to greatness. edison failed 
thousands of times before he found the right way to build a lightbulb.1
However, today something is afoot that is gnawing at the fabric of that leader-
ship, and we need to defend against it. Many, for example, consider a master’s 
degree in business-style management the new form of leadership, because it is so 
analytic and risk averse. these people often regard a leader simply as an excep-
tional manager with an extra dollop of energy and a magnetic personality. others 
believe that success, or wealth, or a fashionable position is the key to leadership, 
thus encouraging such people as celebrities, sports heroes, lawyers, politicians, 
etc., into positions of leadership. While yet others are so anxious to avoid mis-
steps in their careers that they never dare to follow a course of greatness. the 
result is a growing unwillingness and inability to move forward, take risks, or 
courageously solve vexing problems. 
regrettably, I find many senior military officers and business executives to be 
examples of this. they often have all the trappings of leaders but they have rarely 
taken risks, perpetually toe the party line, and rarely break out of their shells to 
make a real difference. these impostors serve to confuse and misdirect us and 
could possibly pose a real threat to our great nation and our military if we allow 
such management types to become our models of leadership. If we had allowed 
this to happen in 1776, there might never have been a United states. We seem 
to be awash in problems but bereft of bold solutions. We search for leaders but 
find few. Where are they? Possibly they too are lost in the misperception of what 
leadership is. 
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leaDerSHiP aT iTS eSSence
What I have learned from my observations is that leadership has nothing to do 
with how people express themselves or how much they know. the world is full 
of intellects and showmen who cannot lead because they are too busy analyzing, 
theorizing, preening for the camera, or wringing their hands about what to do 
next. No, neither intelligence, education, eloquence, nor past position is an indi-
cation of leadership. 
rather, character is the heart of leadership. for that reason, the only true way 
to describe leadership focuses not on how leaders are educated or the processes 
or checklists they must follow (for that’s how managers would try to describe 
the process of leadership), but on the qualities of character that leaders embrace. 
While a manager can be taught in the classroom, a true leader is molded by not 
only education but real-life experience.
there may be many interpretations of the quality set that drives a true leader, 
but here are what I have observed to be the key elements.
Passion. leadership is rooted in a persistent passion, which in this context im-
plies an irresistible commitment of body and soul to a forward-leaning purpose, 
to change, and to progress. It is a constant, constructive discontent with the status 
quo. every leader I have ever known has it. It is not an outward, emotionalized, 
frenzied passion worn on the sleeve but an inner fire that only occasionally bursts 
through a cool and composed exterior. Where there is a real leader, I will show 
you passion.
this passion often contains elements of nobility and rebellion. It is noble be-
cause it encompasses the ability and willingness to sense right from wrong, self-
less from selfish, good from bad, and to make consistently good choices between 
them. 
leaders are also rebels. there is a spirit within a leader that remains un-
daunted by criticism. a leader is often compelled to speak bluntly and is willing 
to disregard both regulations and conventional thinking. often progress comes 
more in breaking rules than abiding by them. Joe rochefort was admiral Chester 
Nimitz’s lead cryptologist prior to the battle of Midway. He broke many rules and 
willingly angered many superiors in Washington, but his passion for breaking the 
Japanese naval code led to a startling american victory at Midway and perma-
nently reversed allied fortunes in the Pacific theater in World War II.2 thomas 
edison said, “restlessness is discontent, and discontent is the first necessity of 
progress. show me a thoroughly satisfied man, and I will show you a failure.”3
Curiosity. leaders are perpetually curious. as salesmen are taught to look quickly 
around the offices of people on whom they call to understand and form a better 
bond with them, so a leader must constantly learn more about the organization 
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he or she leads. In this regard, a leader’s best friend is a great question—a question 
that is asked over and over until a meaningful insight surfaces. answers, or even 
the absence of an answer, gives a leader the basis for an intimate understanding 
of the organization. 
leaders eventually learn that they cannot gain real clarity simply by taking 
briefs and reports from subordinates. they must walk around, engage people, 
ask questions, and feel the inner workings of the organization. even the best-
intentioned subordinate rarely sees or senses things through the same lens as the 
person in charge. leadership is often based on perception and intuition. leaders 
look for and sense the things that briefs will not reveal, such as an unhappy em-
ployee, a system that does not quite work, a bullheaded supervisor, or a brilliant 
but underperforming team member.
Curiosity truly educates a leader’s perspective, and it supports two essential 
visions—one, a sense of how to move forward, and two, a peripheral vision that 
alerts a leader to the surprises that lurk around the corner. surprise is a leader’s 
greatest enemy, and curiosity can be the greatest resource.
albert einstein said, “I have no special talent—I am only passionately curi-
ous.”4 Walt disney explains, “there’s really no secret about our approach. We keep 
moving forward—opening new doors and doing new things—because we are cu-
rious. and curiosity keeps leading us down new paths. We’re always exploring.”5
Vision. vision is often spoken of as some mystical ability to see the future and 
respond accordingly. Presidents are often praised when they are perceived to have 
it and vilified when they are perceived to lack it. However, I find vision to be no 
magical mental capacity but a much simpler, everyday thing—the convergence of 
passion, curiosity, imagination, and perspective. Passion fuels the leader’s com-
pulsion for progress, curiosity digs out the places where progress is most impor-
tant, imagination allows one to see new ways of proceeding. therefore, vision is 
not an issue of genius or clairvoyance. 
Consider the possibility that there are really no new ideas and no new visions 
that leaders personally must feel responsible for inventing. something that poses 
as a new idea or new vision is often just a refocus or rearrangement of many old 
ideas, connected in different ways to produce a fresh solution to a problem. after 
all, the vision of a horse cart is merely a mental image of a container, an axle, two 
wheels, and a horse, all connected for the first time. 
vision is the result of a passionate, inquiring, open, and practical mind that 
permits itself to think without preconceived bounds or conventions. It requires 
setting aside quiet time every day to consider new combinations and permuta-
tions and to see new possibilities. It is something normal and natural that often 
just requires the willingness to reflect on what could be.
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Willingness to act. It is stunning to find people who apparently have the instincts 
of a leader but cannot or will not take action. for example, take general george 
b. McClellan, of american Civil War fame. He loved to train, he love to orga-
nize, he loved to plan. He simply was incapable of moving into combat. during 
the Peninsular Campaign (as the documentarian Ken burns notes in his 1990 
Pbs series The civil war), he earned the sobriquet “the virginia Creeper” for his 
willingness to move forward only at the agonizingly slow pace of a well known 
virginia ivy plant, while constantly finding reasons for avoiding any engagement 
with the army of Northern virginia.
In a once widely known pamphlet, a Message to garcia, elbert Hubbard re-
counted the story of a man named rowan who was assigned to take an important 
message from President McKinley to general Calixto garcia, the leader of Cuban 
insurgents, who was somewhere in the mountains of Cuba. the story recounts 
that rowan took the message and delivered it. He did not ask where garcia could 
be found, how he could be recognized, how to get to Cuba, how to survive there, 
how to get back, or what clothes to pack. He simply took the message from Presi-
dent McKinley and delivered it. With obvious admiration, Hubbard proclaimed, 
“there is a man whose form should be cast in deathless bronze and the statue 
placed in every college of the land. It is not book-learning young men need, nor 
instruction about this and that, but a stiffening of the vertebrae which will cause 
them to be loyal to a trust, to act promptly, concentrate their energies: do the 
thing—‘Carry a message to garcia.’”6 
similarly, leaders cannot simply plan; they must act—when, how, and where 
they said they would. they must be decisive, even when there is insufficient 
information and analysis to decide properly; honor commitments; take direct 
charge when required in emergencies; and never allow fear to paralyze them 
or retard quick, effective, aggressive action. an essential part of a leader’s job is 
constantly to “take a message to garcia”!
Sacred bond with Subordinates. the relationship between leaders and their ad-
herents goes far beyond that of managers and their employees. leaders under-
stand that they are under constant surveillance. these are the qualities that really 
command the trust and loyalty of subordinates:
•	 a resolute spirit: subordinates constantly seek evidence of courage, resolve, 
unflagging optimism, and fortitude to assure them that their leader is truly 
committed to the vision at hand and will be at their side to the bitter end—
win or lose. 
•	 integrity: subordinates earnestly seek from a leader and an organization 
justice, caring, and respect. they seek a place where no one is above the law, 
where a subordinate’s welfare is a priority, and offenses are investigated and 
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dealt with fairly and openly. subordinates respect leaders who are willing to 
bear the responsibility for their every action.
•	 Truth: Nothing is so corrosive to loyalty as someone using secrets and 
untruthful representations to gain favor. regardless of how good or bad the 
news is, the leader’s standard must be a full and honest account. 
•	 Balance and perspective: a leader can be daring, but never rash or dogmatic, 
never willing to sacrifice subordinates needlessly or for mere glory. sub-
ordinates seek constant assurance that leadership will act intelligently and 
thoughtfully, and will constantly find a way to win. 
•	 Humanity: subordinates want to know that a leader’s decisions are based 
as much on their health and welfare, and those of their families, as on the 
completion of the task at hand. the leader must show them unbounded 
loyalty and respect. this allows subordinates to face difficult and dangerous, 
even deadly, circumstances with pride and dignity.  
In addition to these qualities, I believe that every leader owns a unique per-
sonal quality that is somehow exemplary, that identifies and bonds him or her to 
the team. It can be humor, kindness, strength, honesty, empathy, intelligence, or 
any other trait, but in every case this quality is deep, enduring, and reassuring. 
leaders take care to identify those singular qualities in themselves, and then lean 
on them, hone them, and let them shine.
discussions on leadership often speak of eloquence and communication as 
crucial qualities for leaders. Communication rises above words, speeches, ges-
tures, and superficial pep talks. It empowers the team to persevere in the toughest 
conditions. 
loyalty is crucial, but it can be easily faked when leaders do not measure up. 
leaders see subordinates as treasured teammates or comrades in arms, while 
managers usually see them as mere employees. Which attitude prompts the 
greater loyalty in return? Which attitude cements that bond between leader and 
subordinate?
Commitment to Teamwork. leaders lead people. they must remember that it is 
their team that really gets the job done. this points to a leader’s real occupation—
enabling, facilitating, and inspiring teamwork. Here is a key secret of leadership: 
once the value and purpose of teamwork are understood, a leader can lead almost 
any organization on earth, because success depends not on technical knowledge 
or masterful decision making but on shepherding teams effectively and then let-
ting them do the work.
adjusting or correcting the elements of teamwork is also, by far, the most expedient 
and effective way to improve an organization’s performance. New equipment, detailed 
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training, and new facilities all cost money and take time to implement . . . but shifting 
team member roles, building confidence, opening new avenues of communication 
or sources of information can all be accomplished swiftly, and can invigorate a team’s 
chemistry and ignite performance overnight. the Cincinnati reds of Major league 
baseball proved this in 1975 when, by moving Pete rose from left field to third base 
and inserting george foster in left field, they created the infamous big red Machine 
that won 108 games in 1975 and is to this day the last National league team to win 
consecutive World series.7 
often, igniting a team can be very simple. a leader supports teamwork formally 
in five ways—by 
•	 listening to, observing, shepherding, and adjusting the team continuously
•	 Constantly removing obstacles to its progress, both internally and externally
•	 Pushing all team members to grow individually through delegating respon-
sibilities to subordinates, allowing them to make key decisions, and building 
confidence in their decision-making abilities
•	 encouraging and permitting the team to self-correct and self-inspire
•	 Holding team members accountable for their actions, not as punishment, 
but as a vehicle to heighten awareness that the team functions properly only 
when all do their jobs properly and efficiently.
In a very real way, teamwork underlies everything a leader accomplishes, and the 
constant development of the team is often the leader’s most important job.
Humility. I find real leaders are perpetually intuitive. leaders make decisions as 
much on instinct as they do on analysis, and the door to intuition and instinct is 
humility. by enforcing an inner quiet and a willingness to hear new ideas, leaders 
permit themselves to escape for a few moments from the amplified howl of ana-
lytic thought, dogma, preconceived notions, hardened positions, and the noise of 
educated opinion. this permits them to listen to quieter voices from their own 
team or within themselves. 
When leaders send the message to their team that they know everything and 
have every answer, the proximate result is that everyone concerned stops bring-
ing them new ideas, insights, inspirations, or warnings. the quickest way to be 
alone is to let your team know that you do not require its input.
Humility is a check against one’s own voice, the door through which new in-
spirations enter, and a constant reminder that leadership is not about power and 
self-promotion but selfless pursuit of progress. It signals the leader when it is time 
to lead, when it is time to follow, and when it is time to compromise.
Perhaps Washington crossed the delaware because he was more willing to lis-
ten to inspiration and intuition than to an educated evaluation of the probability 
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of success, and that required humility. einstein reputedly said that “the intuitive 
mind is a sacred gift and the rational mind is a faithful servant. We have created 
a society that honors the servant and forgotten the gift.”8
leadership is often difficult; it runs counter to the more comfortable, and of-
ten more lucrative, path of management. a leader’s road is often strewn with 
obstacles. leaders take risks, and sometimes those risks lead to failure. leaders 
are sometimes viewed as misfits, troublemakers, and rebels. often the reward 
for a job well done, for grasping victory from the jaws of defeat, is dismissal or a 
letter of reprimand. after the success at Midway, rochefort was removed by his 
superiors in Washington and never served directly in a cryptanalysis billet again.9
Interestingly, the John Wayne style of being a leader—big talking and guns 
a-blazin’—hardly seems to be the model for the everyday practice of leadership. 
rather than constantly being at the epicenter of the action, the leader is just as 
likely to be in the background, letting the team do the real work—staying calm, 
collected, and supportive, and letting the traits of his or her leadership character 
shine through and imparting confidence, wisdom, and (at the right moments) 
daring to subordinates. 
In the same way, the daily practice of leadership is embodied not so much by 
the image of a knight leading men into battle from atop a white stallion, but by 
that of men and women working hard to make the team successful and victori-
ous, by
•	 Constantly balancing leadership and management traits to fit the situation
•	 being curious and passionate
•	 shepherding, improving, testing, and preparing the team for success
•	 living up to the occasional take-charge moment or crucial, real-time  
decision
•	 Confronting failure with courage and determination 
•	 Consistently finding time to be quiet to listen to his or her inner voice for 
guidance.
leaders walk this road of leadership because they are compelled to follow that 
inner fire that pushes them out of the groove to make a difference. leaders take 
pride in being among those people who find the new way, pursue it, and never shy 
away from conflict, danger, and opportunity. leadership leads us all to greatness. 
local and national problems abound; it is a daunting world. We are in des-
perate need of leaders to solve our problems, because managers will not. thus 
there is an increasing urgency for us all to come to grips with the real nature 
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of leadership, to understand the place of management and of managers in the 
context of leadership, to recommit ourselves to the development and practice of 
leadership in ourselves and our subordinates, and to have the courage to promote 
and protect people who fail in the pursuit of greatness—for that failure often 
makes them stronger and makes them better leaders.
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BOOK REvIEWS
IS PROFESSIONaL MILITaRY EDuCaTION NECESSaRY?
ricks, thomas e. The generals: american Military command from world war ii to Today. New 
york: Penguin, 2012. 576pp. $32.95
tom ricks has earned over the past 
two decades a justified reputation as a 
thorough and knowledgeable military 
correspondent. His latest work ad-
dresses the decline in the competence 
of generals in the U.s. army, which he 
regards as a major and timely issue. as 
is to be expected from such a thought-
ful journalist, ricks has produced an 
important book that should spark debate 
and discussion not only among the 
army’s leaders but also among those of 
the other services. The generals is well 
written and at times insightful. Indeed, 
it makes a plausible case that there is 
something flawed in the choice and 
education of army leaders. for that 
reason alone it deserves close attention 
from those responsible for the shaping 
and course of service personnel policies 
that guide the preparation and promo-
tion of america’s future military leaders.
Nevertheless, there are serious weak-
nesses in ricks’s examination. admit-
tedly, he has provided an excellent 
catalogue of the symptoms that indicate 
the decline in quality of army gener-
als from george Marshall to tommy 
franks. However, in the end, ricks’s 
account fails to address systemic factors 
that lie behind that decline. thus at few 
points does he draw out the underlying 
landscape of causality and accident, the 
impact of chance on events, the other 
possibilities open to army leaders of 
the past, or the impact of trends and 
political choices on the army’s lead-
ership. Moreover, he fails to address 
the elusive but essential problem of 
changes in the army’s culture over 
time, or how and why those changes 
came about. yet from this military 
historian’s point of view, that last issue 
represents the crucial element in the 
effectiveness of military institutions.
What this review aims to suggest is 
some of the larger areas that do not 
form a part of ricks’s account, such as 
the problem of unexpected changes in 
the underlying culture of the army; 
the problem of unintended effects in 
personnel decisions and overall policy; 
the often baleful choices that political 
leaders have imposed on the army; the 
importance of understanding the conti-
nuity of events in examining the leaders 
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who reach the senior levels; and above 
all, the intellectual framework within 
which that leadership has developed.
the difficulty with developing military 
leaders to which ricks alludes is that 
the military profession demands two 
different attributes in its leaders, at-
tributes that flow from the very nature 
of the profession. as Michael Howard 
so brilliantly suggested in an address at 
the royal United services Institute in 
the early 1970s, the military represents 
a profession that, fortunately, rarely 
gets to practice the fundamental reason 
for its existence—namely, the conduct 
of wars. that reality in turn makes the 
leadership of military forces not only 
the most physically demanding of all 
the professions but the most demand-
ing intellectually. the mere running of 
military forces in peacetime, particularly 
after the second World War, has become 
such a complex task that its leaders can 
all too easily lose sight of the reason 
why their organizations exist. Moreover, 
over the course of the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries military institu-
tions have confronted the considerable 
problems that rapid changes in technol-
ogy bring in their wake. How then are 
military leaders to address a world in 
constant flux, with its massive social and 
technological changes? Most impor-
tantly, they cannot replicate the horrors 
and complexities of the battlefield on 
which their soldiers, marines, sailors, 
and airmen will fight. that conundrum 
represents the heart of peacetime in-
novation, on which the combat effective-
ness of military institutions depends.
let us begin with george C. Marshall, 
whom ricks has quite rightly selected 
as the paradigm by which those who 
aspire to high command should model 
their careers (but more often do not). 
the problem with selecting Marshall, 
however, is that he was an anomaly 
in the officer corps. significantly, and 
reflective of the weaknesses in his analy-
sis, ricks omits to discuss Marshall’s 
seminal role as the deputy commandant 
of the army’s Infantry school, at fort 
benning, in the 1930s. In that post the 
army’s future chief of staff emphasized 
the education of the faculty as well as of 
the students. If he kept a “black book” in 
which he recorded the most outstanding, 
as well as the least capable, of the officers 
with whom he came in contact, it was 
at fort benning. there he could, and 
undoubtedly did, observe a considerable 
number of officers who passed through 
that institution as either faculty mem-
bers or students and who would eventu-
ally lead the U.s. army in World War II. 
In the midst of the rush to mobilize a 
grossly unprepared institution to meet 
the desperate situation of 1940, Mar-
shall’s emphasis on education remained 
steadfast. significantly, with the world 
going to hell in a handbasket in June 
1940, two out of the six faculty mem-
bers of the army War College at fort 
McNair were Colonel W. H. simpson 
and Major J. lawton Collins. In today’s 
military an assignment as instructor to 
a war college during a major crisis is a 
sure sign of the end of a career. Not so in 
Marshall’s army. simpson would become 
a lieutenant general by 1944 and com-
mand the Ninth army in the european 
theater of operations, while Collins 
would be a division commander by 1942 
on guadalcanal, a corps commander 
in europe by 1944, later an army chief 
of staff, and in the postwar period the 
army’s chief of staff. yet both remained 
in their faculty positions for the remain-
der of the 1940–41 academic year. that 
is perhaps where the greatest difference 
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lies between the culture of today’s 
military and the attitude of Marshall.
ricks is quite right to underline the 
ruthlessness with which Marshall and 
his senior subordinates fired those who 
failed to measure up to the demands of 
war. He is, however, on shakier ground 
in suggesting that they were willing to 
give those who failed a second chance. 
In fact, such cases were quite rare. 
Moreover, it is at the more junior levels 
(major and below) where one might 
consider a few second chances. In that 
respect, it is worth noting that Major 
Jack galvin was one of the junior of-
ficers who felt general William dePuy’s 
wrath during the vietnam War and 
was fired. Nevertheless, in the army of 
the 1970s, his career recovered, and he 
eventually reached the post of supreme 
allied Commander, europe. In terms 
of World War II, the generals, for the 
most part, who were removed from 
command disappeared into retirement 
or into commands stateside as colonels. 
those who did not were the exceptions. 
Marshall and his subordinates were 
able to purge those whom they believed 
incompetent because the United states 
faced a challenge to its existence. Con-
fronting that reality as well, the media 
were hardly willing to complain about 
the firing of incompetent officers from 
senior command positions. thus it may 
be a stretch to point to command poli-
cies in a time of national emergency as a 
pattern worth following in the present. 
a great weakness in ricks’s account 
lies in his failure to address the impor-
tance of professional military educa-
tion (PMe) to create a culture that can 
innovate in peacetime and adapt to the 
unexpected conditions of combat. the 
historical rec ord of the interwar period 
suggests that the schoolhouse provided 
the basis for the strategic and operation-
al framework within which america’s 
military forces conducted and won the 
great campaigns of a two-front war, one 
that saw the projection of U.s. power 
across the Pacific and atlantic oceans. 
one of the possible explanations for the 
prewar emphasis on PMe lies in the fact 
that without any significant resources 
in those years, the U.s. military had no 
choice but to devote much of its energy 
to serious study. on the other hand, it 
is also clear that many officers in that 
military believed that as members of a 
serious profession, they needed to study 
their profession just as lawyers and doc-
tors do. on the Navy side of the house, it 
is significant that one of the most inno-
vative CINCUss (Commanders in Chief, 
United states), admiral Joseph reeves, 
spent a tour on the faculty at the Naval 
War College, in Newport, rhode Island, 
while the future admiral raymond spru-
ance, the great leader of the Central Pa-
cific drive, spent two tours on its faculty.
at the end of World War II, many of 
the returning generals and admirals 
who had led U.s. forces identified the 
staff and war colleges as having played 
major roles in preparing them for the 
arduous tasks they had just confronted. 
eisenhower, as the army’s chief of staff, 
went so far as to take a major part in the 
founding of the National War College. 
However, almost immediately the staff 
and war colleges declined in importance, 
until by the sixties they represented 
refuges in which both faculty and stu-
dents could search for postretirement 
jobs or play golf. thus the instruments 
for the study of the military profession 
never really recovered the influence 
they had possessed before the war.
there are a number of possible explana-
tions. this reviewer favors two. first, 
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the pressures of the Cold War and the 
conduct of major wars in Korea and 
vietnam led senior leaders to devalue 
education in favor of readiness. second, 
but equally important, was the fact that 
the generation of leaders that assumed 
control of the american military in 
the early sixties had risen rapidly to 
command positions in the massive 
mobilization of World War II. like 
Westmoreland—who refused a potential 
assignment to the army War College 
with the comment that he was too 
advanced to be a student but was willing 
to serve as a faculty member—many of-
ficers dismissed the idea of serious study 
of their profession, having “learned” ev-
erything they needed to know about war 
and strategy from combat experience. 
by skipping across a broad spectrum 
of the army’s history, however, ricks 
ignores two other factors in the de-
cline in the army’s generalship: the 
constraints that the post–World War 
II reforms in personnel policies cre-
ated and still impose on the american 
military and the impact of the choices 
that political and military leaders 
inevitably make in the running of a 
complex organization. What was clear 
to those who had served in the interwar 
military was that the system of promo-
tion then had not only been unfair but 
rewarded the slow, the plodding, and 
the stupid. Moreover, as Marshall’s firing 
of so many officers at the war’s outset 
underlined, the system had kept large 
numbers of officers on active duty who 
were too old or incompetent to serve 
in the harsh conditions of wartime.
the result was a major reform of the 
personnel system in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. the “up or out” system, 
modeled on the industrial practices 
of the time, largely frames the present 
practice. that system also aimed at keep-
ing more officers at the middle levels 
than needed, to address the problems 
that a massive mobilization in a major 
world war with the soviet Union would 
require. the up-or-out part of the equa-
tion aimed at ensuring that the system 
would prevent the stagnation that had 
marked the interwar army and forced 
Marshall to fire so many superannuated 
officers. Moreover, the new personnel 
system, with its financial inducements 
encouraging majors, lieutenant colonels, 
and colonels to retire in their middle 
and early forties, fit the health profiles 
of the time. this, after all, was a period 
when officers smoked like chimneys 
and drank like fish. It certainly fit 
the model that american businesses 
had established for their executives, 
a model that came close to destroy-
ing the competitiveness of american 
industry in the 1970s. Most american 
industries have changed their personnel 
systems, forcing out those who fail to 
comply. the american military has not. 
the unintended consequences of this 
system now plague the U.s. military. 
above all, the twenty-year up-or-out 
system has created minimal flexibility 
for the broader education of the officer 
corps. Moreover, it encourages signifi-
cant numbers of outstanding officers 
to retire at precisely the point when 
they could offer much to their services. 
the retirement policies have resulted 
in a brain drain that encourages many 
of the brightest and most competent 
to leave as early as they can to begin 
their second careers. simply put, no 
competent business would allow the 
loss of talent that now takes place every 
year, as exceptional officers retire in 
their midforties. the bottom line has 
been a culture of few risk takers and 
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too many conformists. therefore, the 
future Petraeuses of the army, who 
have pursued efforts to broaden their 
knowledge of military and strategic 
history, have found themselves regarded 
by many of their colleagues as outliers. 
they are to all intents and purposes the 
exceptions to the rule, while too many 
others like tommy franks and ricardo 
sanchez have followed the system of 
lockstep promotion and assignment. 
the army’s present culture (much like 
that of the german army, which lost two 
world wars because the brilliance of its 
tactics could not overcome its contempt 
for strategy and politics) should have 
been the centerpiece on which ricks 
hung his argument. In particular, the 
failure of fort leavenworth and Carlisle 
barracks to provide the educational 
underpinnings of army culture rep-
resents the heart of where it has gone 
wrong. of all the military institutions, 
the army most requires the steady hand 
of professional military education. 
Unfortunately, since 1945 the army has 
been the service least served by that 
crucial enabler of military culture. even 
after the vietnam War underlined the 
flaws in the PMe system, education 
received too little attention from those 
in charge. at times their interference 
was pernicious, as ricks quite correctly 
points out in his discussion of the con-
flict between Jack Cushman and William 
dePuy. the mantra of the army War 
College (at least when this reviewer was 
familiar with it) was that the institution 
existed to give officers rests in their busy 
careers. a former dean of the college 
was even quoted as “preferring that his 
officers spend their time on the golf 
course rather than in the library.” Most 
of the attending officers got the message, 
although a few, like the future Marine 
general Paul van riper, simply went off 
to the Military History Institute and read 
books. today, one of the great ironies in 
the army’s PMe system is the fact that 
there is intense competition among the 
most outstanding army officers to at-
tend the junior or senior course at New-
port and avoid fort leavenworth and 
Carlisle barracks. adding to the irony 
is that the Navy itself has over the past 
forty years made every effort to avoid 
sending its best officers to Newport, or 
to any other PMe institution, despite 
the fact that the Naval War College has 
provided far and away the most intellec-
tually challenging education in strategy.
In examining what has happened to the 
army, it is not sufficient to hop, as ricks 
does, from one decade to another to 
examine this or that general, who may 
or may not reflect the dominant cultural 
mores of a huge organization. following 
vietnam, the pressing problem was to 
reconstitute and reinvigorate a military 
organization that was on its last legs. It 
is not surprising, then, that the army’s 
leadership would concentrate on getting 
the tactics right; operations and strategy 
could come later. Here the two most im-
portant figures in rehabilitating the ar-
my’s leadership were Creighton abrams 
and his successor, frederick C. Weyand, 
who played crucial roles in pushing 
forward that extraordinary group of 
generals who emerged to put the army 
right in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
dePuy was only one of these gener-
als, and while ricks is right to credit 
him with considerable influence (good 
and bad) over the reborn army of the 
1980s, he virtually ignores other equally 
important figures. to understand the 
intellectual and cultural revolution of 
the 1970s at the army’s higher levels, 
we must look at the contributions of 
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generals like don starry, Paul gorman, 
glen otis, and William richardson.
astonishingly, ricks mentions general 
“shy” Meyer, the brilliant army chief 
of staff during the late seventies and 
early eighties, only in passing, quoting 
his famous comment about the “hol-
low army.” yet Meyer, with the help 
of the likes of starry, richardson, and 
otis, was clearly aiming at creating a 
fundamental shift in the army’s culture. 
asking why he failed and why general 
al gray of the Marine Corps succeeded 
would make for a fascinating exami-
nation of the difficulties and pitfalls 
involved in changing organizational 
culture. It also would have allowed ricks 
to get at the heart of the problem. 
Instead, ricks jumps from his discussion 
of dePuy to a discussion of the general-
ship of Norman schwarzkopf and Colin 
Powell, omitting the important story 
of the intellectual retrenchment of the 
intervening years, when dePuy, Meyer, 
starry, and richardson disappeared, to 
be replaced by lesser figures. In that tale 
lies the real cause of whatever decline 
has taken place. as one senior officer 
commented to this reviewer, changing 
the culture of military organizations 
“is like attempting to turn an aircraft 
carrier or ocean liner.” but if profes-
sional military education is not going to 
determine a common culture of excel-
lence, then individual choices are going 
to be the major determinants. therefore, 
in understanding the army’s story, one 
also must pay attention to the role that 
accident, chance, or miscalculation by 
its political masters has played in the 
evolution of what appears to be a decline 
in the effectiveness of its leadership. 
schwarzkopf was probably least typical 
of the army generals of his genera-
tion. rumors ran in Washington that 
he had been shipped out to Central 
Command, at the time a relatively 
unimportant theater in the military 
pecking order, largely to move him out 
of the army staff, where his explosive 
personality had earned him a reputa-
tion for causing turmoil. In other words, 
it was chance and an underestimation 
of how rapidly the world was chang-
ing that led him to fame and fortune. 
It was during the 1990s that flawed po-
litical choices had the greatest impact on 
the culture of the army’s leadership. It 
is not that tommy franks appeared mys-
teriously or as the result of a straight-line 
collapse in the culture of the general-
officer corps. In discussing the causes 
of the vietnam disaster, ricks rightly 
highlights the dysfunctional relation-
ship between lyndon Johnson and his 
military advisers—a flawed relation-
ship exacerbated by the dishonesty of 
secretary of defense robert McNamara 
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of staff, general Maxwell taylor. In 
President William Clinton’s administra-
tion, civil-military relations were equally 
dysfunctional, and for similar reasons. 
Here the president, for reasons that 
remain opaque, appears to have aimed 
at appointing senior service command-
ers who were extraordinarily weak. 
the army got the worst of the deal. 
general dennis reimer may have been 
the weakest of Clinton’s appointments. 
Undoubtedly a well-meaning officer, 
reimer nonetheless made decisions that 
now have, and will continue to have, a 
baleful impact on the army’s culture. 
simply put, he wrecked fort leaven-
worth by decreeing that all majors would 
attend the Command and staff College, 
and that there would be no board selec-
tion for officers to attend the college. 
the result was a drastic downgrading 
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of quality of faculty, students, and 
instruction. reimer then proceeded 
to appoint a family friend, general 
John abrams, a skilled soldier with a 
dominating personality that brooked 
no argument, to the army’s intellectual 
heart, the training and doctrine Com-
mand (tradoC). the other choice 
was lieutenant general don Holder, an 
intellectual soldier who would have been 
an ideal individual to hold that position, 
but reimer had been an aide to Creigh-
ton abrams and thus appointed his 
son to the critical tradoC position. 
there the younger abrams created an 
atmosphere of fear and distrust among 
his subordinates—hardly what the army 
needed when preparing to address the 
challenges of the twenty-first century.
In his epilogue, ricks provides some 
suggestions for fixing the army’s 
problems. Unfortunately, they have 
not been thought through and for the 
most part are not realistic or of much 
use in addressing systemic issues. at 
best they are pablum. after all, even 
if army leaders were interested in 
change (and many are), what could 
they possibly do? of what use are such 
statements as “In assessing the stra-
tegic situation today, Marshall might 
conclude that having adaptive, flexible 
military leaders who also are energetic, 
determined, cooperative, and trustwor-
thy is probably more important now 
than at any time since he was chief of 
staff ”? the devil is in the details, and 
ricks has provided no solution as to 
how the army might create general 
officers with those characteristics. 
as for giving generals second and third 
chances, that suggestion would lead to 
even greater mediocrity. It would be any-
thing other than the hard-charging and 
competent who would get the second 
chances. as this reviewer’s colleague and 
friend Colonel richard sinnreich has 
pointed out, “Could flag officer quality 
be improved by institutional changes? 
No doubt it could. but those changes 
would require more than just better 
PMe. they would require a willingness 
to identify, select, and groom potential 
senior leaders in ways to which ameri-
can society in general, and politicians in 
particular, have proved utterly hostile. 
Could we fire generals more readily? 
sure, but that’s a damn hard way to 
improve quality. Moreover, the Navy al-
ready is under growing fire for excessive 
command reliefs. the real challenge isn’t 
to fire more [generals], as ricks would 
have it, but rather promote fewer with 
much more discrimination. thorough 
examinations, 360-degree efficiency 
ratings, graded exercise performance—
there are a host of tools available to 
winnow future leaders. firing gener-
als is as much a confession of system 
failures as of individual failure, and even 
when necessary imposes huge costs.”
In fact, real change would require sys-
temic alteration in the army’s culture, 
which would then require breaking 
many rice bowls and discarding many 
pet rocks. It would aim at change over 
decades rather than over the short term. 
It would require massive changes in the 
educational approaches at fort leav-
enworth and Carlisle barracks. In this 
regard, the current army leadership is 
taking a step in the right direction by 
board-selecting officers to attend fort 
leavenworth. It would mean making 
intellectual performance at PMe institu-
tions play a major role in promotions 
and assignments. this means that those 
institutions would have to force their 
students to study the profession of arms 
and the crucial issues they will have to 
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deal with—war, strategy, and military 
operations. It would also make perfor-
mance at staff and war colleges play a 
major role in selection for command po-
sitions. above all, it would mean drastic 
changes in the army’s personnel system, 
and to the personnel systems of the oth-
er services as well. Had ricks been will-
ing to wrestle with these issues, he would 
have written a very different book. 
Perhaps the most depressing aspect of 
the landscape of the current american 
military has been the return to a moral 
calculus that is nothing short of a return 
to the sexual standards of the victorian 
age. over the past several months we 
have seen the president of the United 
states remove a highly respected retired 
general, to whom the country owes 
much for his having turned around the 
situation in Iraq, from the director-
ship of the CIa for having an affair. 
at the same time the generals who 
botched up the war in Iraq were, as 
ricks notes in a number of cases, not 
fired. Moreover, in one case, in a sad 
repetition of Westmoreland’s promo-
tion to become the army’s chief of staff 
after his disastrous tenure in vietnam, a 
general whose performance was hardly 
more impressive was removed from 
command in Iraq and promoted to the 
position of the army’s chief of staff. 
at present, it would seem that media 
and politicians would prefer standards 
for military leaders that emphasize 
“moral” behavior rather than compe-
tence in the profession—standards that 
few have followed. In a world where 
competence in any profession is an 
extraordinarily rare commodity, and 
especially competence in the military, 
this is indeed a dangerous precedent. 
the message emanating from Washing-
ton would appear to be that our leaders 
prefer military leaders who are simon-
pure (at least in their sexual mores) to 
competent generals and admirals. In 
the end, those at the sharp end will pay 
a terrible price for such imbecility. 
WIllIaMsoN MUrray
naval war college
gaddis, John lewis. george F. Kennan: an ameri-
can life. New york: Penguin, 2011. 784pp. $39.95 
Winner of the Pulitzer Prize for biog-
raphy in 2012, as well as a number of 
other awards, John lewis gaddis’s study 
of george f. Kennan (1904–2005) has 
already firmly established itself as the 
fundamental scholarly biography for the 
Cold War period in american history. 
gaddis began work on this biography in 
1981, not long after he had spent a two-
year period as visiting professor of strat-
egy and policy at the Naval War College. 
at Newport in those days, he was 
already admired for his first book, The 
United States and the origins of the cold 
war, 1941–1947 (Columbia Univ. Press, 
1972), and for the exemplary quality of 
his teaching, which won him a depart-
ment of the Navy Meritorious Civilian 
service award at the Naval War College. 
It was his first book and subsequent 
articles that brought gaddis to Kennan’s 
attention and led him to choose gaddis 
as his authorized biographer. In giving 
gaddis unrestricted access to what 
would eventually become 330 boxes of 
Kennan’s diaries and papers at Princeton 
University’s seeley g. Mudd Manuscript 
library, as well as giving him regular 
interviews, Kennan stipulated that 
the biography would not be published 
during his lifetime and so ensured that 
it would be a long-maturing project. 
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as the author relates in his foreword, 
Kennan was apologetic that he lived 
for another twenty-five years, thereby 
delaying gaddis’s work for as many 
years. While this did run the risk that 
the subject might outlive the author 
and all would have been in vain, the 
end result proves the merit of the plan. 
It is often said that the best biographies 
are those written by mature scholars 
who have developed not only a wider 
and deeper perspective on the contexts 
of their subjects’ lives, but also have 
their own life experiences to help them 
understand more sensitively those of 
others. so it is with John gaddis’s life of 
george Kennan. yet gaddis’s book was 
not a finished and preapproved manu-
script that merely waited the death of the 
subject to see the light of day. It would 
take gaddis six and a half years after 
Kennan’s death to complete the work. 
In doing so, gaddis leaned neither on 
Kennan’s own published memoirs nor 
on the fourteen earlier studies of Kennan 
by other scholars. Instead, he used his 
own deep knowledge of the man and 
the Cold War era and his broad under-
standing of grand strategy to provide 
a brilliant and independent scholarly 
assessment that is entirely gaddis’s own.
george Kennan is most widely remem-
bered for the article that appeared in 
Foreign affairs journal in July 1947 titled 
“the sources of soviet Conduct.” the 
pen name used for the article, “X,” only 
very briefly obscured his identity as its 
author. this article elaborated on Ken-
nan’s “long telegram” that he, as acting 
head of the U.s. diplomatic mission in 
Moscow, had written to the treasury 
department in february 1946. Kennan’s 
telegram responded to the treasury 
department’s bewilderment that the so-
viet Union had failed to join the World 
bank and the International Monetary 
fund after having participated actively 
in the bretton Woods conference that 
created them both. taken together, these 
two writings provided the intellectual 
foundation for the subsequent ameri-
can grand strategic response to the 
soviet challenge during the Cold War. 
With these two pieces of writing, 
Kennan’s analytical and writing skills 
reached their epitome of effectiveness 
and fame. behind them, as John gaddis 
reveals, Kennan was a strange and rather 
unpleasant man. to the reader, Kennan 
seems to have been some kind of misan-
thropic malcontent. a man of some con-
siderable intellectual capacity, he was a 
notably egocentric, broody, dissatisfied, 
gloomy, and dismal soul. gaddis shows 
that his misanthropic tendencies arose 
from a largely imagined unhappy child-
hood caused by his mother’s early death. 
born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, he was 
sent as a teenager to st. John’s Military 
academy, where the staff discouraged 
the loner from pursuing a further mili-
tary career. His intellectual capacity won 
him entrance at Princeton University, 
where he thought himself a Midwestern-
er out of place among the eastern elite. 
on graduating from Princeton in 1925, 
he decided to enter the foreign service, 
not knowing what else to do. as a junior 
foreign service officer, he found it inter-
esting to be abroad in foreign cultures, 
but the service, itself, dissatisfying. 
despite his attitudes toward the foreign 
service, he did show significant organi-
zational skill in nearly single-handedly 
setting up the american embassy in 
Moscow in 1934, in running the ger-
man embassy between 1939 and 1941, 
and in providing leadership among the 
americans that the Nazis had interned 
at bad Nauheim from december 1941 
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to May 1942. after the war, he was the 
key figure who established the state 
department’s Policy Planning staff, 
and ran it during its most effective and 
influential period. on his return to the 
United states from his periods abroad, 
he found himself out of sympathy and 
rather puzzled by american culture 
and politics. yet, unlike many who live 
abroad for long periods, he did not 
become fully comfortable in another cul-
ture, although obviously enthralled by 
Central and eastern europe, particularly 
the soviet Union and russian culture. 
With his extensive credentials for the 
job, President truman appointed him 
ambassador to the soviet Union in 1952, 
yet he was the least successful of all, 
staying but five months before stalin de-
clared him persona non grata, the only 
american ambassador in Moscow ever 
to achieve that distinction. at the end of 
his foreign service career, he went on to 
become a professor at the National War 
College, and, from time to time, lectured 
in Newport at the Naval War College. 
on leaving the foreign service, Ken-
nan went to the Institute for advanced 
research at Princeton University, where 
he continued his quixotic career, writing 
history, but not fully accepted by the 
historical profession, winning numer-
ous prizes for his writings, but still 
wondering why his thoughts were not 
acted on instantly by policy makers. 
Kennan was twice invited as a visit-
ing professor at oxford, but typically 
found the experience trivial, choosing 
to isolate himself as much as he could. 
the extensive contradictions in Kennan’s 
character make for a remarkable study of 
an individual, but they explain, too, why 
Kennan never became an effective senior 
leader in government, although remain-
ing influential as a public intellectual. 
John gaddis’s fine book can be read 
on several levels for several purposes. 
readers of this journal may find it a 
fascinating case study of the successes 
and frustrations of an intellectual who 
is trying to educate serving officials as 
they put a grand strategy in place. at 
the same time, it is a case study that 
illustrates the problems and frustrations 
for a government in trying to employ 
such talented and sensitive individuals.
JoHN b. HatteNdorf
naval war college
Harrold, J. e., ed. Turning the Tide: The Battles of 
coral Sea and Midway. Plymouth, devon, U.K.: 
Univ. of Plymouth Press, 2013. 232pp. £35 
the latest volume of the britannia 
Naval Histories of World War II revisits 
the royal Navy’s official histories of 
two pivotal naval battles. taken from 
the previously classified battle sum-
maries, numbers 45 and 46, this 
newly printed edition is a valuable 
aid to the study of two groundbreak-
ing carrier battles in the Pacific War. 
originally drafted and written between 
1946 and 1951, these insightful sum-
maries were meant to provide lessons 
learned for the royal Navy officer corps 
studying maritime warfare in the first 
decade of the postwar era. as noted in 
Philip grove’s introduction, these of-
ficial histories “cross-refer and blend the 
official publications more than pub-
lished works of the same era.” Turning 
the Tide enables twenty-first-century 
readers to revisit the myths of the battles 
and reconsider the decisions that the 
leaders of the U.s. Navy and the Impe-
rial Japanese Navy faced during those 
months of uncertainty in 1942. While we 
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may not necessarily find new informa-
tion in these portrayals of the battles, 
we will find much to ponder in how the 
postwar generation studied these two 
pivotal fights in the Pacific theater from 
these richly constructed summaries.
as befits a british publication, the front-
matter data, the allied orders of battle 
(the battle summaries specifically), 
include United Kingdom contribu-
tions to the allies’ efforts in the Pacific 
War. In his foreword, John rodgaard 
punctuates the special anglo-american 
relationship, writing that these histo-
ries are “a testament to the high degree 
of cooperation and interaction that 
existed between the royal and United 
states Navies” and that “continues to the 
present.” by combining the two sum-
maries, the publishers logically follow 
the sequence of events that occurred in 
May and June 1942, as well as highlight 
the importance of securing the allied 
sea lines of communication between 
the United states and australia prior to 
decisive engagement with the Japanese 
navy. the spirit of anglo-american 
relations permeates this british ver-
sion of american naval history. 
each of the summaries is organized 
chronologically by major surface move-
ments, Japanese air engagements, and 
air battles, followed by lessons learned. 
Included are tables that list Japanese and 
allied platforms, operational maps, and 
hand-drawn diagrams depicting force 
dispositions. although the summaries 
do not contain battle photographs, 
they do provide diagrams of tacti-
cal formations and cloud coverage to 
assist readers in understanding how 
weather affected visibility and detec-
tion. another interesting feature is the 
inclusion of Japanese sources. discern-
ing readers will find the footnotes 
fascinating waypoints as to how the 
postwar historians generated the official 
account of these battles. for example, 
the summaries omit any specific men-
tion of Joe rochefort’s decryption of 
Japanese messages prior to Midway but 
comment that “the americans correctly 
appreciated that Midway Island and 
the aleutians would be the threatened 
areas.” this book is as much a descrip-
tion of history as it is a historical docu-
ment, and it should be valued as such.
the battles of the Coral sea and Midway 
were contests that brought many firsts 
in naval history. as rodgaard observes, 
the Coral sea was the first naval battle 
in which belligerent surface forces never 
saw the other side. at the Coral sea at-
tacks were exclusively conducted from 
the air, confirming “the primacy of the 
aircraft carrier as an offensive weapon” 
in the maritime domain. this book 
recognizes Midway as the beginning of 
the end for imperial Japan and provides 
detailed listings of Japanese losses. to be 
sure, Jon Parshall and anthony tully’s 
Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of 
the Battle of Midway (2007) remains the 
definitive account of Midway; however, 
Turning the Tide is a more succinct and, 
at times, accessible account of the battle. 
In publishing these summaries in a 
single volume, the britannia royal 
Naval College has provided an excel-
lent overview, one that can be use-
ful for novice and seasoned naval 
historians in understanding two key 
Pacific battles. furthermore, this book 
illuminates the rise of carrier aviation 
during the second World War and, 
perhaps, the perpetuation of car-
rier aviation by navies thereafter.
JoN sCott logel
naval war college 
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Werneth, ron. Beyond Pearl Harbor: The Un-
told Stories of Japan’s naval airmen. atglen, Pa.: 
schiffer books, 2008. 256pp. $59.95
ron Werneth has gone above and 
beyond the call of duty to produce a de-
tailed perspective of the Japanese airmen 
of World War II. Werneth spent nearly 
a decade living in Japan and immers-
ing himself in its culture. He traveled 
extensively to obtain firsthand accounts 
of seventeen Japanese naval veterans. 
the book is divided into three sections, 
providing discussions of veterans of 
Japanese carrier bombers (kanbaku), 
Japanese carrier attack planes (kanko), 
and Japanese fighter aircraft (kansen). 
However, not all accounts are from 
aviators; some are from maintenance 
personnel and navigators. the veterans’ 
accounts provide details of these men’s 
lives, an approach that humanizes them, 
especially for americans who may 
still bear ill will toward the Japanese. 
one Japanese veteran, ensign takeshi 
Maeda, was instrumental in attacking 
and sinking Uss west virginia. takeshi 
Maeda tells the remarkable story of how 
in 1991 he was invited to the fiftieth an-
niversary of Pearl Harbor. at the event, 
which his family had not wanted him to 
attend, he met a west virginia survivor, 
Mr. richard fiske. Maeda told fiske that 
he was sorry for attacking Pearl Har-
bor, and fiske responded by graciously 
telling Maeda that he had just been 
following orders and it was not his fault. 
Not only did this help Maeda personally, 
but it also provides us a larger perspec-
tive of the war, especially Pearl Harbor.
It is fascinating to learn that a number of 
its participants had been totally unaware 
of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor 
until the days immediately preced-
ing 7 december. one veteran, ensign 
yuji akamatsu, states that he never 
doubted that attacking Pearl Harbor 
was the right thing to do, in view of the 
economic hardships Japan was facing. 
However, many other veterans’ accounts 
explain how the attack was either a 
bad idea or how they were just doing 
their jobs for their nation, and offer-
ing their own patriotic perspectives.
Werneth has a fascinating writing style 
and makes the stories come alive with 
his carefully chosen words, explana-
tions of details and Japanese terms, 
and use of illustrations. He did an 
outstanding job acquiring photo-
graphs of the Japanese naval airmen, 
both old and new, including photos 
of ships, planes, and actual attacks. 
this book is an absolute must-read 
for any naval aviator or student of 
the World War II Pacific theater. 
MaJ. JasoN ravNsborg, U.s. arMy reserve
Coll, steve. Private empire: exxonMobil and amer- 
ican Power. New york: Penguin, 2012. 685pp. $36
What is it like to lead and work for 
america’s largest privately owned 
company, one that finds, transports, 
processes, and ultimately delivers a 
product essential to the operation of 
almost everything in the developed 
world? this product is found hundreds 
to thousands of feet below the surface of 
the earth, from the deserts of the Middle 
east to the arctic, as well as many miles 
beneath the ocean. It is located in areas 
of the world that are isolated, disease 
ridden, politically unstable, and often 
right in the middle of armed conflicts. 
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When this company gets the product to 
where it is needed, when it is needed, 
and at the expected price, it is highly 
regarded. However, when it does not 
meet required standards or generates 
profits perceived to be higher than 
“reasonable,” it is the object of scorn.
the company is exxonMobil, and the 
product is petroleum, primarily oil, and 
natural gas. steve Coll, twice winner of 
the Pulitzer Prize, does a great job of 
taking readers behind the scenes, from 
the exxon valdez disaster in 1989 to the 
bP Deepwater Horizon disaster in 2011. 
In this extremely well-researched book, 
Coll uses his considerable interviewing 
skills and his well-developed network 
of sources to illuminate the interests 
and perspectives of key members of 
the company itself and officials from 
the administrations of george H. W. 
bush, bill Clinton, george W. bush, and 
barack obama, as well as those of other 
nations and other energy companies.
He begins with the exxon valdez acci-
dent and details the effect it had on risk 
assessment and safety-control measures 
taken by the company worldwide, and 
on efforts to perfect media and public-
relations capabilities. lee raymond, 
then president of the company, admits 
that the accident suggested the need for 
“perhaps a rebalancing of risk-reward 
in many of our operations,” which 
he takes to heart as he drives home 
many changes in the risk-assessment 
calculus that the company uses. 
Coll describes all the places exxonMobil 
must go to secure oil: aceh, Indonesia; 
Chad; equatorial guinea; Iraq after 
the 2003 american invasion; russia; 
Canada; and Nigeria. all these locations 
bring different types and combinations 
of risk, from security to political, cor-
ruption, environmental, and economic. 
this is a fascinating story of overlap-
ping and conflicting interests, with the 
U.s. department of state, and even 
members of the administration, in the 
background, waiting to help if needed. 
one of the most interesting parts of this 
book deals with exxonMobil’s organi-
zational culture, influenced directly by 
the values of Ceo lee raymond and 
his successor, rex tillerson, a cul-
ture that goes back to the company’s 
founder, John d. rockefeller, who 
established it, as standard oil, in 1870. 
this company culture is inculcated 
within the organization and com-
municated outside the firm through 
lobbying and deliberate efforts to 
communicate perspectives to policy 
makers and thought leaders, not only 
in the United states, but worldwide. 
all consumers of petroleum products 
should read this book, to improve 
their understanding of the complexi-
ties and dilemmas presented by the 
search for and transportation, process-
ing, and final delivery of oil and gas. 
roger dUCey
naval war college
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OF SPECIaL INTEREST
recenT BooKS
a selection of books of interest recently received at our editorial office, as de-
scribed by their publishers:
Wray, robert o., Jr. Saltwater leadership: a Primer on leadership for the Junior 
Sea-Service officer. annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2013. 204pp. $22.95
designed for busy junior officers in the U.s. Navy, Coast guard, and merchant 
marine, this primer teaches the basics of leadership in five focused, sequential 
steps, beginning with an overview of major leadership studies, followed by an 
informative summary of the wisdom of 380 senior seagoing officers. along with 
this sage advice, the final chapter helps readers build personalized plans to im-
prove their own leadership skills. 
Winslow, richard e., III. “a race of Shipbuilders”: The Hanscoms of eliot, Maine. 
Portsmouth, N.H.: Portsmouth Marine society, 2013. 305pp. $35
In the 1600s, members of the Hanscom family settled in the Kittery/eliot area of 
Maine as british colonial subjects in the New World. over a period of three hun-
dred years, a number of their descendants became nationally known shipbuilders 
and naval constructors. this book describes their successes, accomplishments, 
trials, and tribulations in forging their imprint on the maritime, marine, and 
naval worlds.
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REFLECTIONS ON REaDING
Professor John e. Jackson is the naval war college’s program manager 
for the chief of naval operations Professional reading Program. 
 the motto of the Chief of Naval operations Professional reading Program (CNo-PrP) is “read to be ready.” to encourage sailors at all levels to read 
books of consequence, lending libraries have been established on board every 
ship and squadron and on every major shore facility. the CNo-PrP is a pro-
fessional reading program, not a simple list of books intended to be read for 
relaxation and entertainment. accordingly, these books should be read with 
techniques different from those used by the casual reader. Mortimer adler and 
Charles van doren’s highly regarded How to read a Book: The classic guide to 
intelligent reading provides some suggestions on how readers can get the most 
out of their time (quotations from the touchstone books / simon & schuster 
edition of 1972): 
television, radio, and all the sources of amusement and information that surround 
us in our daily lives are also artificial props. they can give us the impression that our 
minds are active, because we are required to react to stimuli from outside. but the 
power of those external stimuli to keep us going is limited. they are like drugs. We 
grow used to them, and we continuously need more and more of them. eventually, 
they have little or no effect. then, if we lack resources within ourselves, we cease to 
grow intellectually, morally, and spiritually. and when we cease to grow, we begin to 
die. reading well, which means reading actively, is thus not only a good in itself, nor 
is it merely a means to advancement in our work or career. It also serves to keep our 
minds alive and growing. (Page 346)
they go on to say: 
a good book does reward you for trying to read it. the best books reward you most 
of all. the reward, of course, is of two kinds. first, there is the improvement in your 
reading skill that occurs when you successfully tackle a good, difficult work. second 
—and this in the long run is much more important—a good book can teach you 
about the world and about yourself. you learn more than how to read better; you also 
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learn more about life. you become wiser. Not just more knowledgeable—books that 
provide nothing but information can produce that result. but wiser, in the sense that 
you are more deeply aware of the great and enduring truths of human life. (Page 340) 
the authors advocate what they call “analytical reading”: 
the analytical reader must ask many, and organized, questions of what he is reading. 
We do want to emphasize here that analytical reading is always intensely active.  
on this level of reading, the reader grasps a book—the metaphor is apt—and works 
at it until the book becomes his own. francis bacon once remarked that “some books 
are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested.” 
reading a book analytically is chewing and digesting it. (Page 19) 
adler and van doren recommend that readers ask themselves four primary 
questions as they read: 
 1. What is the book about as a whole? you must try to discover the leading theme of 
the book, and how the author develops this theme in an orderly way by subdivid-
ing it into its essential subordinate themes or topics.
 2. What is being said in detail, and how? you must try to discover the main ideas, 
assertions, and arguments that constitute the author’s particular message.
 3. Is the book true, in whole or part? When you understand a book, however, you are 
obligated, if you are reading seriously, to make up your own mind. Knowing the 
author’s mind is not enough.
 4. What of it? If the book has given you information, you must ask about its sig-
nificance. Why does the author think it is important to know these things? Is it 
important to you to know them? and if the book has not only informed you, but 
also enlightened you, it is necessary to seek further enlightenment by asking what 
else follows, what is further implied or suggested. (Pages 46–47)
the authors go to the heart of what I believe it means to “read to be ready” 
when they argue, “We must be more than a nation of functional literates. We 
must become a nation of truly competent readers, recognizing all that the word 
competent implies. Nothing less will satisfy the needs of the world that is com-
ing” (page 31).
JoHN e. JaCKsoN
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